EOA 218-9: OPERATION/CAMPAIGN XXX Assumptions:Technology Keys: Helicopter Borne Forces (Airmobile) operations allowed for units to move within the theater of operations rapidly. They provided both operational and tactical levels of maneuver. Example- 1 st CAV was moved rapidly from northern South Vietnam to south South Vietnam rapidly to conduct operations in Cambodia. Tactical Airlift reinforced this effort and during the operations in Cambodia provided critical linkages with an aerial LOC to reinforce a weak GLOC (due to terrain and available road networks). Airborne FACs enabled US/SV forces to much more readily access fire support via CAS. Coordination of Army RW Air Force FW and Army artillery support was more readily attained with the FACs and a “Super FAC” to control numerous FAC teams. Commo at the tactical level was severely limited by a reliance on line of sight comms and limited bandwidths available for large operations. Historical Context The TET offensive was repulsed (tactical US/SV victory). The cost of the victory was an increasing amount of domestic opposition to the war. US Forces were given the task to conduct “Vietnamization” of the war IOT withdraw US Forces. Domestic politics (Particularly Nixon's reelection campaign) played a pivotal role in shaping the US effort in Vietnam post TET offensive. SV forces in the early years of the war were primarily used for pacification while US forces were used to conduct search and destroy operations on the NVA. Strategic Context: Nixon Created a 5 Point Strategy- 1. Pacification of enemy forces in SV 2. Diplomatic Isolation of NV 3. Increased Peace Talks with NV 4. Gradual Withdraw of US forces 5. Vietnamization – Ultimately to achieve “Peace with Honor”. The political downfall of the Cambodian government and the NVAs operations in Cambodia gave Nixon a window of opportunity to move into Cambodia with US Forces. Cambodian territory was critical to the NVA in order for them to push supplies for its forces, forces that would ultimately need to mass and assault Saigon to achieve final victory. Appeasing the Cambodians. Campaign Context: Interdicting the Ho Chi Minh trail was seen as an opportunity by US forces to deal a blow to the NVA forces ability to mass conventional forces close to the Capitol of Saigon. SV/US forces were able to significantly weaken the NVA in Cambodia however the damage done to the NVA was not permanent. The NVA was weakened and the SV forces were thus given more time to strengthen their ability to fight a conventional Army Ultimately the SV forces were not able to hold against the NVA but the defeat was delayed allowing US forces to withdraw from Vietnam.

EOA 218-9: OPERATION/CAMPAIGN XXX Operational Approach (Broad Actions) As US forces pull out of Vietnam ARVN forces must be bolstered IOT transition to a more conventional fight against the NVA and assume what responsibilities the US Forces had. Commander’s Intent Set the conditions for ARVN forces to assume the bulk of the fighting against the NVA and Viet Cong. Accomplish this by dealing a decisive blow against the NVAs LOC in Cambodia. Deny the NVA a LOC with close access to supplying forces to the capitol region of Saigon. Basic Concept 1CAV moved from northern South Vietnam close to border IOT conduct Airmobile operations into Cambodia. 25ID moved from Saigon area (where it was conducting a pacification operation) with no backfill (risk assumed) due to limited availability of forces. Raid into Cambodia was limited to 60 days and to approximately KM advance because of political and weather (arrival of monsoons) constraints. Tenants of ULO Flexibility: Airmobile DIV capability to rapidly move within the theater to rapidly surge combat power Integration: ARVN forces conduct large scale conventional maneuver into Cambodia ICW US forces Lethality: USAF and South Vietnamese Air Force is employed via FACs and Super FACs to bolster the firepower of maneuvering elements as they advance into Cambodia Adaptability: Depth: US forces were limited Geographically and via limited time to conduct the operation. Synchronization: US participation on a raid into Cambodia was largely held secret until days prior to the operation and C2 was taxed severely during the initial phases of the operation as command elements pushed forward while simultaneously planning the raid. Elements of Operational Art/Design End state: NVA stockpiles vicinity Saigon along the Ho Chi Minh trail destroyed Conditions: Employ ARVN forces as a maneuver element along with 25ID, 11ACR, and 1CAV COG: NVA LOC OP Approach: See left of this slide Decisive Points: Basing: Seizure of terrain to accommodate FW resupply became necessary for 25ID and 1CAV. LOO: Build ARVN capability to fight NVA directly, Set conditions for US Forces withdraw OP Reach: Political limited Tempo: Simultaneity and Depth: Phasing/Transitions: Per Slide 3 Culmination: As US/SV forces defeated limited NVA forces in zone there were great difficulties encountered in destroying stockpiles of rice. Not easily burned and needed in other parts of the country transporting back to Vietnam became taxing on extended LOCs back to Vietnam. Additionally not all weapons stockpiles could be destroyed because they would be needed to equip the Cambodian resistance to the NVA. Risk (strategic, operational, tactical): Key Concepts of other Theorists MAO- NV was heavily influenced by the MAOist revolutionary model (1. political org 2. insurgency/terrorism 3. develop a conventional force 4. overthrow gov’t) McCuen- In an insurgency forces invited by the local gov’t should be used to fight other conventional forces while local gov’t forces should be used to directly influence the populace. Jomini- American Forces seek the decisive battle to defeat the NVA

EOA 218-9: OPERATION/CAMPAIGN XXX INSERT MAP/SKETCH HERE Phasing:Timeline: Phase I: Planning Effort, limited greatly by MACV commander insistence on secrecy IOT achieve surprise Phase II: Prep OBJ (Recon conducted, Toan Thang 41) Phase III: Defeat (Toan Thang 42 and 43) Phase IV: Reduce Caches Phase V: Withdraw SO1 (1 st CAV) T: Clear enemy forces in zone P: Destroy enemy LOC stockpiles SO2 (25 th ID) T: Clear enemy forces in zone P: Destroy enemy LOC stockpiles DO (ARVN) T: Clear enemy forces in zone P: To establish ARVN as a conventional force Geographic Keys: Destruction of NVA stockpiles along the Ho Chi Minh trail vicinity of Saigon denied the use of this area as a staging base for conventional NVA forces/rapid advance on Saigon.