6/8/2012CEA 20121.  What is the impact of a depressed job market on deviant behavior in the workplace?  Deviant behavior can include any instance of.

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Presentation transcript:

6/8/2012CEA 20121

 What is the impact of a depressed job market on deviant behavior in the workplace?  Deviant behavior can include any instance of workplace indiscipline such as shirking, stealing, sabotage etc. 6/8/2012CEA 20122

 Suppose we compare two scenarios. In the first one, everyone anticipates a benign recession (if at all). In the second one, everyone expects a severe recession (if at all).  Under what scenario would deviant behavior in the workplace (on-the-job crime) be more?  What is the impact of optimism about the future on deviant behavior? 6/8/2012CEA 20123

 The relationship between the severity of a recession and deviant behavior depends on two factors:  Additional probability of being employed in the future of a worker who chooses not to commit a crime.  The additional utility that a person gets from being a deviant, conditional on being employed in future.  Therefore the incentive to commit crime is non- monotonically related with the severity of an anticipated recession. 6/8/2012CEA 20124

 We also find that an increase in optimism about the future unambiguously increases deviant behavior. 6/8/2012CEA 20125

 Two periods- 1 and 2.  Two possible states of the economy- H and L.  Given state in period 1, the probability of state in period 2 is. 6/8/2012CEA 20126

 Everyone is employed during a boom while only a fraction of workers are employed during a recession.  A person derives a private benefit from an act of crime. 6/8/2012CEA 20127

 Chance of being caught:  Therefore, a bad record implies that the person committed a crime in the past. However, a good record implies that the person is either innocent or was lucky in the past. 6/8/2012CEA 20128

 Punishment: A fine and the possibility of being fired from the job (that depends on the state of the economy in future).  Employers’ preference: (i) Experienced worker with a good record, (ii) inexperienced worker, and (iii) experienced worker with a bad record. 6/8/2012CEA 20129

6/8/2012CEA Second offence First offence Does not commit crime

 The rest of the talk considers the case of a boom in the first period.  The paper considers the case of a boom and a recession in period 1 separately. 6/8/2012CEA

 Benefit from committing crime in period 1:  Private benefit from crime  No set up cost of crime in future.  Cost of committing crime in period 1:  Fine (if caught).  Lower probability of employment in future. 6/8/2012CEA

 : Type of the marginal criminal.  : Proportion of workers employed in period 1 with a bad record (at the beginning of period 2). 6/8/2012CEA

Regime 3 Good: All employed No record: Does not exist Bad: Some employed Regime 1 Good: Some employed No record: Does not exist Bad: None employed 6/8/2012CEA

 : Probability of being employed in period 2. 6/8/2012CEA Regime 3 Regime 1

 In period 1, the following condition must hold in equilibrium: where is the dynamic deterrence effect. 6/8/2012CEA

where is the payoff of a person in period 2, given that the person is employed in period 2 and did not commit a crime in period 1. 6/8/2012CEA

 Suppose labor demand during a recession goes up (that is, goes up).  Such a change will impact dynamic deterrence by changing and 6/8/2012CEA

 In Regime 1, only a fraction of the workers with a good record are employed if there is a recession in period 2.  An increase in leads to an  increase in and an  increase in as well. 6/8/2012CEA

 The former decreases the incentive to commit crime in period 1, while the latter increases the incentive to commit crime.  Hence, the net effect on the crime rate is ambiguous. 6/8/2012CEA

 In Regime 3, during a recession in period 2, all of the workers with a good record are employed, and a fraction of the workers with a bad record are employed as well.  An increase in leads to a  decrease in and an  increase in 6/8/2012CEA

 Both of these increases the incentive to commit a crime in period 1.  Hence, crime rate increases. 6/8/2012CEA

 An increase in has an ambiguous effect on  but  increases  Hence, the net effect on the crime rate is ambiguous. 6/8/2012CEA

 Suppose there is an increase in  This unambiguously increases the crime rate. 6/8/2012CEA

 If the recession becomes less severe, then the crime rate increases unambiguously in only one of three possible cases.  An increase in optimism increases the crime rate unambiguously. 6/8/2012CEA