The Cyprus Peace Process: Alternative Power-Sharing Designs Neophytos Loizides University of Kent Address at the Cyprus Academic Dialogue/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung May 2, Nicosia

Main Themes ▫The D’Hondt Executive (‘A Northern Irish Innovation’, O’Leary et al, 2005) ▫Negotiability and Durability  How could d’Hondt or similar methods catalyse the Cyprus peace process? ▫Variations and Alternative Arrangements  Strengths and weaknesses of Cypriot federalism

Institutional Innovation What criteria should we employ in judging institutional innovation? What makes institutions exportable? What are the limits? Why should we care about institutions in general?

Importing Institutions: Evaluation Criteria Did it work elsewhere? Did it work under ‘least likely’ conditions? Would key actors embrace it? (analysis of local conditions, stakeholders and surveys) Does it eliminate worst-case scenarios? (unintended outcomes) Is their a theoretical justification? (does it address tensions and alternative explanations in the literature?)

Two Schools of Thought Should power-sharing systems favour the moderates or try to incorporate the extremes? ▫Centripetalism (Horowitz, 2003) ▫Consociationalism (Lijphart, 2004; McGarry & O’Leary, 2009)

Northern Irish Experience Short-lived experience of Sunningdale (1973-4) ‘..out of the blue there was a proposal that departments would be share around’ (McEvoy, 2006) D’Hondt promised proportionality, inclusivity and automaticity (Ibid, 2006)

Northern Irish Political Parties UUP: pro-agreement Unionists (i.e. protestants aiming to maintain the Union with the UK) DUP: anti-agreement Unionists (also Protestants) SDLP: moderate Irish Nationalists (i.e. Catholics aiming for Irish unification) SF: militant Republicans (i.e. also Catholics associated with IRA)

Northern Ireland Today ‘Up until the 26 March this year, Ian Paisley and I never had a conversation about anything - not even about the weather - and now we have worked very closely together over the last seven months and there's been no angry words between us (Martin McGuinness from Sinn Fein, BBC, 08/12/2007)’

Where else does it work? D’Hondt or another similar method is used in most parliamentary elections (including Turkey and among the Turkish Cypriots) Similar methods are used in the allocation of the committees of the European Parliament (and Cyprus parliament) Also used in the allocation of executive committees in specific municipalities both in Northern Ireland and Denmark (e.g. in Copenhagen since 1938)

Modified Cypriot Version Sainte-Lague executive plus cross-voting arbitration Political parties will be entitled automatically cabinet positions A cross-voted joint presidency will form an arbitration mechanism Executive power will lie with cabinet but the two co- presidents will maintain joint arbitration powers before constitutional court

Illustration of Sainte-Lague allocation Example of how automaticity in Saint Lague works Parties’ vote divided by 1,3,5…. (Sainte-Lague divisor) Then parties choose in order of highest quotient for the six positions The order here is for parties A, B, C, A, B and D 135 Party A34, 28 (1st choice)11, 42 (4 th choice)6,85 Party B32,67 (2 nd choice)10, 89 (5 th choice)5,44 Party C15, 76 (3 rd choice)7,883,94 Party D8,93 (6 th choice)4,472,23

Advantages of the Proposal The formula is fair and inclusive to all political parties regardless of their national/ideological orientation It is more likely to be endorsed by everyone including UBP It eliminates two negative scenarios: ▫A single party running the country alone with a weak majority ▫A party which aims to be included to be permanently excluded from power It is functional by safeguarding decision making through a ‘triple lock’ (i.e. executive, presidency, and judiciary)

Strengths and Weaknesses of ‘Cypriot Federalism’ Dyadic federation but also diverse political traditions About half of us will live in mixed urban centers Creative Linkages (e.g. power-sharing vs. land) Positive feelings but also lack of trust to the settlement No recent violence but also no experience with power-sharing for five decades

Third Alternatives Ohrid Framework Agreement (automatic coalition of the two largest parties from each community ) The Swiss Magic Formula (fixed seats) Annan Plan for ‘Slow Learners’ (coalitions)

Variations of the formula D’ Hondt (1,2,3,….) 4GC/2TC (DISY, UBP, AKEL, CTP, DISY, AKEL) 6GC/4-TC (DISY, UBP, AKEL, CTP, DISY, UBP, AKEL, CTP, DIKO, DISY) Sainte-Lague (1, 3, 5,...) 4GC/2TC (DISY, UBP, AKEL, CTP, DIKO, DISY) 6GC/4TC (DISY, UBP, AKEL, CTP, DIKO, UBP, DISY, DP, AKEL, EDEK) Danish (1, 4, 7, …) 4GC/2TC (DISY, UBP, AKEL, CTP, DIKO, EDEK) 6GC/4TC (DISY, UBP, AKEL, CTP, DIKO, DP, EDEK, UBP, DISY, AKEL)

Further Questions Should post-election coalitions be allowed? Should there be cross-voting or consensus for certain positions? What kind of balance between presidency and cabinet? ▫Reversing the logic of checks and balances ▫Build-in reform mechanisms