DeepDroid Dynamically Enforcing Enterprise Policy Manwoong (Andy) Choi
Introduction Motivation: Company’s require a means of limiting access to resources in mobile devices belonging to employees to protect company assets. Android market share of 81% “all-or-nothing” installation option continuous access of approved permissions Solutions Android 4.3, experimental feature called “App Ops” Device Administration APIs provided by Google DeepDroid
Android Resource Access Resource Access through Android Middleware Resource Access through Linux kernel Binder encapsulates inter-process communication (IPC) messages and interprets them to corresponding procedure calls system_server acts as permission checking center with built-in permissions Native code can bypass middleware permission checking mechanism Group of IDs which are responsible for determining accessible resources for the app
DeepDroid Portability Fine Granularity Trustworthy Ease to Use Solution is deployed on different Android versions and devices with minimum configuration Various enterprise policies are supported by supervising and regulating Access control policy rules are strictly enforced, so that no app can violate any rules How easy the solution is deployed on different Android versions and devices
DeepDroid Enterprise Policy Center Authenticate mobile devices Distribute enterprise policies Monitor mobile devices DeepDroid On-device Device Monitor Bridge between the mobile device and Enterprise Policy Center Privilege Enforcement Authorises access privilege to apps Permission Configurator - middleware Process Creation Guard - kernel Context Enforcement Monitor resource access Trace system calls to regulate app operations Policy Engine Stores and maintains policy rules
Evaluations & Results Functional EvaluationPortability Evaluation Performance Evaluation
Summary Dynamic enterprise security policy enforcement scheme on Android Memory instrumentation Evaluation Portable Negligible performance overhead
Criticism Collusion Attack Combination of privileges to cause malicious behavior Communication through a covert channel Policy rules are user defined In report assumed to be trustworthy May not be the case, no tracking of policies
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