Federated Security Services Ken Klingenstein Day Job: Middleware Night Job: Network Security.

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Presentation transcript:

Federated Security Services Ken Klingenstein Day Job: Middleware Night Job: Network Security

CHANGE DATE 2 Federated Security Services  Federated networks Share a common network substrate Share a common trust fabric Together they could permit…  Collaborative incident analysis and response Network-wide views Leveraged diagnostic help Ability for automated tools to use distributed monitors Protect privacy at several layers  Security-aware capabilities Trust-moderated transparency Integrated security/performance diagnostics  Moving it into the broader Internet

CHANGE DATE 3 Collaborative Incident Analysis  Moving beyond the “border” to see network-wide views I’m seeing activity X? Are others seeing it? What variants are they seeing? Real-time attack recognition From the central observatory, let me see the full address of the attacking node at site Y in the federation I’m seeing an attack ostensibly from source address z at enterprise Y. Let me look at logging within site Y to verify Correlate signatures and traffic among sites A-Z to provide an early warning system of DDOS Let external experts from site Z examine our forensic information to assist our diagnostics  Requires federated backbone (meters, log files, etc) and federated trust fabric (for scaling, role-based access control, contact info, etc.)

CHANGE DATE 4 Collaborative incident analysis  Scaling requires managing large data sets Centralized – the Abilene Observatory, perhaps others Distributed – on a per enterprise level  Which in turn requires a clear data model Common event records, likely distilled and reformatted from native logs Is enterprise-level security sufficient  And also pluggable modules for harvesting records by tools  Tools  And also a trust fabric that permits multiple levels of authentication and fine-grain authorization

CHANGE DATE 5 Federated Security-aware Capabilities  Federated user network authentication for on-the-road science  Control spam through federated verification of sending enterprises  Tell me which firewall is dropping which service request  Permit end-end videoconferencing through firewalls and NATs  Allow enterprise-specific patching paradigms to coexist  Create end-end transparency for use of Grids  Personal firewall configuration based on authorization

CHANGE DATE 6 Moving it into the broader Internet  Picking approaches that are deployable and build on embedded bases  Federated substrata among those on common backbones  Interfederation issues – how hard will they be  International discrepancies in privacy  International IdSP’s - legalisms