© 2004 Ravi Sandhu www.list.gmu.edu The Extended Schematic Protection Model (ESPM) Ravi Sandhu Laboratory for Information Security Technology George Mason.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Combinatorial Auction
Advertisements

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu The Schematic Protection Model (SPM) Ravi Sandhu Laboratory for Information Security Technology George Mason University.
© 2004 Ravi Sandhu The Safety Problem in Access Control HRU Model Ravi Sandhu Laboratory for Information Security Technology George Mason.
© 2004 Ravi Sandhu A Perspective on Graphs and Access Control Models Ravi Sandhu Laboratory for Information Security Technology George.
On the Expressive Power of the Unary Transformation Model by Ravi Sandhu Srinivas Ganta Center for Secure Information Systems George Mason University.
ACCESS CONTROL: THE NEGLECTED FRONTIER Ravi Sandhu George Mason University.
ENGINEERING AUTHORITY AND TRUST IN CYBERSPACE: A ROLE-BASED APPROACH Prof. Ravi Sandhu Laboratory for Information Security Technology George Mason University.
© Ravi Sandhu HRU and TAM Ravi Sandhu Laboratory for Information Security Technology George Mason University
© 2004 Ravi Sandhu The Typed Access Matrix Model (TAM) and Augmented TAM (ATAM) Ravi Sandhu Laboratory for Information Security Technology.
Safety in Access Control Take-Grant (best viewed in slide-show mode)
© 2005 Ravi Sandhu Administrative Scope (continued) (best viewed in slide show mode) Ravi Sandhu Laboratory for Information Security Technology.
OM-AM and RBAC Ravi Sandhu * Laboratory for Information Security Technology (LIST) George Mason University.
CS344 : Introduction to Artificial Intelligence Pushpak Bhattacharyya CSE Dept., IIT Bombay Lecture 2 - Search.
Siddharth Srivastava, Shlomo Zilberstein, Neil Immerman University of Massachusetts Amherst Hector Geffner Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Siddharth Srivastava, Neil Immerman, Shlomo Zilberstein University of Massachusetts Amherst.
JAYASRI JETTI CHINMAYA KRISHNA SURYADEVARA
Primal-Dual Algorithms for Connected Facility Location Chaitanya SwamyAmit Kumar Cornell University.
Exact Inference in Bayes Nets
1 Towards formal manipulations of scenarios represented by High-level Message Sequence Charts Loïc Hélouet Claude Jard Benoît Caillaud IRISA/PAMPA (INRIA/CNRS/Univ.
1 Introduction to Computability Theory Lecture12: Decidable Languages Prof. Amos Israeli.
July 1, 2004Computer Security: Art and Science © Matt Bishop Slide #3-1 Chapter 3: Foundational Results Overview Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman result.
April 6, 2004ECS 235Slide #1 Chapter 13: Design Principles Overview Principles –Least Privilege –Fail-Safe Defaults –Economy of Mechanism –Complete Mediation.
April 13, 2004ECS 235Slide #1 Expressive Power How do the sets of systems that models can describe compare? –If HRU equivalent to SPM, SPM provides more.
Validating Streaming XML Documents Luc Segoufin & Victor Vianu Presented by Harel Paz.
Learning Equivalence Classes of Bayesian-Network Structures David M. Chickering Presented by Dmitry Zinenko.
Chapter 11: Limitations of Algorithmic Power
Weizmann Institute Tuning SAT-checkers for Bounded Model-Checking A bounded guided tour Ofer Shtrichman Weizmann Institute & IBM-HRL.
Mechanism Design Traditional Algorithmic Setting Mechanism Design Setting.
Variable-Length Codes: Huffman Codes
Dr. Kalpakis CMSC 621, Advanced Operating Systems. Fall 2003 URL: Security & Protection.
Pebble games for rigidity Overview. The game of pebbling was first suggested by Lagarias and Saks, as a tool for solving a particular problem in number.
CS-550 (M.Soneru): Protection and Security - 2 [SaS] 1 Protection and Security - 2.
Dr. Kalpakis CMSC 621, Advanced Operating Systems. Security & Protection.
System/Software Testing
CS526: Information Security Prof. Cristina Nita-Rotaru September 9, 2003 Protection Models.
CH14 – Protection / Security. Basics Potential Violations – Unauthorized release, modification, DoS External vs Internal Security Policy vs Mechanism.
1 Structured Region Graphs: Morphing EP into GBP Max Welling Tom Minka Yee Whye Teh.
Next-generation databases Active databases: when a particular event occurs and given conditions are satisfied then some actions are executed. An active.
May 9, New Topic The complexity of counting.
Slide #3-1 Chapter 3: Foundational Results Overview Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman result –Corollaries.
Slide #2-1 Access Control Matrix and Safety Results CS461/ECE422 Computer Security I, Fall 2009 Based on slides provided by Matt Bishop for use with Computer.
Slides for “Data Mining” by I. H. Witten and E. Frank.
Lection №4 Development of the Relational Databases.
Strings Basic data type in computational biology A string is an ordered succession of characters or symbols from a finite set called an alphabet Sequence.
2/1/20161 Computer Security Foundational Results.
Secret Sharing Non-Shannon Information Inequalities Presented in: Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC) 2009 Published in: IEEE Transactions on Information.
Combinatorial Auction. A single item auction t 1 =10 t 2 =12 t 3 =7 r 1 =11 r 2 =10 Social-choice function: the winner should be the guy having in mind.
Courtesy of Professors Chris Clifton & Matt Bishop INFSCI 2935: Introduction of Computer Security1 September 23, 2004 Introduction to Computer Security.
April 8, 2004ECS 235Slide #1 Overview Safety Question HRU Model Take-Grant Protection Model SPM, ESPM –Multiparent joint creation Expressive power Typed.
INFSCI 2935: Introduction of Computer Security1 September 13, 2005 Introduction to Computer Security Lecture 3 Take Grant Model (Cont) HRU Schematic Protection.
July 1, 2004Computer Security: Art and Science © Matt Bishop Slide #3-1 Chapter 3: Foundational Results Overview Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman result.
CS 2750: Machine Learning Directed Graphical Models
Institute for Cyber Security
September 16, 2004 Introduction to Computer Security Lecture 3
Intro to Theory of Computation
IS 2150 / TEL 2810 Introduction to Security
On the effect of randomness on planted 3-coloring models
OM-AM and RBAC Ravi Sandhu*
Expressive Power How do the sets of systems that models can describe compare? If HRU equivalent to SPM, SPM provides more specific answer to safety question.
Computational Issues in Secure Interoperation
Overview Safety Question HRU Model Take-Grant Protection Model
Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition
Computer Security Foundations
Outline Motivation Access Control Matrix Model
Chapter 3: Foundational Results
Assured Information Sharing
Chapter 6: Integrity Policies
Part 7. Phantoms: Legal States That Cannot Be Constructed
Jens Groth and Mary Maller University College London
Presentation transcript:

