Robust Random Number Generation for Peer-to-Peer Systems Baruch Awerbuch Johns Hopkins University Christian Scheideler Technical University of Munich.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Stefan Schmid & Christian Scheideler Dept. of Computer Science
Advertisements

Ion Stoica, Robert Morris, David Karger, M. Frans Kaashoek, Hari Balakrishnan MIT and Berkeley presented by Daniel Figueiredo Chord: A Scalable Peer-to-peer.
Evaluation of a Scalable P2P Lookup Protocol for Internet Applications
Constant Density Spanners for Wireless Ad hoc Networks Kishore Kothapalli (JHU) Melih Onus (ASU) Christian Scheideler (JHU) Andrea Richa (ASU) 1.
Kademlia: A Peer-to-peer Information System Based on the XOR Metric Petar Mayamounkov David Mazières A few slides are taken from the authors’ original.
CHORD – peer to peer lookup protocol Shankar Karthik Vaithianathan & Aravind Sivaraman University of Central Florida.
Chord: A Scalable Peer-to- Peer Lookup Service for Internet Applications Ion StoicaRobert Morris David Liben-NowellDavid R. Karger M. Frans KaashoekFrank.
CHORD: A Peer-to-Peer Lookup Service CHORD: A Peer-to-Peer Lookup Service Ion StoicaRobert Morris David R. Karger M. Frans Kaashoek Hari Balakrishnan Presented.
Chord: A scalable peer-to- peer lookup service for Internet applications Ion Stoica, Robert Morris, David Karger, M. Frans Kaashock, Hari Balakrishnan.
1 1 Chord: A scalable Peer-to-peer Lookup Service for Internet Applications Dariotaki Roula
Commensal Cuckoo: Secure Group Partitioning for Large-Scale Services Siddhartha Sen and Mike Freedman Princeton University.
1 David Liben-Nowell, Hari Balakrishnan, David Karger Analysis of the Evolution of Peer-to-Peer Systems Speaker: Jan Conrad.
Robert Morris, M. Frans Kaashoek, David Karger, Hari Balakrishnan, Ion Stoica, David Liben-Nowell, Frank Dabek Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer look-up.
Massively Distributed Database Systems Distributed Hash Spring 2014 Ki-Joune Li Pusan National University.
A Distributed and Oblivious Heap Christian Scheideler and Stefan Schmid Dept. of Computer Science University of Paderborn.
Secure Multicast Xun Kang. Content Why need secure Multicast? Secure Group Communications Using Key Graphs Batch Update of Key Trees Reliable Group Rekeying.
Peer to Peer File Sharing Huseyin Ozgur TAN. What is Peer-to-Peer?  Every node is designed to(but may not by user choice) provide some service that helps.
A DoS-Resilient Information System for Dynamic Data Management by Baumgart, M. and Scheideler, C. and Schmid, S. In SPAA 2009 Mahdi Asadpour
Topics in Reliable Distributed Systems Lecture 2, Fall Dr. Idit Keidar.
Robust Mixing for Structured Overlay Networks Christian Scheideler Institut für Informatik Technische Universität München.
Chord: A Scalable Peer-to-Peer Lookup Protocol for Internet Applications Stoica et al. Presented by Tam Chantem March 30, 2007.
Fault-tolerant Routing in Peer-to-Peer Systems James Aspnes Zoë Diamadi Gauri Shah Yale University PODC 2002.
Breaking the O(n 2 ) Bit Barrier: Scalable Byzantine Agreement with an Adaptive Adversary Valerie King Jared Saia Univ. of VictoriaUniv. of New Mexico.
Chord-over-Chord Overlay Sudhindra Rao Ph.D Qualifier Exam Department of ECECS.
Secure Overlay Services Adam Hathcock Information Assurance Lab Auburn University.
Topics in Reliable Distributed Systems Fall Dr. Idit Keidar.
Chord: A Scalable Peer-to-peer Lookup Protocol for Internet Applications 吳俊興 國立高雄大學 資訊工程學系 Spring 2006 EEF582 – Internet Applications and Services 網路應用與服務.
Wide-area cooperative storage with CFS
P2P Course, Structured systems 1 Introduction (26/10/05)
Peer-to-Peer Networks Slides largely adopted from Ion Stoica’s lecture at UCB.
UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ Resource Discovery Using NeuroSearch Presentation for the Agora Center InBCT-seminar Mikko Vapa, researcher InBCT 3.2.
Multicast Communication Multicast is the delivery of a message to a group of receivers simultaneously in a single transmission from the source – The source.
Computer Science CSC 774 Adv. Net. SecurityDr. Peng Ning1 CSC 774 Advanced Network Security Topic 4. Broadcast Authentication.
