New Model of Major Power Relations: China-U.S. Global Cooperation and Regional Contention Emeritus Professor Carlyle A. Thayer Presentation to International Conference on ASEAN and China-US Relations: New Security Dynamics and Regional Implications Co-sponsored by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Sheraton Hotel, Hanoi March 10, 2016

Outline 1.Xi Jinping’s ‘new model of major country relations’ and the United States 2.China-U.S. contention in the South China Sea 3.ASEAN and China-United States Relations 4.Conclusion

1. New Model of Major Country Relations: China and the United States Evolution of the ‘new model’ Vice President Xi Jinping visits U.S. Feb – ‘new type of relationship between major countries in the 21 st century’ Sunnylands Informal Summit June 2013 – Xi: no confrontation or conflict, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation’ – Obama: ‘new model of cooperation… based on mutual interest and mutual respect’

Areas of Global Cooperation Anti-piracy in the Horn of Africa Climate change Countering international terrorism, Non-proliferation in Iran and North Korea Consultations on Afghanistan Peace in the Middle East (Palestine and Syria) Cyber security Pandemics (Ebola virus)

Areas of Divergence Rollback in official U.S. statements 1.Implications of power-sharing by a ‘G2’ 2.Chinese pressure on the U.S. to reaffirm the new model 3.Unilateral expansion of China’s ‘core interests’ 4.Cyber espionage undermines strategic trust 5.Militarization of artificial islands

2. China-U.S. Contention in the South China Sea 17 th ARF (July 2010) Hillary Clinton identifies South China Sea as a ‘national interest’ China’s construction of artificial islands War of words over militarization of the South China Sea – ‘great wall of sand’ -v- ‘necessary defence’ Secretary Carter ‘specific actions will have specific consequences’

Carrier Strike Group: USS John C. Stennis and USS Blue Ridge

3. ASEAN and China-United States Relations ASEAN centrality and Southeast Asian regional autonomy ASEAN’s ‘even keel’ between China & U.S. – ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2003) – ASEAN-US Strategic Partnership (2015) – 18 ASEAN-China Summits, 5 ASEAN-US Summits

ASEAN-China & South China Sea ASEAN statements 1992 and 1995 Declaration on Conduct of Parties (2002) – Terms of Reference, Joint Working Group – Address ‘crucial, difficult and complicated issues’ – Two lists of commonalities – Code of Conduct unlikely in 2016 China’s ‘dual-track’ approach – Excludes United States

ASEAN and China-US 18 th ASEAN-China Summit – Freedom of navigation and over-flight – Implementation of the DOC/self-restraint – Not to resort to threat or use of force – Sovereign states directly resolve differences – International law including UNCLOS Special ASEAN-U.S. Summit – Ensuring maritime security and safety

East Asian Summit Uphold freedom of navigation and over-flight 2.Serious concerns over recent developments that eroded trust… and may underminepeace, security and stability 3.Xi’s assurance China does not intend to pursue militarization 4.Commitment to DOC/self-restraint 5.Peaceful resolution of disputes/UNCLOS

Special ASEAN-US Summit 1.Peaceful resolution of disputes, without resort to threat or use of force, in accord with international law/UNCLOS 2.Maritime security and safety, freedom of navigation and over-flight, unimpeded lawful maritime commece, non-militarization and self=restraint 3.Cooperation to address common challenges in the maritime domain

AMM Retreat, Vientiane 1.Ministers remained seriously concerned took note of concerns on land reclamation and escalation of activities, eroded trust 2.Freedom of navigation and over-flight 3.Self-restraint and peaceful resolution of disputes 4.Full respect for legal and diplomatic process 5.Implementation of DOC, develop COC

Conclusion South China Sea now cockpit for China-U.S. strategic rivalry Tensions will get worse before they get better Four drivers behind China’s sense of urgency – UN Arbitral Tribunal decision – 19 May elections in the Philippines – New U.S. assertiveness – FONOP – November U.S. presidential elections

Conclusion ASEAN shoud give priority to – Defining militarization – Transparency Implications DOC and self-restraint overtaken by events China’s refusal to recognize Arbitral Tribunal will undermine UNCLOS and good order at sea

Conclusion Implications continued: Chinese civil or dual use infrastructure will lean to construction of ‘some necessary military facilities’ China is laying foundations of ADIZ – Nascent ADIZ already exists China’s action have created security dilemma Militarization will alter naval balance of power

New Model of Major Power Relations: China-U.S. Global Cooperation and Regional Contention Emeritus Professor Carlyle A. Thayer Presentation to International Conference on ASEAN and China-US Relations: New Security Dynamics and Regional Implications Co-sponsored by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Sheraton Hotel, Hanoi March 10, 2016