Fiscal Framework in Latvia NILS SAKSS DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT MINISTRY OF FINANCE 1.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
The Hungarian Budget Review Daniel Bergvall and Ian Hawkesworth Budgeting and Public Expenditures Division.
Advertisements

Determination of Budget ceilings and Distribution Among competing priorities – a Sector Based Appraoch By P.N. Makau BSD/MOF.
1 The 6-pack: tools for a stronger Economic Governance.
Linkages Between NPoA and MTEF
October 29,  Fiscal Risks identified and quantified in Mexico: ◦ Budgetary impact of fluctuations in key assumed macro-economic variables ◦ Long-term.
1 A New Fiscal Rule Karnit Flug Research department The Bank of Israel May, 2009.
Modernising government budget operations: Case studies from Europe Lewis Hawke World Bank The Exchange Abu Dhabi, UAE May 13-15, 2013.
The Brazilian Fiscal Responsibility Law of May 2000 The Brazilian Fiscal Responsibility Law of May 2000 Helio Tollini Fiscal Affairs Department/IMF April.
“Medium-Term Fiscal Framework in Brazilian States” Celia Carvalho President of the Finance State Managers’ Group “Medium-Term Fiscal Framework and Performance.
EU institutions.
The Treaties, Institutions and Policies of the EU
Method for salary and pension adjustment – Annex XI GTR – 28 September 2011.
Ireland’s Medium-Term Budgetary Framework John McHale Irish Fiscal Advisory Council National University of Ireland, Galway 17 April 2015 Session 7 – Independent.
The Stability and Growth Pact Frederick University 2013.
Elke Baumann Federal Ministry of Finance, Germany 39th CMTEA September 25, 2008 Iaşi A new budget rule for Germany in the light of uncertainty about medium-term.
PEFA Performance Measurement Framework A Tool For Budget Reforms THE GEORGIA EXPERIENCE.
The National Audit Office of Finland
Supervision and regulation of banking system duty is given to a autonomous organization called Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency. BRSA is public.
Commission’s proposals: 1) Revising Stability and Growth Pact 2) Preventing and Correcting macroeconomic imbalances Lecture 5 LIUC 2010.
Swedish Fiscal Policy 2008 Lars Calmfors Chairman.
International Symposium on the changing role of Parliament in the budget process: Experiences from PUIC Countries and EU Member States Cooperation between.
Fiscal Institutions Austrian Court of Audit and the Federal Financial Statements MMag. Günter Bauer, MBA.
System of public budgests in CR the state budget + extrabudgetary state funds = centralized municipality budgets (counties, towns) Distribute more than.
เอกสารประกอบการสัมมนาย่อย Clinic 3 “Discipline Court for Accounting, Budgeting, Finance and Fiscal” คุณหญิงจารุวรรณ เมณฑกา นายกสมาคมผู้ตรวจสอบภายในแห่งประเทศไทย.
Fiscal Policy Audit – National Audit Office of Finland Hannu Rajamäki Director for Performance Audit NAO of Finland.
PLAN AND BUDGET COMMITTEE AND THE OVERALL BUDGET PROCESS Yüksel KARADENİZ Legislative Expert.
Fiscal Frameworks: The Swedish experience 8 July, Ljubljana Joakim Sonnegård Head of Agency 1.
Paulius Baniūnas Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Lithuania EU Structural Support Management Department Monitoring and Analysis Division SYSTEM OF.
Economic Policy Committee The President Medium term expenditure frameworks and performance budgeting: Elements of the Quality of Public Finances Dr. Christian.
SAI & PAC Relationship Perspective from the Maldives “The work of an SAI, and its relations with parliament are key factors in a strong chain of accountability.
Fiscal Institutions Austrian Court of Audit and the Federal Financial Statements MMag. Günter Bauer, MBA.