A DoS-Resilient Information System for Dynamic Data Management Stefan Schmid & Christian Scheideler Dept. of Computer Science University of Paderborn Matthias.
Towards Scalable and Robust Distributed Systems Christian Scheideler Institut für Informatik Technische Universität München.
COCONET: Co-Operative Cache driven Overlay NETwork for p2p VoD streaming Abhishek Bhattacharya, Zhenyu Yang & Deng Pan.
Towards a Widely Applicable SINR Model for Wireless Access Sharing Christian Scheideler University of Paderborn Joint work with Andrea Richa and Stefan.
GeoGrid: A scalable Location Service Network Authors: J.Zhang, G.Zhang, L.Liu Georgia Institute of Technology presented by Olga Weiss Com S 587x, Fall.
Towards Scalable and Robust Overlay Networks Christian Scheideler Institut für Informatik Technische Universität München Baruch Awerbuch Dept. of Computer.
Content Overlays (Nick Feamster). 2 Content Overlays Distributed content storage and retrieval Two primary approaches: –Structured overlay –Unstructured.
Peer to Peer Research survey TingYang Chang. Intro. Of P2P Computers of the system was known as peers which sharing data files with each other. Build.
Jamming-Resistant MAC Protocol1 A Jamming-Resistant MAC Protocol for Single-Hop Wireless Networks Baruch Awerbuch (JHU) Andrea W. Richa (ASU) Christian.
Using the Small-World Model to Improve Freenet Performance Hui Zhang Ashish Goel Ramesh Govindan USC.
Chord: A Scalable Peer-to-peer Lookup Protocol for Internet Applications Xiaozhou Li COS 461: Computer Networks (precept 04/06/12) Princeton University.
BitTorrent Nathan Marz Raylene Yung. BitTorrent BitTorrent consists of two protocols – Tracker HTTP protocol (THP) How an agent joins a swarm How an agent.
Security Michael Foukarakis – 13/12/2004 A Survey of Peer-to-Peer Security Issues Dan S. Wallach Rice University,
Network Computing Laboratory Scalable File Sharing System Using Distributed Hash Table Idea Proposal April 14, 2005 Presentation by Jaesun Han.
Presentation 1 By: Hitesh Chheda 2/2/2010. Ion Stoica, Robert Morris, David Karger, M. Frans Kaashoek, Hari Balakrishnan MIT Laboratory for Computer Science.
Byzantine fault-tolerance COMP 413 Fall Overview Models –Synchronous vs. asynchronous systems –Byzantine failure model Secure storage with self-certifying.
Chord: A Scalable Peer-to-peer Lookup Service for Internet Applications.
Dynamic Networks for Peer-to-Peer Systems Pierre Fraigniaud CNRS LRI, Univ. Paris Sud Joint work with Philippe Gauron.
The new protocol of freenet Taken from Ian Clarke and Oskar Sandberg (The Freenet Project)
1 Secure Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Frans Kaashoek, David Karger, Robert Morris, Ion Stoica, Hari Balakrishnan MIT Laboratory.
Chord Advanced issues. Analysis Theorem. Search takes O (log N) time (Note that in general, 2 m may be much larger than N) Proof. After log N forwarding.
Idit Keidar, Principles of Reliable Distributed Systems, Technion EE, Spring Principles of Reliable Distributed Systems Lecture 2: Distributed Hash.
Dynamic Networks for Peer-to-Peer Systems Pierre Fraigniaud CNRS Lab. de Recherche en Informatique (LRI) Univ. Paris-Sud, Orsay Joint work with Philippe.
BATON A Balanced Tree Structure for Peer-to-Peer Networks H. V. Jagadish, Beng Chin Ooi, Quang Hieu Vu.
A Denial-of-Service Resistant DHT Christian Scheideler Technische Universität München Joint work with Baruch Awerbuch, JHU.
Algorithms and Techniques in Structured Scalable Peer-to-Peer Networks
Towards a Scalable and Robust DHT Baruch Awerbuch Johns Hopkins University Christian Scheideler Technical University of Munich.
INTERNET TECHNOLOGIES Week 10 Peer to Peer Paradigm 1.
Peer-to-Peer Data Structures Christian Scheideler Dept. of Computer Science Johns Hopkins University.
IPTPS 2005 Mirek Korzeniowski: Page 1 International Graduate School of Dynamic Intelligent Systems HEINZ NIXDORF INSTITUT University of Paderborn Algorithms.
Chord: A Scalable Peer-to-Peer Lookup Service for Internet Applications * CS587x Lecture Department of Computer Science Iowa State University *I. Stoica,
Christian Scheideler Dept. of Computer Science
(slides by Nick Feamster)
DHT Routing Geometries and Chord
Chord Advanced issues.
Chord Advanced issues.
Chord Advanced issues.
Presentation transcript:

Robust Random Number Generation for Peer-to-Peer Systems Baruch Awerbuch Johns Hopkins University Christian Scheideler Technical University of Munich

2Robust Random Number Generation Holy Grail of Distributed Systems Scalability and Robustness Adversarial behavior increasingly pressing issue!

3Robust Random Number Generation Why is this difficult??? Scalability: minimize resources needed for operations Robustness: maximize resources needed for attack Scalable solutions seem to be easy to attack!

4Robust Random Number Generation Peer-to-Peer Systems Basic problem: maintain a scalable and robust overlay network among the peers Basic operations: Join(p): peer p joins the system Join(p): peer p joins the system Leave(p): peer p leaves the system Leave(p): peer p leaves the system Challenge: implement operations so that problem solved (with high probability)

5Robust Random Number Generation Basic approach Peers assigned to points in [0,1)-interval n honest peers,  n adv. peers,  <1 Adversarial peers join and leave in arbitrary adaptive manner

6Robust Random Number Generation Two Central Conditions Balancing condition: only O(log n) peers in intervals of size (c log n)/n Majority condition: adv. peers in minority in all intervals of size (c log n)/n Balancing condition: scalability Majority condition: robustness via majority decision

7Robust Random Number Generation How to satisfy conditions? Chord: uses cryptographic hash function to map peers to points in [0,1) randomly distributes honest peers does not randomly distribute adversarial peers

8Robust Random Number Generation How to satisfy conditions? CAN: map peers to random points in [0,1)

9Robust Random Number Generation How to satisfy conditions? Group spreading [AS04]: Map peers to random points in [0,1) Limit lifetime of points Too expensive!

10Robust Random Number Generation How to satisfy conditions? Rule that works: k-cuckoo rule [AS06] evict k/n-region n honest  n adversarial   < 1-1/k

11Robust Random Number Generation Are we done? How can we design a robust random number generator in a peer-to-peer environment? Possible solution [AS06]: use VSS Disadvantages: difficult to implement difficult to implement requires private channels requires private channels

12Robust Random Number Generation Central Question Is it possible to design an elementary robust random number generator that even works for public channels and a constant fraction of adversarial peers?

13Robust Random Number Generation Elementary RNG We have a dealer and m players. Simple protocol [AS04]: dealer players generate

14Robust Random Number Generation Elementary RNG We have a dealer and m players. Simple protocol [AS04]: dealer players commit x1x1 x5x5 x2x2 x3x3 x4x4 h(x 1 )

15Robust Random Number Generation Elementary RNG We have a dealer and m players. Simple protocol [AS04]: dealer players reveal(h(x 1 ),…,h(x 5 )) x1x1 x5x5 x2x2 x3x3 x4x4

16Robust Random Number Generation Elementary RNG We have a dealer and m players. Simple protocol [AS04]: dealer players reveal(x i ) x1x1 x5x5 x2x2 x3x3 x4x4

