Evolving Specialisation, Altruism & Group-Level Optimisation Using Tags David Hales Centre for Policy Modelling, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK.

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Evolving Specialisation, Altruism & Group-Level Optimisation Using Tags David Hales Centre for Policy Modelling, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK.

What are “tags” Holland (1992) discussed tags as powerful “symmetry breaking” mechanism which could be useful for understanding complex “social- like” processes Tags are observable labels or social cues Agents can observe the tags of others Tags evolve in the same way that behavioral traits evolve Agents may evolve behavioral traits that discriminate based on tags

Recent tag models Tags may be bit strings signifying some observable cultural cue (Sugarscape model, Hales Mabs2000) Tags may be a single real number (Riolo, Cohen, Axelrod Nature2001) Earlier work by Riolo showed how tags could improve cooperation between agents playing the IPD. More recent work is focusing on how, even without memory of past interactions, tags can cause seemingly altruistic behavior between strangers

Recent tag models In Hales (Mabs2000) high levels of cooperation evolved using tag game biasing in the single round PD. In Riolo et al (Nature2001) high levels of altruistic donation evolved using a tag toleration mechanism. However, in both these models the agents effectively either “cooperate” or “defect”. In both, groups of agents sharing the same tag form cooperative groups. There is a dynamic formation and dissolution of such groups – groups break down when agents invade them that do not cooperate and exploit them

Visualising the process (mabs2000)

What else can tags do? These previous models show that cooperation can evolve in groups with tags – overcoming commons dilemmas But, can tags support the formation of groups in which agents perform specialised functions – supporting each other to exploit the environment as a “team” or “productive unit” We extended the Riolo et al model to test this

The model Agents consist of a tag (real number), a tolerance (real number) and a skill (integer) Each agent is awarded some of resources in each cycle. Resources associated with randomly selected skill An agent can only “harvest” a resource matching it’s own skill If it can not harvest the resource, it may donate the resource to another agent (if it can find one) that matches its tag

The model An agent is considered to “match” the tags of another if the difference between the tag values is no more than the tolerance value So a high tolerance means “donate to any agent” and a low tolerance means “only donate to those with similar tag value” When an agent attempts to make a donation it selects another agent from the population compares tags for a match and then passes the resource if the receiving agents has the required skill value

The model In the initial model, there are 2-skills, 100 agents, partner selection involves a single random selection from the population When agents make a successful donation they incur an energy cost (0.1) When an agent successfully harvests a resource it gets a unit of energy (1) After each cycle a tournament selection process based on energy, increases the number of successful agents (high energy) over those with low energy When successful agents are copied, mutation is applied to both tag, tolerance and skill

What will the results tell us? If the donation rate (over time) is non-zero, then we can conclude that: Agents are forming tag groups with a diversity of skills Agents are behaving altruistically, since donation produces immediate costs but does to produce immediate returns Therefore agents (from a myopic individual bounded rationality) form internally specialised altruistic teams

2-skills, averages of 30 runs to 30,000 generations

Results – what does it mean? A significant level of donation – confirming specialisation and altruism (of a sort!) But not so high, if we instead of selecting potential donation partners at random we use a “smart” matching method then significant increases in the donation rate are seen (previous slide) This smart matching can even support higher donor costs

5-skills, averages of 30 runs to 30,000 generations

Results – what does it mean? The random (or dumb) matching goes lower The smart matching goes lower too but still stays high and recovers quickly as the number of resource awards increases Hence, it would seem that to support a higher degree of specialisation (more skills) smart matching is required

Conclusions Agents form groups based on tag similarity, containing diverse skills, donating resources to between each other, to efficiently exploit the environment – for the good of the group This happens even though individuals are selected on the basis of their individual utility We question intuitions which claim that evolution produces “selfish replicators” Can such models help us to understand how early social groups formed with specialised roles? Group distinguishing abilities (smart searching) would appear to be important Future work: does smart searching evolve (see RASTA)? What about putting agents in social networks = smart is cheap? The Tag Clone issue! What are we really seeing here?