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu The Extended Schematic Protection Model (ESPM) Ravi Sandhu Laboratory for Information Security Technology George Mason University

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 2 Recap HRU has undecidable safety under very weak assumptions Bi-conditional monotonic Take-Grant and variations Efficiently decidable safety Unexpected aggregate policy Schematic protection model (SPM) Useful demarcation of efficiently decidable safety –Decidable for acyclic attenuating schemes polynomial in size of initial state exponential in number of types (for dense cc relation) open question: acyclic non-attenuating –Undecidable for cyclic schemes Copy flag and demand operation turn out to be redundant SPM can simulate Bell LaPadula multilevel security

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 3 SPM creation

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 4 ESPM joint creation

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 5 Monotonic HRU command

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 6 ESPM simulation 1.Parameter list generation Marshall parameter set of size Ji 2.Validating the conditional 3.Simulating the HRU command body Simulating creates –Unconditional create with alive right, so X/alive  dom(X) is required for X to participate in any command Simulating enters –straightforward

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 7 ESPM types p: proxy entity type P x /r  dom(P y ) for P x, P y of type p in ESPM system iff r  [P y,P x ] in HRU system {a j | j=1…J max }: agent types Represent ESPM proxy entity in j th parameter of HRU command {v i | i=1…I}: validator types Represent a collection of J i entities in instance of HRU command i Created by joint creation with agent types as parents {t k i | k=1…K i, i=1…I}: term types Simulate truth value of each term in each HRU command {c m i | m=1…M i, i=1…I}: create types Simulate creates for each HRU command {e n i | n=1…N i, i=1…I}: enter types Simulate enters for each HRU command

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 8 ESPM creation

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 9 ESPM attenuating loops If type(u i ) = type(v) Except that one such parent can have attenuating rule cr pj (u 1, u 2, …, u N, v) = p j /R 2 j  c/R 1 j cr c (u 1, u 2, …, u N, v) = p j /R 3 j  c/R 4 j so R 1 j  R 2 j and R 3 j  R 2 j and R 4 j  R 1 j

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 10 ESPM unfolded state

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 11 ESPM unfolded state

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 12 ESPM safety analysis exponential in types (like SPM) exponential in size of initial state (unlike SPM)

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 13 ESPM safety analysis

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 14 Expressive power of SPM and ESPM both are monotonic ESPM is equivalent to monotonic HRU HRU can simulate ESPM ESPM can simulate HRU ESPM with double-parent creation is equivalent to ESPM ESPM is at least as expressive as SPM ESPM can simulate SPM trivially it turns out that SPM is less expressive than ESPM (and thereby less expressive than monotonic) HRU

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 15 Monotonic access graph model nodes are strongly typed type of a node cannot change edges are strongly typed type of an edge cannot change graph operations initial state operations node operations –multi-parent –creates new edges from each parent to child edge operations –cannot create new nodes –must be monotonic (edges cannot be removed)

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 16 Simulation: scheme B simulates scheme A

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 17 Scheme A has double-parent creation

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 18 Double-parent creation in scheme A

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 19 Double-parent creation in scheme A

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 20 Failed simulation in scheme B with single-parent creation and identical initial state

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 21 Failed simulation in scheme B with single-parent creation and arbitrary initial state

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 22 Failed simulation in scheme B with single-parent creation and arbitrary initial state

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 23 Failed simulation in scheme B with single-parent creation and arbitrary initial state

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 24 Multi-parent creation does not add power in non- monotonic systems

© 2004 Ravi Sandhu 25 Multi-parent creation Adds power to monotonic models Perhaps should be viewed as a non-monotonic binding operation