Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex National Radiological Emergency Preparedness Conference May 5, 2016

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 History of the NRIA Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (1996) NRIA originally drafted in 2004 as an incident annex to the National Response Plan (NRP). NRIA updated in 2008 as an incident annex to the National Response Framework (NRF). The NRF was updated in Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) directed the creation of national planning frameworks and integrated operational plans 2

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 NRIA Scope 3 This iteration of the NRIA supersedes the 2008 version and will serve as an operational annex to the Response and Recovery FIOPs. Addresses both inadvertent/accidental incidents and deliberate attacks: ­ Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) ­ Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) ­ Radiation Exposure Device (RED) ­ Fixed nuclear facility incidents (deliberate and inadvertent/accidental) ­ Lost/found/orphaned radioactive material sources ­ Transportation incidents ­ Domestic nuclear weapons accidents ­ Foreign incidents involving nuclear or radioactive material (deliberate and inadvertent/accidental)

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 Updates Since 2008 NRIA Expansion of scope to address the Recovery Mission Area. Inclusion of new authorities, capabilities, and assets: ­ Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, Price-Anderson Act, Clean Water Act ­ Nuclear Regulatory Commission base and site teams and resident inspectors ­ Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Enterprise ­ Updated NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 Clarification of roles and responsibilities of coordinating agencies and linkages between mission areas. Identification of policy/strategic issues that uniquely impact delivery of the Response and Recovery Core Capabilities. 4

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex Base Annex Deliberate Attacks (Branch 1)Inadvertent Incidents (Branch 2)International Incidents (Branch 3) NRIA - Composition

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex Base Annex Concept of Operations Authorities for Interagency Coordination Roles and Responsibilities of Federal Agencies Support and Coordination Elements Cross cutting information requirements 6 Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex Base Annex

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 Federal Deployment Limitations 7 Information analysis established the following within early in an operation: There is limited Federal capability to operate within the damage zones. Multiple interagency missions (e.g., Counterterrorism, Defense, Continuity, Response, Recovery) will occur simultaneously. There is limited Federal capacity (e.g., military air support) to simultaneously support the deployment requirements of multiple missions. Prioritization of capability will be necessary to realize the greatest good for the greatest number of people.

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 KEY ISSUES How will various incident management roles be integrated/coordinated? How will interagency partners access the incident area/crime scene? What protocols, equipment, and expertise are needed to monitor responders’ accumulated radiation dose data? How can we improve pre-incident preparedness at the Federal level? How will large-scale radioactive waste be managed? What is the policy for reimbursing host states that provide sheltering and support services? How will resource requests be de-conflicted? 8

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 Federal Agencies with Primary Authority for Nuclear/Radiological Incident 9

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex Base Annex Appendix 1 - Federal Response Capability Inventory Appendix 2 - Data and Models to Support Nuclear/Radiological Response and Recovery Appendix 3 - Training to Support Nuclear/Radiological Response and Recovery Incidents 10 Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex Base Annex Appendices

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex Base Annex 11 Branch 1: Federal Response to and Recovery from Deliberate Nuclear/Radiological Attacks Provides scenario-specific supplemental information to the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex Base Plan. Applies to all federal responses to deliberate nuclear/radiological incidents, regardless of size or complexity, unless otherwise noted. The main focus is on a no-notice surface burst IND detonation with a yield of 10 kilotons Surface burst.

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 Zoned Approach 12 The traditional approach of deploying the maximum number of resources and responders to the incident area as quickly as possible is not realistic or effective for some types of nuclear/radiological incidents – notably INDs – due to the scope and complexity of the scenario (e.g., degree of immediate destruction, high levels of residual radiation in near-term). The Zoned Approach Workgroup found that using the Severe, Moderate, and Light Damage Zones to plan response operations and prioritize actions (“Zoned Approach”) helps to maximize: ­ Life-saving operations ­ Safety of Federal responders ­ Effectiveness of responder activities

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 Severe Damage Zone (to.5 mile) Moderate Damage Zone (to 1 mile) Light Damage Zone (to 3 miles) Outside Damage Zone Due to exceptionally high dose rates, Federal operations in the Severe Damage Zone expected to be limited to overflight operations such as aerial monitoring and to law enforcement investigative operations. Immediate local and state life- saving operations in the Light and Moderate Damage Zones outside of the fallout zone. Requests for Federal assistance in the Moderate and Light Damage Zones are expected to focus on lifesaving operations – specifically urban search and rescue operations. Majority of Federal operations and staging will occur well outside of damage and fallout zones* Federal Public Information and Warning Actions/Operations immediately upon detonation directing everyone within 50 miles to "Get Inside, Stay Inside and Stay Tuned" via IPAWS and all other media means. FALLOUT ZONE (inclusive of the DFZ) *Based on modeling, impacts to critical infrastructure (e.g. fuel, water, power) may inhibit operations outside of the damage zones. Zoned Approach – IND Phase 2a 13 Requests for Federal assistance are expected for the Light and Moderate Damage Fallout Zones. While the type of assistance required will mirror non- fallout zones, Federal capabilities must be able to operate in a contaminated environment. Capabilities will have a limited ‘stay time’ to protect federal responders from unacceptable health effects/risks.