Central government in the planning of municipal revenues and controlling financial sustainability in municipalities Audit department 3, Vilnius division,
European Labour Law Institutions and their Competencies JUDr. Jana Komendová, Ph.D.
The Government Budget Process and the Role of the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council Lars Calmfors Chairman.
EU Politics CHAPTER 13: Other Institutions. Outline 1) European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) 2) Committee of the Regions (CoR) 3) European Agencies.
MEDIUM TERM FINANCIAL PLAN ( ) Date : 8/10/2010 Decision No : 2010/28.
M O N T E N E G R O Negotiating Team for the Accession of Montenegro to the European Union Working Group for Chapter 32 – Financial Control Bilateral screening:
1 STRATEGIC PLANNING AND BUDGET PRIORITISATION IN CROATIA Francois-Roger Cazala, Rimantas Veckys SIGMA - Lithuanian Ministry of Finance.
Ministry of Finance Sweden Government Offices of Sweden Fiscal rules and medium term budgeting in Sweden Thomas Wilhelmsson, Budget Department, Ministry.
1 M O N T E N E G R O Negotiating Team for the Accession of Montenegro to the European Union Working Group for Chapter 9– Financial Services Bilateral.
M O N T E N E G R O Negotiating Team for the Accession of Montenegro to the European Union Working Group for Chapter 17– Economic and Monetary Policy Bilateral.
1 GROUP 1. 2 Group 1 - COUNTRIES 1. ARMENIA 2. CROATIA 3. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 4. BULGARIA 5. MACEDONIA 6. MONTENEGRO 7. ROMANIA 8. SERBIA Including.
M O N T E N E G R O Negotiating Team for the Accession of Montenegro to the European Union Working Group for Chapter 19 – Social Policy and Employment.
REPUBLIKA SLOVENIJA MINISTRSTVO ZA FINANCE 1 PLANNING WAGE BILL EXPENDITURES Saša Jazbec, Director General / Budget Directorate Ministry of Finance Ljubljana,
Results of (OECD) fiscal rules survey of PEMPAL countries Deanna Aubrey on behalf of BCOP Resource Team World Bank 24 February 2016.
Nacionalna agencija Republike Slovenije za kakovost v viskoem šolstvu - NAKVIS Slovenian Quality Assurance Agency of Higher Education - SQAA presented.
FINANCIAL AND FISCAL COMMISSION
Cash management and forecasting The relationship between the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Montenegro Marija Popović Branka Rogošić Pavle.
Fiscal Risk managment in Latvia
EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS
Irena Roštan Ministry of Finance OECD SBO CESEE meeting
Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Bill [B 75–2008]
Flavio Padrini Italy’s Parliamentary Budget Office
External Audit Core PFM Training Program Sanjay Vani
INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT
Jaehyuk CHOI / Policy Analyst
The Assessment of the Stability Programme of Lithuania for 2018
Ilze Danga Chief Economist of the Budget Division
Local governments and the fiscal discipine framework
The evaluation process
Bulgaria – Evolution in the Development of the Medium-Term Budgetary Framework Zagreb, Croatia | May 2018.
BCOP MEETING ON FISCAL RULES: WRAP-UP
International Experience with Rules-Based Fiscal Frameworks: Design Issues George Kopits Fiscal Council Republic of Hungary Conference on Fiscal.
Ministry of National Economy of The Republic of Kazakhstan
Bulgaria – Capital Budgeting And Fiscal Institutions
A New Fiscal Rule Karnit Flug Research department The Bank of Israel
The Czech Fiscal Council
Reforming Europe's fiscal framework Discussion
EDP/GFS revisions – user perspective
Identification and management of fiscal risks in Latvia
Presentation transcript:

