Group 2: Securing the Use, Storage and Transport of Radiological and Strategic Nuclear Materials Kent Cole President and Chief Executive Officer NAC International v v

Working Group Scope Securing the Use, Storage and Transport of Radiological and Strategic Nuclear Materials at civilian facilities:  Minimizing the civilian use of strategic nuclear materials, most significantly HEU, and removal for disposal / downblending  Radioactive Source Security  Used Nuclear Fuel Security (new topic for NIS-2016)  Transportation Security (new topic for NIS-2016) The report acknowledges that industry has a vital, but limited role in nuclear material security because it is national governments that set policies, ratify treaties and set regulations related to the security of nuclear materials v v

Membership Sun Qin, China National Nuclear Corporation Rick Didsbury, Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Jean Michel Romary, AREVA Michel Pays, EDF Jack Edlow, Edlow International Matt Fox, INS Jong-Kyung Kim, KAERI Kwang-Seok Lee, KAERI Phumzile Tshelane, South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (NECSA) Kent Cole, NAC International (chair) v v

Material Security Basics  Objective: Protect against unauthorized removal and sabotage  Functions: Deter, Detect, Delay, Respond and Security Management  Security Level is based on a Graded Approach considering the material attractiveness and the threat  For certain materials, elimination or minimization is a better objective with associated relocation of excess material to special purpose facilities for disposition. v v

HEU Minimization Program History HEU Minimization Program History  The Reduced Enrichment of Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) program was first established in 1978  The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) replaced RERTR in 2004  The Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) replaced GTRI in January Source: U.S. National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine, “Reducing the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors”, 2016 v v

Accomplishments Over the Summit Period  22 HEU Fueled Reactors converted or shutdown  x Countries eliminated all HEU (and separated Pu)  3 of 8 major reactors producing Mo-99 are now using LEU Targets; significant activity toward industry conversion to LEU  Radioactive Source security significantly improved globally v v

Countries Eliminating All HEU  Austria (2012)  Brazil *  Bulgaria  Chile (2010) *  Colombia  Czech Republic (2103) *  Denmark *  Georgia *  Greece  Hungary (2013) *  South Korea *  Spain *  Sweden *  Switzerland (2015)  Taiwan  Thailand *  Turkey (2010) *  Ukraine (2012) *  Uzbekistan (2015)  Vietnam (2013) * v v * Attending the 2016 NSS HEU eliminated during Summits period  Iraq  Jamaica (2015)  Latvia  Libya  Mexico (2012) *  Philippines *  Portugal  Romania *  Serbia (2010)  Slovenia

Accomplishments in Reactor HEU to LEU Conversions  94 HEU fuel reactors converted or shutdown. 106 to go.  55 since GTRI began in 2004  22 since 2010 NSS  6 since last NSS  1 st Russian Domestic Reactor (ARGUS) conversion (July 2014)  Recent Conversions: WWR-K (Kazakhstan), SLOWPOKE (Jamaica)  Significant international cooperation and funded programs for U-Mo LEU fuel development v v

Accomplishments in Mo-99 Production  Nearly all Mo-99 production reactors run on LEU fuel  Mo-99 producers have begun to use LEU targets  OPAL, RA-3 and Safari already using LEU targets  Conversion to LEU targets in process for most others  Broad international support to move to LEU and unsubsidized production  The American Medical Isotopes Production Act (AMIPA) is driving the development of LEU targets and LEU fueled research reactors for the U.S. market  Several projects in various phases of development and licensing v v

Accomplishments in Clean-out of Strategic Nuclear Materials  Uzbekistan, Jamaica and Switzerland are free of HEU and high purity Pu since the 2014 Summit  Japan is removing 331 kg of high purity Pu and HEU from the FCA facility in 2016  Removal projects underway in Kazakhstan and Canada  Significant activity is planned prior to Return program closure over the next several years v v

Accomplishments in Radiological Source Security  Unique challenge due to variety, location, use, transport, storage and their management when disused  IAEA has done significant work to structure and advance its Sources Security program with member states  Industry groups and NGO’s have embraced and included Source Security in their scope/mission  Significant increase globally in guidance and training  Ongoing recovery and responsible management of disused sources v v

Accomplishments in Used Fuel Security  Unique challenge is large amount (400,000 tons)  Robust physical protection of nuclear facilities, enhanced since 9/1/2001  There are security benefits of an integrated used fuel management program with ultimate disposition / disposal facilities in operation  Positive progress on repositories in Finland and Sweden. v v

Accomplishments in Transportation Security  Industry organizations like WINS and the World Nuclear Transport Institute (WNTI) interface to represents industry with IAEA and national regulators on radioactive material transportation matters  Provides mechanism for lessons learned and best practices  Numerous training course, tabletop exercises and field exercises (including road, rail and sea) which involve government, polices, special forces, regulators and industry v v

Major Findings and Conclusions 1.The threat of radiological and nuclear terrorism is of concern to the public, and therefore affects public support for the nuclear industry. 2.The minimization of civilian use of HEU and high purity plutonium and the responsible management of radiological sources and used nuclear fuel are important and worthwhile missions for all industry stakeholders, and should be undertaken in a manner that is economically sound and responsible. 3.Progress towards the minimization of civilian use of HEU for medical isotopes should not come at the expense of patient outcomes. 4.Responsible management of disused radioactive sources should include their management as waste when recycling or re-use is not (practically) possible. 5.Responsible management of used nuclear fuel should include tangible progress by States and Operators in siting, developing and operating long term disposal facilities to support the use of nuclear power, the world’s largest carbon free generation alternative.