Is Free Trade Optimal for a Small Open Economy with Tourism? Chi-Chur Chao *, Bharat R. Hazari +, Jean- Pierre Laffargue #, and Eden S. H. Yu + * Chinese University of Hong Kong, + City University of Hong Kong, # PSE-CNRS and CEPREMAP, Paris, France
Small open economy, tariff lowers welfare Large open economy, optimal tariff > 0 First best: DRS = DRT = FRT Question: Would these results hold with tourism? Background
Tourism is an important growth industry Tourism Receipts in Hong Kong International Tourism Receipts 2006 US billion $% of GDP RankCountryUS billion $RankCountryUS billion $ 1United States85.46UK33.5 2Spain51.17Germany32.8 3France46.38Australia17.8 4Italy38.19Turkey16.9 5China33.910Austria Japan8.5 Source: World Tourism Organization (UNWTO).
(temporary) movement of consumers from one country to another to consume non- traded goods and services this transforms non-traded goods into tradables creating an additional tourism induced terms of trade effect Two types of terms of trade Key Features
Three sector, small open economy Foreign tourists demand only the domestically produced non-traded goods Two types of policies: Tariffs ( t ) Investment taxes ( τ ) Assumptions
Effects of tariff: Tariff raises the importable good price Substitution effect for non-traded Price of the non-traded goods increases Favorable terms of trade effect Optimal tariff > 0 even for a small open economy Additional Effect of Tariffs: Tariffs Capital inflows may immiserizing growth Investment tax
On tourism and trade Hazari and Sgro, Tourism Trade and National Welfare, Elsevier, On capital flow Brecher and Diaz Alejandro, JIE, On non-traded goods Komiya, IER, Makoto and Nugent, AER, Literature
Model with Tourism Three Sectors Production Functions GoodsPrices X, agriculture,Exportablenumeraire Y, manufacturing, importableImportablep ZNon-tradedq K = foreign capital inflow until L = unskilled labor S = skilled labor V = land r = domestic rate of return τ = investment tax
Factor Rewards w = wage of unskilled labor s = wage of skilled labor r = rate of return on capital v = rate of return on land Perfect Competitive Equilibrium (unit price = unit cost) (1) (2) (3)
By envelop property Equations (1) to (7) have 7 unkowns: w, s, r, v, X, Y, Z, for given p, q, K. = unit demand for unskilled labor in X (4) (5) (6) (7)
Block recursive system: Eq. (1) w Eq. (2), (5) and (6) s, r and Y as functions of p and K Eq. (3) and (7) v and Z as functions of q Eq. (4) X as a function p, q and K.
Revenue Function Envelope Property:
Demand Side Domestic Demand (Expenditure Function) (Compensated demand) ( Y and Z are substitutes) Tourist Demand T = tourist expenditure - +
Equilibrium Conditions Eq. (8) To (11) have 4 unknowns: u, M, K and q 2 policy variables: t and τ (8) (9) (10) (11) Domestic demand for Z Tourist demand for Z Supply of Z
Optimal Tariff and Investment Tax Welfare Analysis From (8) : From (9) : From (10) : From (11) : (12) (15) (14) (13)
(given ) Welfare Effect of Tariffs only (for a fixed τ ) Solving (12) – (15) : where No tourism and When (16) Free trade is optimal
Setting du/dt = 0, if Free trade is not optimal (See Figure 1a) (17)
t τ 0 Figure 1a
Welfare Effect of Investment Taxes (for a fixed t ) when (See Figure 1b) (19) (20)
t τ 0 Figure 1b
Jointly Optimal Tariffs and Investment Taxes Solving (17) and (20) : With tourism (See Figure 1c) (22) (23)
t τ 0 E Figure 1c
Jointly Optimal Tariffs and Investment Taxes Solving (17) and (20) : With tourism (See Figure 1c) ↑shifts the schedule to the right higher optimal t and τ. (See Figure 1d) (22) (23)
t τ 0 E Figure 1d E’E’
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