Fiscal Framework in Latvia NILS SAKSS DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT MINISTRY OF FINANCE 1

Hierarchy of Laws Fiscal Discipline Law Law of Budget and Finance management Medium Term Budget Law Annual Budget Law 2

Fiscal Discipline Law 3

Architecture 4 Numerical fiscal rules 3 years fiscal framework Annual budget Top down fiscal planning Fiscal Discipline Law (FDL) Medium term Budget Framework Law (MTBFL ) Annual Budget Law

Fiscal Discipline Law  Entered into force: ;  Applicable starting from MTBF; Impact on budget laws from  Transitional provisions:  Declaration of Fiscal Risks (DFR): from MTBF;  Fiscal Safety Reserve: 2014: 0; 2015: 0; 2016: 0,1%; 2017 and onwards: according DFR;  Expenditure smoothing of EU Funds: from 2016;  Expenditure smoothing of government debt service : from 2017;  Fiscal Council : from  Entered into force: ;  Applicable starting from MTBF; Impact on budget laws from  Transitional provisions:  Declaration of Fiscal Risks (DFR): from MTBF;  Fiscal Safety Reserve: 2014: 0; 2015: 0; 2016: 0,1%; 2017 and onwards: according DFR;  Expenditure smoothing of EU Funds: from 2016;  Expenditure smoothing of government debt service : from 2017;  Fiscal Council : from Enactment Main elements Numerical Fiscal Rules; Fiscal Risks; Fiscal Council. Numerical Fiscal Rules; Fiscal Risks; Fiscal Council.

3 Numerical Fiscal Rules 6 Balance rule Expenditure growth rule Expenditure ceiling = Cyclical part + Structural balance + One-off measures Expenditure growth ( net GDP deflator): not more than the average potential GDP growth. Fixed in MTBFL for each of next 3 years. Operational tool for preparation of Budget Law ( stabilization, equalization, exceptions).

FDL: interaction of fiscal numerical rules (1) 7 Calculation of balance Government decision of size of structural balance (structural balance target (SBT)) Adding one - off measures Calculation of cyclical component Net of local government projected balance Net of projected balance of derived public bodies Net of ESA corrections Central government fiscal balance Central government revenue projections - Calculated CG expenditure ceiling (1) = Not less than minimal allowed structural balance -0,5% = MTO

FDL: interaction of fiscal numerical rules (2) 8 GG ESA expenditure in previous year Permissible expenditure growth Calculated GG ESA expenditure ceiling Net of local government projected expenditure Net of derived public bodies projected expenditure Net of ESA expenditure corrections Calculated CG expenditure ceiling (2) Calculated expenditure ceiling min Calculated CG expenditure ceiling (1)

FDL: interaction of fiscal numerical rules (3) 9 Calculated ceiling Inherited ceiling from previous MTBF 2nd and 3rd year Expenditure ceiling in MTBF for the 3rd year Expenditure ceiling in MTBF for the 1st and 2nd year difference difference < 0,1% GDP difference > 0,1% GDP

Max permissible CG expenditure  Max. permissible CG expenditure may differ from CG expenditure ceiling due to allowed modulation. 10 CG adjusted expenditure CG expenditure ceiling Debt service smoothed expenditure EU projects smoothed expenditure =-- Max. permissible CG expenditure CG adjusted expenditure = Actual debt service expenditure Actual EU projects expenditure ++ Fiscal Safety Reserve (FSR) Fiscal Risk expenditure covered by FSR -+ expenditure under Escape Clause balance neutral expenditure + +/- special one – off (court ruling) +

Escape clauses 1. Natural catastrophes, disasters and other material losses caused by natural or social processes. (>0,1% GDP); 2. In case of threat to national security according to article 62 of Latvian Constitution; 3. In case of severe economic downturn (recession). 11

Fiscal risk management  Fiscal risk management:  Regular identification, disclosure and mitigation;  Declaration of fiscal risks annexed to MTBFL;  Fiscal safety reserve: ( expenditure ceiling in MTBFL – expenditure in Budget Law) depending of fiscal risks, at least 0,1% of GDP. 12

Modulation 13 Max. permissible CG expenditure CG expenditure ceiling ≠ = In each single year In long term Projected structural balance Structural Balance Target ≠ = In each single year In long term 1.Expenditure smoothing 2.Fiscal safety reserve First «defense line» Automatic correction mechanism Second «defense line»

