DISASTER AT DIEN BIEN PHU The end of French rule in Vietnam

THE SITUATION IN 1954 France had been fighting an increasing ‘dirty war’ (sale guerre) in Indo-China to keep control of Vietnam. France had been fighting an increasing ‘dirty war’ (sale guerre) in Indo-China to keep control of Vietnam. Despite considerable financial assistance from America, the French had not been successful in defeating the Viet Minh. Despite considerable financial assistance from America, the French had not been successful in defeating the Viet Minh. The French were seeking a means to fight a decisive battle to inflict a defeat on the Viet Minh. The French were seeking a means to fight a decisive battle to inflict a defeat on the Viet Minh.

The site of the battle Dien Bien Phu was on the border with Laos. Dien Bien Phu was on the border with Laos. It was a narrow valley that was a considerable distance from French supply lines based around Hanoi. It was a narrow valley that was a considerable distance from French supply lines based around Hanoi.

The French plan Navarre, the French commander, aimed to use French forces as a bait for the Viet Minh. Navarre, the French commander, aimed to use French forces as a bait for the Viet Minh. He did not believe that the Viet Minh could assemble a force strong enough to defeat the French forces. He did not believe that the Viet Minh could assemble a force strong enough to defeat the French forces. He believed that French tanks and planes could be used to destroy the Viet Minh. He believed that French tanks and planes could be used to destroy the Viet Minh. He began to build up an armed camp at Dien Bien Phu to encourage the Viet Minh to attack him. He began to build up an armed camp at Dien Bien Phu to encourage the Viet Minh to attack him.

An historian’s view “As Navarre, the French commander, poured troops into Dien Bien Phu, Giap increasingly felt that this was the place to stand. The French, he observed, were "completely isolated" in the valley and dependent on airlifted supplies, which meant that they could be strangled. By contrast, their domination of the surrounding mountains gave the Viet Minh forces both the advantage of height for their cannon and a way to bring food and equipment in from the rear. “ Karnow, Vietnam A History Karnow, Vietnam A History. 1994

The Viet Minh buildup Giap, the Viet Minh commander, began to build up his forces, bringing men and material secretly through mountainous areas. Giap, the Viet Minh commander, began to build up his forces, bringing men and material secretly through mountainous areas. Navarre built an airfield to act as his main supply link to headquarters. Navarre built an airfield to act as his main supply link to headquarters. Members of the People’s Militia resupply Viet Minh troops around Dien Bien Phu

A false assumption As in modern warfare the role of the artillery was to be decisive. As in modern warfare the role of the artillery was to be decisive. Navarre did not believe that the Viet Minh could provide sufficient artillery to threaten his base. He was wrong, as this quote indicates. Navarre did not believe that the Viet Minh could provide sufficient artillery to threaten his base. He was wrong, as this quote indicates. “For three days Dong's company had been dragging the heavily camouflaged guns up the mountain, moving it no more than a yard a minute, half a mile in a whole day. To ease its passage, a long trench had been hacked out of the limestone by hand, and a camouflage of thick foliage had been woven into wide nets strung across the gully above their heads. The gun was the last of twenty- four 105-millimeter howitzers which General Giap's 351st. Heavy Artillery Division had dragged undetected through the five hundred miles of mountainous jungle between Dien Bien Phu and the Chinese border.” Grey, Saigon, 1982 Grey, Saigon, 1982

The Viet Minh strategy Giap wanted to wait until he had sufficient strength to overwhelm the French. Giap wanted to wait until he had sufficient strength to overwhelm the French. He accumulated forces and munitions to be able to mount a decisive massed assault. He accumulated forces and munitions to be able to mount a decisive massed assault. Viet Minh: 50,000, including 33 infantry battalions, 6 artillery regiments and 1 regiment of engineers. 20,000 working on supply trails leading to the valley. French: 13,000, half of whom were inexperienced in combat

The assault begins On 13 March 1954, Giap launched his attack on Dien Bien Phu with a huge artillery barrage (right) On 13 March 1954, Giap launched his attack on Dien Bien Phu with a huge artillery barrage (right) Meanwhile Viet Minh troops moved forward to attack different French fire bases (right) Meanwhile Viet Minh troops moved forward to attack different French fire bases (right)

Eliminating the fire bases As the artillery pounded the fire bases, Viet Minh troops moved in to overwhelm them one by one. As the artillery pounded the fire bases, Viet Minh troops moved in to overwhelm them one by one. French artillery and planes could not locate and destroy the carefully camouflaged guns. French artillery and planes could not locate and destroy the carefully camouflaged guns. The airstrip was destroyed, preventing the French from easily re- supplying or reinforcing the French forces on Dien Bien Phu. The airstrip was destroyed, preventing the French from easily re- supplying or reinforcing the French forces on Dien Bien Phu.