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 Response Posture 14 The Response Posture Workgroup prioritized Response Core Capability delivery based on those that have the greatest impact on life-saving operations, while also ensuring the safety of federal responders. This prioritization is for use adjudicating resource requests within Phase 2a and some Core Capabilities become pivotal as the incident progresses. Many core capabilities are not dependent on the same resources, therefore, could be supported simultaneously without affecting a higher priority core capability.

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 Resource Prioritization – IND Severe Damage Zone FBI Hazardous Evidence Response Team EPA National Counterterrorism Evidence Response Team DOE Aerial Measuring System EPA Fixed-Wing Aircraft for Aerial Monitoring Moderate Damage Zone DOD CBRN Response Enterprise (e.g., Command and Control CBRN Response Elements A & B, Defense CBRN Response Force) DOE Radiological Assistance Program EPA Environmental Response Team EPA CBRN Consequence Management Advisory Team EPA On-Scene Coordinators Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center Light Damage Zone FEMA Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces and Incident Support Teams Fallout Zone All assets, resources, and teams capable of operating in the SDZ, MDZ, and LDZ. Outside of the Damage and Fallout Zones The majority of Federal assets, resources, and teams will deploy to and stage outside of the damage and fallout zones. 15 Utilizing the NRIA Resource List, the Resource Prioritization Workgroup identified Federal resources that could conduct operations within the damage and/or fallout zone in Phase 2a:

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex Base Annex 16 Branch 2: Federal Response to and Recovery from Inadvertent Nuclear/Radiological Incidents Provides scenario-specific supplemental information to the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex Base Plan. While focused on an incident at a nuclear power plant, the branch plan applies to all federal response and recovery efforts as they pertain to the unique circumstances of inadvertent nuclear/radiological incident types and locations.

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 Zoned Approach – Fixed Nuclear Facility 17

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 Utilizing the NRIA Resource List, the following Federal resources that could conduct operations within the Plume, Plume Exposure Pathway, and Ingestion Exposure Pathway in Phase 2a: Plume DOE Aerial Measuring System DOE Radiological Assistance Program EPA Fixed-Wing Aircraft for Aerial Monitoring Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center DOD CBRN Response Enterprise (e.g., Command and Control CBRN Response Elements A & B, Defense CBRN Response Force) Plume Exposure Pathway – 10 miles EPA Environmental Response Team EPA CBRN Consequence Management Advisory Team EPA On-Scene Coordinators Ingestion Exposure Pathway outside of the Plume – 50 miles The majority of Federal assets, resources, and teams will deploy and stage outside of the affected area. 18 Resource Prioritization – Fixed Nuclear Facility

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex Base Annex 19 Branch 3: Federal Response to International Nuclear/Radiological Incidents Provides supplemental information regarding overseas events to the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex Base Plan. Applies to all federal response and recovery efforts as they pertain to the unique circumstances of international nuclear/radiological incident types.

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 A series of time-phased decision points are outlined for executive leadership with guidance on decision criteria, responsible entities, and other information. Examples include:  Public Information and Warning  Crisis Standards Of Care  Emergency and Permanent Work Involving Contaminated Structures  Management and Removal of Debris  Long Term Waste Management  Decontamination Standards / Clearance Goals  Funding and Applicability of the Price Anderson Act  Relocation, Alternative Housing, and Reoccupancy  Remediation and Cleanup Executive Decision Points

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 Nuclear/Radiological Incident Task Force (NRITF)  Interagency group that convenes within the NRCC to provide nuclear/radiological incident specific subject matter expertise in support of national level incident planning and whole community core capability delivery.  Addresses specific tasks, objectives or issues, related to a nuclear or radiological incident, and makes recommendations for executive decision points.  The Task Force does not take the place of any Emergency Support Function (ESF), Recovery Support Function (RSF), program area, or agency. 21

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 Mission Area Integration - Prevention  If the incident involves suspected federal crimes of terrorism, the FBI will lead and coordinate the law enforcement response and investigation.  The Response and Prevention Mission Areas should enhance information-sharing pathways and coordinate interdependent decisions and operational activities.  The FBI has mechanisms to share sensitive information and coordinate interdependencies of activities and decisions at both the national and local level with its partners, as appropriate.  The FBI-led WMDSG at the FBI SIOC utilizes its FEMA-led Consequence Management Coordination Unit (CMCU) to ensure information sharing and coordination across the PPD 8 mission areas. 22

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 Where are we today???? The annex has been sent to the White House for final concurrence. The NRIA will be used in the next 2 weeks during the Capstone 2016 series of exercises. 23