The use of land development concessions in the dutch urban regeneration Wim van der Post & Jeroen Traudes June 25, 2009

Contents Regeneration in the Netherlands: issues The iterated prisonners dilemma in the regeneration Land development concessions and comparison with other models Breaking the dilemma Conclusions and suggestions for further research

Regeneration in the Netherlands A complex game between government, housing corporations, private actors and other stakeholders Trust plays an important role All actors are dissatified with the process

The iterated prisonners dilemma Regeneration processes are long term processes The process is going around in circles The actors do not have full information The actors do not fully trust each other The actors want the other stakeholder to invest and take the risk, but they want to control the process

The iterated prisonners dilemma Results: Stagnation of the process An iterated prisonners dilemma Stakeholders that are unable to break this dilemma

The concession model The concession model is seen as a way to improve the process Concession is given to a private actor by the government Land is owned by the government Rules of the game are predefined by the government

The concession model The model leads to a risk reduction for the private actor The costs for the public actors are higher Similarities with the Valencian model, the TDR system and the land lease system can be identified

Breaking the dilemma Concession model can be an option It is not about the model, it is about trust, transparancy, risk and interest With the redistribution of risk and interest levels of trust can be increased It is not about the model it is about the implementation!

Conclusions Trust, rational behavior and opportunism are more important than the model The concession model can help The implementation of the model has still to be studied, a suggestion for further research!