The Good News about The Bad News Gospel. The BAD News Gospel: Humans are “fallen”, “depraved” and incapable of doing the right thing “Human Nature” is.

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Presentation transcript:

The Good News about The Bad News Gospel

The BAD News Gospel: Humans are “fallen”, “depraved” and incapable of doing the right thing “Human Nature” is intrinsically evil. I am not responsible God is to blame, not I

The Good News: It’s more complicated than that: You are responsible—which means you can change things. The good news is that – despite short- term incentives to cheat – it is our human nature that allows us to reason and to make better choices for the long-term.

If all you are getting is the Bad News: think about what “human nature” really is. “Live with the grain” and act in accordance with the design.

What is “Human Nature”? Humans have the ability to grasp—and act upon—abstract concepts. Humans have the ability to envision the future. Humans have the ability to understand that other humans are their equals. Humans have the ability to build a world that works better for all of us.

All People are Created Equal If you have the right to do something to somebody else, They have the same right to do the same thing to you. Any “rights” that can’t be universalized are not “rights” Your “rights” to swing your arm end at the other person’s nose.

Partnership:

What is “winning?”

The Pragmatic Partnership Ethic: Whether or not you think of this as an “ethical issue” The fundamental question is: Is this a one-time opportunity to grab and run—Or is this a long-term relationship? Future benefits outweigh short term gains from cheating. Examples of the cooperative stance in games : –The quality premium in marketing –“TQM” –“Supply Chain Management” There is never a “last round” Even if this is your last contact with this partner, Your approach will earn you a long-term reputation that will carry over to business with others. The “Radar O’Reilly” Phenomenon. Your spouse and your children

None of this is new This Pragmatic Partnership Ethic can be described as enlightened self-interest. Rational Selfishness is a virtue The Pragmatic Partnership Ethic has a common name.

But… Does that mean you should always “turn the other cheek” and let unscrupulous people run over you?

There is a problem with this… 1.There are jerks everywhere (about 5%). 2.Jerks change the game from win-win to lose-lose. 3. If you don’t protect yourself, you will get hurt and jerks will be empowered to hurt others. 4. But if you treat everyone as jerks, it will wreck the game and everyone will lose.

The Evolution of Cooperation (Robert Axelrod, 1985) Simulation tournament of strategies for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD). The simplest strategy, Tit-for-tat (TFT) was most consistently the winner. Tit-for-tat: start with cooperation, then echo the opponent’s move on the last round. Properties: –Nice, never the first to defect; –Provocable, immediately, on one defection; –Forgiving, can return to cooperation after defection. –Simple and Transparent, the opponent knows what will happen.

Tit-for-tat TFT wins but not by defeating opponents, but by doing better with other TFT players. By definition, TFT can, at best, have a tie score in a series with a single opponent. No opponent is ever “defeated.” But TFT accumulates higher total scores by finding and cooperating with cooperative players, while avoiding being taken advantage of by the defectors. TFT demands only equity, doing well by promoting mutual interest rather than exploiting weakness.

What is “winning?” Winning isn’t “beating your opponent.” Winning is achieved by helping your opponent to win too.

Evolutionary games and growth of a “just” civilization Successful strategies prosper and grow Less successful strategies diminish A consistent defection (“meanies”) culture can only be stable if “nice” players are isolated from each other. A “nice” culture is stable and can resist invasion by “meanies” only if the TFT rule is followed: “avoid exploitation: Be provocable by the first defection of the other player.” TFT also helps others by making it harder for exploitative strategies to survive. Axelrod’s Conclusion: “Reciprocity is a better foundation for morality than is unconditional cooperation.”

“If you do not visit bad neighborhoods, then bad neighborhoods will visit you.” Justice protects the weak and maintains civilization It is not moral to tolerate the bully.

The Tit-for-Tat Rule in Games (Simulation studies indicate Tit-for-tat strategy gives the best expected results when dealing with the 5% who are jerks) 1. Treat everyone as if they belong to the other 95% (suffer occasional vulnerability as a price for pursuing the best long-run average result). 2. If someone acts like a jerk, thump them. 3. If they continue to be jerks, thump them harder. Accept conversions, but, 4. Don't let a few jerks wreck the game for everyone else. 5. Arrange future endeavors to exclude jerks.