Important Piece of Research I Forgot to Cover Larry Sherman’s Domestic Violence Experiments  Random assignment of police response to D.V. Counsel Separate Arrest  Minneapolis results = very positive (arrest decreases crime) Leads to “Mandatory Arrest” BUT….

D.V. Experiments II Replication in Milwaukee  Arrest increases future D.V.  Re-analysis of data—different effects depending upon whether individuals were employed  Similar results from other D.V. experiments WHY? Formal Sanctions may “Activate” Informal Sanctions (fear of job loss, fear of disapproval)

Deterrence Theory POLICY IMPLICATIONS General Deterrence: certain, swift, and severe punishment reduces crime rates, or the probability that an individual will offend Specific Deterrence: CS&S punishment reduces recidivism Can’t/Won’t make sentences swift, certain, and severe enough?  Incapacitate

“Rational Choice Theory” Economics (language, theory)  “Expected Utility” = calculation of all risks and rewards Same assumptions as deterrence theory  This is because “economic theory” (supply/demand, rational consumers) has same roots Not Confined to “formal” punishment—much more broad than deterrence

Rationality Assumption How “RATIONAL” is the offender?  PURE = only expected utility matters BECKER closest example  LIMITED = then, what else matters? CORNISH AND CLARKE good example

Gary Becker: Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach (1968) “Classic” article that signaled the rebirth of classical school ideas  Recast deterrence in “economic language” Major Assumption  “A person commits an offense if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and other resources at other activities”

Becker cont. What affects “expected utility?” 1. Probability of arrest/conviction a. analogous to the probability of having to “pay” 2. Severity of punishment b. analogous to “price” 3. “Other variables” a. Income available in legal or illegal activities b. Willingness to commit an illegal act c. Intelligence, age, education, family upbringing….

Cornish and Clarke (1986) Crime as a Rational Choice  Criminal Involvement: the decision to engage in crime (versus other activity)  Criminal Event: factors that influence the decision to commit a specific crime

Criminal Involvement Choices to become involved in crime, to continue in crime, and to desist from crime  Each (involvement, continuance, desistence) need separate explanation  Involvement decisions are multistage and multi- factor, extending over long time periods

Example of factors that explain initial involvement: Background Factors  temperament, intelligence, cognitive style, sex, class, education, neighborhood, broken home… Previous experience  Direct and vicarious learning, moral attitudes, self- perception, foresight and planning Solutions evaluated  Degree of effort, amount/immediacy of reward, likelihood and severity of punishment, moral costs

Criticisms What happened to our “rational” offender guided by “free will?”  In their models, rational thinking and free will are very constrained/limited  Not much different from other theories of crime Borrow liberally from learning theory, psychology, social control theory…  At what point does their theory cease to be a “rational choice” model?

Example of Continuance in Burglary Increased Professionalism  pride in skills, reduce risk (better planning), acquire fencing contacts, skill in dealing with criminal justice system Changes in Lifestyle and Values  choose work to facilitate burglaries, enjoy “life in fast lane,” devalue legitimate work Changes in Peer group  lose contact with prosocial friends, labeled as criminal, quarrels with family...

The Criminal Event Focus on predictors of specific crimes, look at immediate (situational) factors  e.g., what might lead a person to commit a burglaries in middle class neighborhood? Area  Easily accessible, few police patrols, low security Home  anyone home?, especially wealthy, detached, bushes/other cover, dog, security system...

Evaluating Rational Choice Empirical Support?  Criminal Involvement Ethnographic research suggests limited (if any) rational reasoning or weighing of costs/benefits Things that constrain rational thought more important  Criminal Event Ethnographic research somewhat supportive, but many crimes suggest limited appraisals. Parsimony and Scope? Policy Implication?

Routine Activities Theory Cohen and Felson (1979): “Crime and Everyday Life” Crime as the Convergence in Time and Space of Three Factors 1. Motivated Offenders (typically ignored) 2. Suitable Targets 3. Lack of Capable Guardianship Scope: “Direct-Contact Predatory Crimes”  Felson now: all sorts of crime (drug use, etc)

Motivated offenders taken for granted Assumption is that they are always present Criticized for this (really a theory of crime?) Really explains “victimization” or the “criminal event”  Similar to Cornish and Clarke in that respect

Suitable Targets Value ($, ability to fence) Visibility (sights and sounds) Accessibility (why autos are victimized) Weight and Mobility (high tech movement)

Lack of Capable Guardianship Strength in numbers Protection from police  Less emphasis in this over time Informal social control Time spent at home

Evaluating Routine Activities Theory Empirical Support  Household activity ratio related to crime  Criminal “Hotspots” within high crime areas  Prison Studies (% time outside of cell)  Victimization Studies Criticism? Confirming common sense.

Policy Implication: “Situational Crime Prevention.” Increased the Percieved Effort of Crime  Target hardening, Control Access to Targets Increase Perceived Risk of Crime  Formal surveillance  Natural surveillance Reduce Anticipated Rewards of Crime  Remove targets, reduce temptation, deny benefits