Towards ‘Brexit’? The Politics of EU Referendum Campaigns 15 March 2016 Kai Oppermann

54 EU Referendums Triggering Mechanisms Subject Matter Governmental Discretion in Triggering the Referendum (n=20) No Governmental Discretion in Triggering the Referendum (n=34) Treaty Ratification (n=16) Denmark 1986 France 1992, 2005 Luxembourg 2005 Spain 2005 Denmark 1992, 1993, 1998 Ireland 1987, 1992, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2008, 2009 Netherlands 2005 Accession to the EU (n=20) Åland Islands 1994 Czech Republic 2003 Finland 1994 Malta 2003 Norway 1972 Poland 2003 Sweden 1994 Austria 1994 Croatia 2013 Denmark 1972 Estonia 2003 Hungary 2003 Ireland 1972 Latvia 2003 Lithuania 2003 Norway 1994 Slovakia 2003 Slovenia 2003 Switzerland 1997, 2001 Specific Issues (n=18) France 1972 Britain 1975 Greece 2015 Greenland 1982 Italy 1989 Sweden 2003 Switzerland 1972, 1992 Denmark 2000, 2015 Ireland 2012 Liechtenstein 1992, 1995 Switzerland 2000, 2005(2), 2009, 2014

30 Discretionary Government Commitments to EU Referendums Referendums/ Referendum Commitments Subject Matter ReferendumsReferendum Commitments Treaty Ratification Denmark 1986 (SEA) France 1992 (Maastricht), 2005 (Constitutional Treaty) Luxembourg 2005 (Constitutional Treaty) Spain 2005 (Constitutional Treaty) B RITAIN 2004 (C ONSTITUTIONAL T REATY ), 2010 (F UTURE T REATY R EVISIONS ) Portugal 2003 (Constitutional Treaty) Czech Republic 2005 (Constitutional Treaty) Poland 2005 (Constitutional Treaty) Accession to the EU Norway 1972 (Accession) Finland 1994 (Accession) Åland Islands 1994 (Accession) Sweden 1994 (Accession) Czech Republic 2003 (Accession) Malta 2003 (Accession) Poland 2003 (Accession) Specific Issues France 1972 (First Enlargement of EC) B RITAIN 1975 (T ERMS OF M EMBERSHIP ) Greece 2015 (Eurozone Bailout Package) Greenland 1982 (Leaving the EC) Italy 1989 (Constitution for Europe) Sweden 2003 (Euro) Switzerland 1972 (Free Trade Agreement), 1992 (EEA) B RITAIN 1996 (E URO ), 1997 (E URO ), 2013 (M EMBERSHIP OF EU) France 2004 (Accession of Turkey) Austria 2008 (Accession of Turkey)

The British ‘In or Out’ Referendum in Comparative Perspective  The EU is the “most voted-on issue” in the world (De Vreese/Semetko 2004).  The UK has seen more discretionary EU referendum commitments than any other European country o 1975 (Terms of membership), 1996 (Euro), 1997 (Euro), 2004 (TCE), 2010 (Future Treaty Revisions), 2013 (Membership) o Strong domestic political incentives for governments to commit to referendums Patterns of ‘open contestation’ on Europe: Public and party-based Euroscepticism Permissive constitutional environment  The only cases of ‘in or out’ referendums: o The UK voted to remain in the EC in 1975 o Greenland voted to leave the EC in 1982

Six things we know about EU referendum campaigns (I) Referendum outcomes are hard to predict  Current opinion polls do not allow us to project the outcome.  Referendum voting is less settled than voting behaviour in general elections.  Party identification matters less, campaign effects matter more.  Of the 54 EU referendums: 12 went against the position of the government.  Expectations for UK ‘in or out’ referendum: o Referendum campaign will update public information about Britain in the EU.

Six things we know about EU referendum campaigns (II) Turnout matters  EU Referendums have been won or lost depending on the ability of the two camps to mobilise. o Examples: Irish referendums on Nice (2001, 2002) and Lisbon (2008, 2009)  Expectations for UK ‘in or out’ referendum: o Strong mobilisation on both sides o High turnout o Unclear if ‘remain’ or ‘leave’ side will benefit from high turnout

Six things we know about EU referendum campaigns (III) Establishment versus anti-establishment  EU referendums tend to pitch the pro-European establishment against the anti-establishment on the Eurosceptic side.  This binary structure tends to work as a magnifying glass for the Eurosceptic argument.  Expectations for UK ‘in or out’ referendum: o Establishment/anti-establishment divide less clear cut than in most previous EU referendums. o The ‘leave’ camp still plays the anti-establishment card.

Six things we know about EU referendum campaigns (IV) Elite cues matter  Elite cues matter more if camps are united and if key figures are well-trusted.  Expectations for UK ‘in or out’ referendum: o Conservative divisions weaken ‘remain’ cues. o ‘Leave’ campaign divided over key message and relationship to UKIP. o Cameron is currently more trusted on the referendum than key representatives of the ‘leave’ campaign.

Six things we know about EU referendum campaigns (V) Priming Effects  Voters think about the question on the ballot in terms of what is at the forefront of their minds on voting day.  Expectations for UK ‘in or out’ referendum: o ‘Leave’ camp will benefit from high salience of the immigration issue. o ‘Remain’ camp will benefit from positive economic outlook and general satisfaction with the government (and if England does well in the Euro 2016).

Six things we know about EU referendum campaigns (VI) Status quo bias  Voters are risk averse and referendum outcomes tend to be biased towards the status quo.  Expectations for UK ‘in or out’ referendum: o Much of the referendum campaign will be about the consequences of Brexit. o The ‘remain’ side will emphasise the risks of leaving the EU. o The ‘leave’ side will argue that change after Brexit will be gradual and incremental. o Voters will be more risk acceptant if they think they lose out from the status quo.

Towards ‘Brexit’? The ‘known knowns’ (and the ‘known unknowns’): o Voting behavior in EU referendums is volatile: We can’t predict the outcome from current opinion polls. o Turnout will be high: It is unclear whether this benefits the ‘remain’ or the ‘leave’ side. o The ‘leave’ campaign will try to portray the issue as a debate between the establishment and the anti- establishment. o Elite cues matter: The side which is seen as more unified and which is more trusted benefits. o The referendum outcome will be influenced by whatever issue is most salient on voting day. o Status quo bias: Much of the referendum debate will be about the consequences and risks of Brexit.

Thank you!