Brexit, Migration, and Mobility James Hampshire Senior Lecturer in Politics University of Sussex 8 March 2016

Britain in Europe Not in Schengen = border controls Opt-in to JHA measures = join EU migration policy on a case-by- case basis As part of EU single market = free movement The difference the deal makes? In-work benefit; child benefit Unlikely to reduce migration (Child benefit change may even incentivise whole family movement)

Public opinion on immigration Public attitudes on immigration in general are: Negative: approximately ¾ of people in Britain favour reducing immigration. Salient: immigration is consistenly one of the top two most important issues Public attitudes to EU free movement are negative: 51% of the British public want to end the free movement of people in the EU 59% want to stop EU migrants from accessing the NHS for free 68% favour reducing EU migrants’ access to welfare benefits 47% think the EU is ‘undermining Britain’s distinctive identity’ Source: British Social Attitudes, Curtice, How Deeply does Britain’s Euroscepticism Run? 2015

Source: Transatlantic Trends Immigration 2014

Net migration by nationality,

Immigration by nationality, 2014

Socio-demographic characteristics of A8 and A2 migrants A8 migrants to the UK are: young: 53% <30, 85% <40 (Labour Force Survey) more highly educated than the British population high levels of employment (Drinkwater et al., 2009) mobile: high levels of return and circulation (Pollard et al. 2008) highly responsive to labour market conditions, more so than previous settlement migration disproportionately likely to be employed in low-skill, low-wage sectors e.g. elementary trades or services

The Polski Sklep effect, or Is it the economy, stupid? Are we barking up the wrong tree? Is this a matter of material interests or something else? Perceptions and identity? Analysis of public attitudes on immigration in general find that: identity is more important than interests as a determinant of anti-immigrant attitudes (Sides and Citrin 2007, Ivarsflaten 2005); to the extent that economic factors are important, it is more socio-tropic concerns about the overall economy, rather than egocentric concerns about an individual’s own economic standing that influence attitudes. Information is very important: publics overestimate the number of migrants by wide margins, which hardens attitudes Is opposition as much about the perceived threat of social and cultural change as economic impacts?

Source: Transatlantic Trends Immigration 2014

Culture and economics Many Britons perceive the EU as a cultural threat: 40% think the EU is ‘undermining Britain's cultural identity’ Briton’s also have a weak sense of European identity (only 16%) But they are unpersuaded that leaving makes economic sense Impact on Britain's economy if Britain leaves the EU: Positive 24%, negative 40% Among those who think positive 72% support leaving, among those who think negative just 6% support leave Concern about identity is the strongest predictor of ‘leave’ Source: British Social Attitudes, Curtice, How Deeply does Britain’s Euroscepticism Run? 2015

Migration after a Brexit Outside the EU, but in the EEA = continued free movement for EU citizens. Very unlikely free trade without free movement Outside EU and EEA = no free movement EU citizens treated as other immigrants (NB EU15, A8 and A2) UK would have to loosen immigration policy (Tiers 1-3) or accept reduced skilled immigration levels in potentially damaging ways (expect strong lobbying by business) And what about the 1.2 million Brits in the EU? Bilateral negotiations would have to take place on their residency rights. How would EU member states respond?