Workshop Specialized in Exercises The Chernobyl Field Exercise Jakarta, Indonesia, June 2007 Peter Zombori Technical Officer

2 The phases of an emergency response

3 Project data Title: IAEA/RCA Field Trial of Emergency Response Capacity Content: Regional Training Course in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone for Extended Response by Radiological Assessors (1w) with communication of field data back to their respective national decision makers for analysis. RCA project area: Sustainability of Regional Radiation Protection Infrastructure – RAS9042 Date: May 2007 Place: Slavutich, Ukraine (field work in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone)

4 Objectives Characterization of a contaminated area by field teams for the purpose of supporting decision makers. Field measurements, on-site data analysis, data telecommunication, proposal for intervention, international notification (IAEA NS-IEC)

5 Participants 5 teams (of 2 experts each, specialized Radiological Assessors who would be involved during the Extended Response phase in an emergency) from the RCA following countries: Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Australia Singapore In addition: 3 instructors (2 ANSTO and 1 IAEA) plus ~5 ‘controllers’ (local)

6 Tasks Full characterization of 6 different sites (5 in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone plus 1 in Slavutich), from the point of view of the radiological situation, based on field measurements (mapping radiation levels, contamination, sampling etc). Data evaluation on the site or after the daily work, to reduce the data to a meaningful minimum that can be communicated to the National ER Centres (NERC). Transmission of the data obtained to the NERC. Evaluation of the data by NERC, proposal for intervention/action. Notification of the IEC. Evaluation of the received information by IEC, preparation of a media statement.

7 Equipment Dose rate meter(s) (gamma monitors) Contamination meter(s) (alpha/beta/gamma surface cont. monitors) Air contamination monitor(s) Personal dosimeters (active and passive) Portable gamma spectrometer (if possible) Tools for data evaluation/storage (PC) Tools for (data) telecommunication Personal protective clothing

8 The sites City A (Slavutich) City B (Pripyat) City C (Chernobyl) Village (Kopachi) Reservoir (Fish Farm) Forest (Red Forest)

9 Dose rates and contamination measurements

10 Dose rates measured at different locations City A (Slavutich) City B (Pripyat) City C (Chernobyl) Village (Kopachi) Reservoir (Fish Farm) Forest (Red Forest)

11 Contaminations measured at different locations City A (Slavutich) City B (Pripyat) City C (Chernobyl) Village (Kopachi) Reservoir (Fish Farm) Forest (Red Forest)

12 Lesson 1 Dose rate meters are the best means of rapid assessment of the radiological situation Surface contamination monitors are useful for special applications but the results are hard to interpret

13 Sampling

14 Sampling (1) Sampling siteAirSoilWater City A (Slavutych) A - -n/a B - - CND -n/a DND -n/a END -n/a

15 Sampling (2) Sampling siteAirSoilWater City B (Pripyat) A - -n/a B - - CND -n/a D- - END -n/a

16 Sampling (3) Sampling siteAirSoilWater City C (Chornobyl) A - -n/a B - - CND -n/a D- - END -n/a

17 Sampling (4) Sampling siteAirSoilWater Village (Kopachi) A - -n/a B - - CND -n/a D- - END Cs-137n/a

18 Sampling (5) Sampling siteAirSoilWater Reservoir (Fish Farm) A - -ND B C - - D - E Cs-137ND

19 Sampling (6) Sampling siteAirSoilWater Forest (Red Forest) A - -n/a B - - CND -n/a D- - END Cs-137n/a

20 Lesson 2 Sampling is important element of the assessment Local (on site) measurement of the samples provide only qualitative (indicative) results

21 Nuclide identification Cs-137 identified by Teams A, C, D, E Team B had no means for identification Team A misidentified contamination at some sites (I-131?, Np-237?)

22 Lesson 3 Nuclide identifiers (mainly NaI(Tl) based systems) are important and useful tools Their measuring range is limited and they require special attention when used

23 Using PPE

24 Using PPE (1) City A (Slavutych) A - B - C - D - E -

25 Using PPE (2) City B (Pripyat) A Full PPE B - C Overshoe D E Overshoe, masks

26 Using PPE (3) City C (Chernobyl) A - B - C - D - E Overshoes and dust musk until proven safe (air sample)

27 Using PPE (4) Village (Kopachi) A Overboots B - C - D E Overshoes and dust musk until proven safe (air sample)

28 Using PPE (3) Reservoir (Fish Farm) A - B - C - D - E Overshoes and dust musk until proven safe (air sample)

29 Using PPE (2) Forest (Red Forest) A Full PPE B C D E

30 Lesson 4 Be conservative: use PPE at any indication of potential contamination (at least overshoes and masks) until the place is proven safe by air and surface monitoring Using PPE makes your life and work more difficult, get rid of it if there is no need for it

31 Personal contamination control

32 Integrated personal doses IAEA official dosimeter readings scatter in the range of μSv

33 Lesson 5 Doses can be controlled by carefully planning and implementing the work in contaminated areas You have to accept that certain doses are unavoidable in such situations

34 Delay in data communication to NREC City A (Slavutich) City B (Pripyat) City C (Chernobyl) Village (Kopachi) Reservoir (Fish Farm) Forest (Red Forest)

35 Recommended actions City ACity BCity CVillageReservoirForest A Not received B No action Restrict local food, relocate people No actionRestrict local food Relocate people, restrict local food, monitor C No recommendation No recommendation No recommendation No recommendation No recommendation No recommendation D General recommendation for all sites: restrict local food E No action (further surveys) Restrict local foodNo actionRestrict local food Restrict fishing, measure water, sediment fish Relocate people, restrict local food, restrict access, monitor

36 Lesson 5 More exercise is needed to improve decision support (based on field measurements) and data communication Better preparation could have made this part of the programme better!

37 Some further lessons learned… The problems of team deployment abroad (travel, visa, equipment import/export, lost luggage etc.) Logistical issues (transportation, accommodation, catering etc.) Equipment behaviour (calibration, contamination, saturation, resolution etc.) Procedure problems (working on high radiation areas, survey optimization, contamination, waste handling etc.) Other possible difficulties (language, cultural differences, food etc.)

38 Other activities Visiting the International Radioecological Laboratory (IRL) in Slavutich Visiting the Chornobyl Shelter (‘Sarcophagus’) Visitor Centre in the CNPP Presentation on the Extended Response Manual (B. Holland), based on the Beijing RTC on Radiological Assessment Presentation on RANET (P. Zombori)

39 Thank you!