Reinforcing failure Despite the deteriorating situation French paratroopers still volunteered to jump into Dien Bien Phu to assist with its defence. Despite the deteriorating situation French paratroopers still volunteered to jump into Dien Bien Phu to assist with its defence.

“It was the major surprise of the battle." "All around our positions, the enemy had created a network of camouflaged paths which permitted the (unhindered) transport of ammunition... to the vicinity of the batteries. We knew that a large number of artillery and antiaircraft gun emplacements had been prepared, but their camouflage had been so perfect that only a small number of them had been located prior to the beginning of the attack... This way of using the artillery and AA guns was possible only with the "human ant hill" at the disposal of the Vietminh and was to make shambles of all the estimates of our own artillerymen. It was the major surprise of the battle." "All around our positions, the enemy had created a network of camouflaged paths which permitted the (unhindered) transport of ammunition... to the vicinity of the batteries. We knew that a large number of artillery and antiaircraft gun emplacements had been prepared, but their camouflage had been so perfect that only a small number of them had been located prior to the beginning of the attack... This way of using the artillery and AA guns was possible only with the "human ant hill" at the disposal of the Vietminh and was to make shambles of all the estimates of our own artillerymen. It was the major surprise of the battle." Navarre, Agonie de L'Indochine, 1956

The final assault On 7 May 1954, Giap ordered the final assault on the remaining French positions at Dien Bien Phu. On 7 May 1954, Giap ordered the final assault on the remaining French positions at Dien Bien Phu. At 5.30pm Navarre ordered a ceasefire and the battle was over. At 5.30pm Navarre ordered a ceasefire and the battle was over.

Why did the French lose? “Navarre misread Giap's ability to move a huge force rapidly, so that his own troops were outnumbered by a ratio of more than five to one during the trial by fire. He rejected the notion that the Viet Minh could devastate his men with artillery deployed on the hills above Dienbienphu, nor did he foresee that the enemy emplacements would be protected by camouflage and antiaircraft guns against bombing from the air. He failed to anticipate that Giap's howitzers, poised within easy range of his airstrip, would cut off flights in and out of the valley, making it difficult for his besieged soldiers to receive supplies or evacuate wounded - much less withdraw themselves. He also chose a terrain presumably suitable for tanks only to discover that, unlike its description on his maps, its cover of thick bush entangled armoured vehicles and its monsoon rains flooded the plain in spring. “ “Navarre misread Giap's ability to move a huge force rapidly, so that his own troops were outnumbered by a ratio of more than five to one during the trial by fire. He rejected the notion that the Viet Minh could devastate his men with artillery deployed on the hills above Dienbienphu, nor did he foresee that the enemy emplacements would be protected by camouflage and antiaircraft guns against bombing from the air. He failed to anticipate that Giap's howitzers, poised within easy range of his airstrip, would cut off flights in and out of the valley, making it difficult for his besieged soldiers to receive supplies or evacuate wounded - much less withdraw themselves. He also chose a terrain presumably suitable for tanks only to discover that, unlike its description on his maps, its cover of thick bush entangled armoured vehicles and its monsoon rains flooded the plain in spring. “ Karnow, Vietnam A History 1994

The cost of the battle The battle lasted 55 days. The battle lasted 55 days. The Viet Minh lost 7900 killed and 15,000 wounded. The Viet Minh lost 7900 killed and 15,000 wounded. The battle cost 2000 French lives and 5600 were wounded. The battle cost 2000 French lives and 5600 were wounded. Some of the 6500 French prisoners that were taken after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu.

What now? Though the Viet Minh had won the battle, it did not immediately follow that they would become the rulers of Vietnam. Though the Viet Minh had won the battle, it did not immediately follow that they would become the rulers of Vietnam. A conference was being held at Geneva to determine the future of both Korea and Vietnam. A conference was being held at Geneva to determine the future of both Korea and Vietnam. In the tense Cold War atmosphere of the time, superpowers would determine Vietnam’s immediate future. In the tense Cold War atmosphere of the time, superpowers would determine Vietnam’s immediate future.