 Exploring the Possibility of Using Independent Oversight to Determine Standards for Space Vehicles Operating in the NAS By: Tara Halt

Background  Evolution from government agencies to private enterprises has been chaotic  Framework is needed to properly incentivize companies and create a safe environment  Models from other industries can be extremely insightful  Those models may be utilized as a framework for incentivizing safety in the commercial spaceflight industry by providing higher priority in a space transportation management scheme

Government, Industry and Third Party Framework  Governments  Slow to react and bureaucratic  Industry  May be willing to compromise safety for increased profits  Independent Safety Organization  May be a good compromise

Accident Theories Normal Accident Theory  Technological and Organizational Complexities contribute to failures  Accidents are seen as inevitable  Focus on learning from “close calls”  System approaches and system thinking High Reliability Theory  Bottom up approach  A properly designed system should be robust enough to avoid catastrophic failures  Lots of testing and research required

Naval Reactor Programs  Columbia Accident Investigation Report used the Naval Reactor Program as an example of a good safety culture  5,500 reactor years of experience without an accident  The Report attributed their success to these elements:  Communication and Action  Recurring Training and Learning from mistakes  Encouraging Minority Opinions  Retaining Knowledge  Worst-Case Event Failures

Classification Society  Developed by merchants and ship owners in the 1800s  The International Association of Classification Societies (ICAS) is the technical arm of the IMO  Classification societies are: “impartial organizations consisting of technical experts that have established a system of public safety based on private law contracts. They are often described as the unofficial ‘policemen’ in the marine world”  ICAS’s rules and standards are used by “over 90% of the word’s cargo carrying tonnage”

Aerospace Corporation  Performs independent launch verification for the U.S. Air Force  Extremely successful  “only has a 2.9 percent probability of failure rate in comparison to the commercial sector which is 14.6 percent”  The relationship between the Aerospace Corporation and the air space could be an excellent model for the space industry to follow

Applications to Space Traffic Management  Government could be too slow to create regulations until it is too late  “Blood Laws” in the Aviation Industry  Could create organizations similar to classification society's to develop standards  Tiered system for air traffic prioritization  The safer the system, the higher priority it receives  Determined by the independent safety organization  For example: points could be awarded if the company shows that they analyzed their system with both “top down” and “bottom up” approaches

Conclusion  The ideal independent oversight organization for space would be a combination of two models:  Classification Society Model  Aerospace Corporation Model  Important for organization not be prescriptive  Focus on safety and not just meeting design requirements  Government could still be involved as well  Example: Independent Organization verifies the launch is safe and the FAA ensures the safety of the uninvolved public

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