Beam Interlock System Technology Evaluation and Design MACS Week 1, 2011 Hannes Pavetits 1 R. Gutleber PR-110328-a-HPA, March 28 th, 2011 H. Pavetits.

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Presentation transcript:

Beam Interlock System Technology Evaluation and Design MACS Week 1, 2011 Hannes Pavetits 1 R. Gutleber PR a-HPA, March 28 th, 2011 H. Pavetits

Overview Concepts Risk Management From FMEA to interlockchains Design Purpose of the BIS Scope of the BIS Hardware / Software Safety-Matrix tool Defined Safety-Matrices Status PR a-HPA, March 28 th, 2011 H. Pavetits 2

3 CONCEPTS PR a-HPA, March 28 th, 2011 H. Pavetits

Identify, characterize, and assess threats Assess the vulnerability to the specific threats and determine the risk Identify ways to reduce those risks Prioritize and apply risk reduction measures based on a strategy Risk Management ! The BIS is the LAST resort ! H. Pavetits PR a-HPA, March 28 th,

5 From FMEA to Interlockchains PR a-HPA, March 28 th, 2011 H. Pavetits

6 Beam Interlock System Design PR a-HPA, March 28 th, 2011 H. Pavetits

Goals of the BIS Protect machine components from damage Due to conflicting commands Reduce risk for persons to be harmed Due to conflicting commands intended for beam generation 7 The scope of the BIS is to act as a functional safety mechanism for the particle accelerator PR a-HPA, March 28 th, 2011 H. Pavetits

What it is not Protect patients from beams that deviate from expected characteristics Protect people from hazards that do not originate from the particle accelerator 8 PR a-HPA, March 28 th, 2011 H. Pavetits

Sensors and Actuators PR a-HPA, March 28 th, 2011 H. Pavetits 9

Characteristics Reaction time Order of “cycle” times Faster than human Slower than dedicated safety systems Orthogonal to the other systems Interconnects subsystems to achieve safety behaviour Prevention of the next beam cycle PR a-HPA, March 28 th, 2011 H. Pavetits 10

Siemens Simatic Safety Matrix Table based interface Cause & effect method Siemens PLCs And Safety I/O Modules Reliable, flexible and scalable Profibus I/O network Distributed I/O Modules to interconnect racks Hardware / Software PR a-HPA, March 28 th, 2011 H. Pavetits 11

Safety-Matrix Tool Multiple matrices possible At most 128 causes and 128 effects per Matrix Outputs cannot be shared by matrices 12 PR a-HPA, March 28 th, 2011 H. Pavetits

13 Defined Matrices PCO / Magnets Srcs + LEBT PCO / Magnets LINAC + MEBT PCO / Magnets MR + EX PCO / Magnets EX PCO / Magnets + MTE IR1 + IR2 PCO / Magnets + MTE IR3 + IR4 Shared Outputs Emergency devices Shared Outputs Beam stoppers Srcs RF... Emergency Inputs Emergency buttons SMS PCS RP... Emergency Outputs “Hard interlock” PCO’s Other matrices Shared Inputs Other matrices RF Vacuum Beam stoppers PR a-HPA, March 28 th, 2011 H. Pavetits

14 Status PR a-HPA, March 28 th, 2011 H. Pavetits

BIS Workshop BD Snipped from FMECA BD risk sheet 55 hazards found in total PR a-HPA, March 28 th, 2011 H. Pavetits 15

16 BD Interlock Chains Other hazards defined No risk reduction measure because of risk level 3 Hardware safety system of BD Redundant measurements Example of interlock chain QPMBeam blocker LINAC bunker CTS Beam blocker LINAC bunker PR a-HPA, March 28 th, 2011 H. Pavetits

17 BD Open Questions Devices which need to be in and out of the beam due to the different modes of the accelerator BIS has no modes! On-Delay in the Safety-Matrix Devices up to one day in the beam Time period is too long No interlock chains for that devices Other safety measures have to be taken BIS does not know the position of the devices Resulting interlock of another device (e.g. BDS) because of wrong or no beam PR a-HPA, March 28 th, 2011 H. Pavetits

Achievements since last MACS week Evaluation of the Siemens hardware and software performed Concept of the program structure in the Safety-Matrix tool with the I/O’s Draft of the BIS Architecture document Version 0.2 Definition of the racks and cabling for the BIS in the MedAustron building first version delivered to Architect Engineer for tendering Draft of the BIS Deployment Scenario Version Till next MACS week Release of the BIS Architecture & Design document Implementation of initial set of interlock chains Definition of the missing interlock chains GUI for BIS and magnets in WinCC OA Summary PR a-HPA, March 28 th, 2011 H. Pavetits