Automatic correction mechanism  (based on Swiss debt break rules) notional account registering deviations of actual structural balance (+/-) from its planned targets. If cumulative deviation is negative and higher than 0,5%, correction is triggered automatically by improving structural balance in next MTBF by extra 0,5% until deviation is fully compensated. 14

Fiscal Council  Fiscal Council: main task - monitoring implementation of fiscal rules. No direct mandate for independent macroeconomic forecasts, (in meaning of producing or endorsing macroeconomic forecasts), however will provide its opinion, which is not binding.  issuing annual report and irregularity reports;  Government response: comply or explain;  6 members;  independence safeguards (removal from office, financing). 15

Fiscal Council (2) Fiscal Council is independent collegiate institution established for the purpose of monitoring of the compliance with this Law. Council consists of six members; 1) three members of Council are nominated under the joint proposal of president of Bank of Latvia and minister of finance; 2) three members of Council are nominated by at least ten members of the Parliament. Members of Council shall be experts in financial and economical field from Latvia or from other member state of the European Union with experience in fiscal policy issues. Council consists of six members; 1) three members of Council are nominated under the joint proposal of president of Bank of Latvia and minister of finance; 2) three members of Council are nominated by at least ten members of the Parliament. Members of Council shall be experts in financial and economical field from Latvia or from other member state of the European Union with experience in fiscal policy issues. Members of Council shall be elected by Parliament for six years. The same member of Council shall be reelected not more than twice in consecutive order. status composition appointment 16

Financial safeguard mechanism Hourly salary rate for Council members is determined by applying a coefficient to the amount of the average monthly remuneration. salary Operational expenditure of the Council shall be planned by Ministry of Finance in separate budget programme under Ministry of Finance prescribing: 1) remuneration of members of the Council for at least six meetings per year, inter alia for at least eight hours for preparation for each Council meeting; 2) remuneration for Secretary of the Council; 3) expenditure for external experts not less than 50 percent of the Councils members and Councils Secretary remuneration fund; 4) compensation of travel expenses and accommodation Operational expenditure of the Council shall be planned by Ministry of Finance in separate budget programme under Ministry of Finance prescribing: 1) remuneration of members of the Council for at least six meetings per year, inter alia for at least eight hours for preparation for each Council meeting; 2) remuneration for Secretary of the Council; 3) expenditure for external experts not less than 50 percent of the Councils members and Councils Secretary remuneration fund; 4) compensation of travel expenses and accommodation budget 17

Fiscal Space Max. permissible CG expenditure Fiscal Discipline Law Previous year CG expenditure one –off expenditure n-1 one –off expenditure n adjustments of automatic mechanisms -++= Budget bases Fiscal space If positive fiscal space is projected, the procedure for new policy initiatives is launched 18

New policy initiatives 1.Each ministry may submit a proposal for new policy initiatives ; 2.Proposals are evaluated by cross-sectoral coordination unit and Ministry of Finance. 3.Evaluations are made against approved development programmes. 4.All proposals are ranked and presented to the government. After government take a decision to launch new policy initiatives : In theory Government decided to fund measures ranked highest. Decisions are political taking into account political pressures and governments own perception of most important measures. In praxis 19

Maximum permissible amount of the State budget expenditure (bottom- up) budget basis maximum permissible expenditure approved new policy initiatives For each ministry maximums permissible expenditure has been determined (bottom up). 20

MTBFL 21 Structural balance targets have been set for 2016;2018;2018 (-0,9;-1,0;-0,8) CG adjusted expenditure 2016;2018;2018

MTBFL annex 22 Top down (Max. permissible CG expenditure) Bottom up (CG expenditure under no change policy) Budget basis Initial fiscal space CG expenditure ceilings in MTBFL Free fiscal space

Example of how max. permissible expenditure has been determined

Main Challenges Ahead 24

Vision 25

Open questions 1. What is a role of rules in budget planning in your country; 2. Budget preparation – political tool or rules based process – what balance is desirable and realistic? 3. How to convince politicians to use more rules in budget planning? 4. Complexity of rules – can it be avoided? 26

End of presentation 27