17Robust Random Number Generation Elementary RNG We have a dealer and m players. Simple protocol [AS04]: dealer players reveal(x 1,…,x 5 ) x1x1 x5x5 x2x2 x3x3 x4x4

18Robust Random Number Generation Elementary RNG We have a dealer and m players. Simple protocol [AS04]: dealer players x x x x x x = © i x i

19Robust Random Number Generation Elementary RNG Problems with the simple protocol: If a player is adversarial, it can let the protocol fail (though just in oblivious manner if channels are private). If the dealer is adversarial, it can adaptively let the protocol fail. Solution [AS04]: O(1/log n) fraction of adversarial nodes Quorums of  (log n) nodes Each peer has nodes in  (log n) quorums

20Robust Random Number Generation Better Elementary RNG Idea: create a batch of random numbers Batch protocol: dealer players generate batch

21Robust Random Number Generation Better Elementary RNG Idea: create a batch of random numbers Batch protocol: dealer players forward request P 2 = P-{p 2 }

22Robust Random Number Generation Better Elementary RNG Idea: create a batch of random numbers Batch protocol: dealer players Honest players: clocks have same speed, timely msg delivery

23Robust Random Number Generation Better Elementary RNG Idea: create a batch of random numbers Batch protocol: dealer players Players numbered from 1 to m

24Robust Random Number Generation Better Elementary RNG Idea: create a batch of random numbers Batch protocol: dealer players Round by round, random key is generated

25Robust Random Number Generation Better Elementary RNG Idea: create a batch of random numbers Batch protocol: dealer players Each round: execute elementary RNG with slight difference. h(x 1 )

26Robust Random Number Generation Better Elementary RNG Idea: create a batch of random numbers Batch protocol: dealer players Each round: execute elementary RNG with slight difference. x 2,…,x 5

27Robust Random Number Generation Better Elementary RNG Idea: create a batch of random numbers Batch protocol: dealer players Each round: execute elementary RNG with slight difference. x 1,…,x 5

28Robust Random Number Generation Better Elementary RNG Idea: create a batch of random numbers Batch protocol: dealer players Each round: execute elementary RNG with slight difference. x = © i x i

29Robust Random Number Generation Better Elementary RNG Idea: create a batch of random numbers Batch protocol: dealer players Round fails: send accusation for one player. accuse p i P 2 = P 2 – {p i }

30Robust Random Number Generation Extensions of RNG There can be disagreement of who is in a set of players, as long as honest players know each other. Consecutive indexing (1 to m) is not necessary. Instead, each player may also choose random index out of sufficiently large range.

31Robust Random Number Generation Elementary RNG Theorem: Suppose we have m players with t<m/6 being adversarial. Then the RNG generates random keys y 1,…,y k with m- 2t<=k<=m, s.t. for any subset S ½ {0,1} s, E[|{i | y i 2 S}|] 2 [(m-2t) ,m  ] where  = |S|/2 s. where  = |S|/2 s. So bias of RNG is  = 1+2t/(m-2t).

32Robust Random Number Generation Application to Cuckoo Rule Problem: variable number of random keys evict k/n-region n honest  n adversarial

33Robust Random Number Generation Application to Cuckoo Rule Solution: remap peers in comb-like fashion using just one random anchor evict k/n-region n honest  n adversarial

34Robust Random Number Generation Application to Cuckoo Rule RNG: Batch of random keys. For each key, execute cuckoo rule. evict k/n-region n honest  n adversarial

35Robust Random Number Generation Final Result Theorem: For any constants , k and  with  < 1/  – 1/k, the new cuckoo rule with the round-robin RNG with bias  satisfies the balancing and majority conditions for poly rounds, w.h.p., for any adversarial join- leave strategy.

36Robust Random Number Generation Conclusion We extended the cuckoo rule with a simple, robust RNG that can handle arbitrary adversarial join-leave behavior, w.h.p. Open problems: Low-level DoS attacks ! Subjects-Paradigm Adversary controls join-leave behavior of adversarial and honest nodes ! IPTPS

37Robust Random Number Generation Questions? SPAA 2007: Deadlines /