Islamism, Al-Qaeda, and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Week 6

HISTORY Modern Islamic revival predicated upon: Arab defeat by Israel in Six Day War (1967) Arab defeat by Israel in 1973 Oil boom of the 1970s Origins of al-Qaeda: Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, US and Pakistan-funded Afghan mujāhidīn Ultimate withdrawal of Soviet forces results in instability

Ayman al Zawahiri

Born 1951 Qualified as a medical doctor Originally involved in Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) Salafist group who targeted the Egyptian regime in order to create an Islamic state

Ayman al Zawahiri Arrested an tried in Great Jihad case in 1983—convicted on firearm possession and served 3 years prison time His experiences of torture and deprivation in prison are said to have radicalised him further Joins Afghan Jihad in 1986 where he meets Osama bin Laden

Osama bin Laden

Born 1957 to Muhammad bin Laden Extremely wealthy heritage and became a major financier to the Afghan Jihad in early 1980s Meets al Zawahiri in 1986 who has a profound influence on his views

TIMELINE: 1988: AQ formed by OBL and Abdullah Azzam 1991: Expelled from Saudi Arabia 1992: Aden bombings? 1993: Battle of Mogadishu? 1993: First WTC attack 1996: Moved from Sudan to Afghanistan 1996: Khobar Towers bombing 1998: Merger with EIJ & World Islamic Front fatwa (Feb.) 1998: Embassy bombings in Nairobi & Dar-es- Salaam (Aug.) 2000: USS Cole attack

IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND Ibn Tamiyaa (1263–1328) Hassan al-Banna ( ) Abu Ala Madudi ( ) Sayed Qutb ( ) Abdullah Azzam ( ) Abu Yahya al-Libi (1963-present) Anwar al Awlaki (1971-present) Various revolutionary theorists over time (esp. Lenin & concept of the vanguard party, e.g. in Qutb’s Milestones & Madudi)

RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND Wahhabis = followers of Md. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703 – 1791) Salafis = ‘ancestors,’ refers to the companions of the Prophet Don’t view themselves as a sect, but simply followers of pure monotheistic Islam (monotheism = tawhid) Regard Sufis and Shias as heretics Literal readings of the Koran and the hadith Disagree as to the status of the Saudi government and the necessity of violent jihad More radical salafis/Wahhabis (i.e. those associated with AQ) are known as takfiri Jihad: internal (itjihad) vs. external (defensive vs. offensive)

CONTEMPORARY POLITICS Macro-level: To beat back West and its aggressive imperialistic project begun with the crusades (the Zionist-Crusader alliance) Establishment of caliphate (exact details vague) Micro-Level: OBL = Saudi Arabia (Land of the Two Mosques) Zawahiri = Egypt Zarqawi = Jordan (& Iraq/Land of the Two Rivers) Al Libi = Libya, but more wide ranging Al Awlaki = America in particular

PERSISTENT JIHADI THEMES Hizbollah’s victory over US in Lebanon in 1980s Victory over Soviets in Afghanistan in 1980s 9/11 as victory over US on home territory Iraq as quagmire for US and potential victory for Islamists Duty of defensive jihad Targeting of children (esp. in Palestine) Near enemy (Arab governments) vs. Far enemy (US, the ‘West’ incl. Israel)

STRUCTURE OF A.Q. Pre-9/11 -Hierarchical structure (Gunaratna) -Never established ‘network’ in ways commonly conceived, but acted as venture capital firm (Burke) Post-9/11 -Loss of Afghan base, more loosely structured (Burke refers to “al Qaedism,” Bergen to “al Qaeda 2.0”) -Hoffman vs Sageman: Centralised structure vs. ‘bunch of guys’

ZARQAWI & A.Q. IN IRAQ Powell at UN SC on 5 Feb., 2003 Responsible for many attacks: Truck bombing of UN HQ, Baghdad Imam Ali Mosque Red Cross HQ Assorted police stations Only linked after Zarqawi took responsibility in audio recording (April 2004) Group came to be known as al-Qaeda in Iraq or al Qaeda in Mesopotemia Named ‘emir’ of al-Qaeda in Iraq by Bin Laden in December 2004

HOW ZARQAWI’S POSITION DIFFERED FROM A.Q.’S? Near enemy = Shi’as, Kurds, US troops Far enemy = US & allies, the ‘West’ Aggressive tactics in fomenting revolt, such as the infamous beheading videos, which were subsequently criticised by al Zawahiri (internally) - Zarqawi killed by Americans 7 June, 2006

Contemporary Situation? First Wave of AQ all but eliminated (Gilles Kepel, Scott Atran) Second Wave = younger, less well educated, ‘born again’ Muslims, no formal ties to ‘AQ- central’ (Atran, also Sageman in his new book Leaderless Jihad) Importance of close social ties for ‘recruitment’, also self-/auto radicalisation via the Internet