Making Routing Registries Great Again Jared Mauch – NTT Communications

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Presentation transcript:

Making Routing Registries Great Again Jared Mauch – NTT Communications

Problem Statement Routing Registries are Garbage In systems Automated process to add objects Varying practices about objects and proxy-registrations Tools not well understood

Existing tools Whois bgpq3

Process for accepting routes 1 – Customer wants something routed 2 – ? 3 – Profit!

How it actually works Cogent your sales representative to have prefixes added Validiaton check Passed to be implementation team NTT Generates filters from IRRs { NTTCOM, RIPE, ARIN, ALTDB, RADB, … } Can be described as GIGO (Garbage in, Garbage Out)

How to address this? Create new registry with human validated objects! Create a score and weight based on data such as ROA/RPKI Allocation data, present and past Historical Announcements Human review of paperwork Provide feedback to requestor

Benefits to requestor Ongoing thoughts in this space Block rogue announcements Improved access to BGP communities for traffic engineering Higher confidence in regular routing outcomes Fewer hijacks and sub-prefix hijacks Strictly tied to origin ASN? Immediate access to rebuild prefix-sets and lists No more waiting until cron runs, rebuild on demand!

Why not other $my_technology ROAs and RPKI are not accessible technology Wrapping social problem in cryptography does not solve social problem Existing IRR cleanup efforts feasible Tools exist, require significant education and training Routing police can be ineffective Often lacks real world outcomes in business critical timelines

Feedback/Questions? Abuse, ice cream and warm cookies welcome!