Arab-Israeli Wars 1967; Six Day War/June War 1973; October War

Causes for ‘67 war Unsolved problems from ‘48 of frontiers and refugees  Clashes along the Jordanian-Israeli border in the 1960s; Palestinian guerilla activities Arms race between Israel and the Arab states UNEF kept the Strait of Tiran open to Israel (result of ‘56)  Egyptian resentment Jordan waters  Arab military alliance to defend the sources of the rivers  potential threat to Israeli irrigation and security (Inter-Arab quarrels  united Arab command not a serious threat to Israel)

Triggering causes Conflict between Syria and Israel over demilitarized zones and border raids Soviet intelligence report about Israeli mobilization on the border to Syria (incorrect)  Nasser deployed troops in Sinai to show support for Syria UN troops (UNEF) left Sinai Straits of Tiran closed for Israeli shipping Public pressure as a response to Nasser’s “bluff”

Israeli (re)actions Blockade of Straits of Tiran intolerable Arab solidarity under Nasser’s leadership a serious threat to Israel  Military action necessary

Outbreak Soviet-US intervention did not happen Nasser trapped in his own web of promises and propaganda – gave the impression of being ready for war Jordan and Syria (and Iraq) joined Egypt June 5-9 Complete victory for Israel

Results Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian air forces destroyed Israel conquered – Sinai – Golan Heights – the West Bank Egypt lost men and 80% of air force and armor Syria lost men Refugees New demographic situation in Israel; mill Arabs within its territory

Effects Egypt lost revenue from oil fields in Sinai and shipping through Suez  had to accept help from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait Jordan lost agricultural region and tourist sites Israel too close to Damascus for Syrian comfort Military losses deprived Arabs of bargaining power Disparity in Arab/Israeli military strength abundantly clear “Psychological shock at … hollowness of the new Arab regimes” (– not much better then the old ones)  new regimes in Iraq and Syria  purges and attempted takeovers in Egypt USSR’s prestige in the region damaged

Soviet dependence Egypt’s military restored with Soviet help Thousands of Soviet military advisers in Egypt  Egypt completely dependent on USSR for military survival

Effect on Egypt Defeat  questioning of Egypt’s Arab policy, the efficiency of the army, Arab socialism and Nasser’s competence Nasser resigned, but stayed on because of the people’s insistence Purges; Amr “was suicided” Arab policy changed; better relations established with the conservative Arab states

War of attrition 1969/1970 – Artillery shelling across the Suez canal No development towards a permanent peace – Arab states were not going to negotiate from a position of weakness – Israel saw no need to make concessions Resolution 242; ambiguous and open-ended Rogers plan; a series of cease fires that ended the war of attrition

Resolution 242 November 1967 “termination of all claims or states of belligerency and acknowledgement of he sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area”  unacceptable to numerous Arab countries “just settlement of the refugee problem”  unacceptable to Palestinians and other Arabs “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” + “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict”  vague enough for Israel to accept Israel, Jordan and Egypt signed Resolution 242

The Rogers Plan ; competing strategies within US ME policy – Nixon/Kissinger vs. Rogers Rogers: USSR should be involved in a peace plan Kissinger: USSR should be excluded Rogers planned to implement Res. 242  Israel should withdraw from territories, joint Jordanian/Israeli adm of Jerusalem Israel supported by Kissinger, Nixon, AIPAC, etc. However; ceasefire between Israel and Egypt agreed upon

Nasser’s death August 1970: Cease-fire to end the War of Attrition signed September: Nasser called peace conference in Cairo to end the fighting between the Jordanian government and the Palestinian fedayeen in Jordan (Black September) Nasser died of a heart attack the next day (Sept. 28)

Anwar Sadat Goals – De-Nasserize Egyptian politics – Improve Egypt’s economy  had to make peace

Sadat and the superpowers USSR Sadat unhappy with Soviet cooperation  expelled the Soviet advisors from Egypt  USSR sped up arms shipment USA US favored signs of weakening ties between Egypt and USSR However: Firm supporters of Israel who saw no danger of war any time soon Israel had no interest in a peace agreement which would include loss of territory

Arms race continue USA and USSR did not want war in the Middle East, but continued to supply their allies with weapons… USA became Israel’s main supplier USSR supplied Egypt and Syria in return for use of air and naval bases Heavy Soviet involvement in Egypt; military advisers + pilots

1973 War Egypt’s economy drained by “no war, no peace” situation  needed peace to rebuild But: Israel not interested in peace negotiations Sadat attempted to make US involved in breaking the stalemate  Expelled Soviet military advisers Effect lost in Munich… New attempt; reveal Israeli military weakness  Israel/US willing to negotiate  War as an instrument of diplomacy

1973 Egypt’s decision – Attempt to break the deadlock – Keep the superpowers’ interest alive  reclaiming of the Suez Canal (and Sinai) – Instability  USSR pressured into supplying Egypt with arms (  success) – Wish to destroy the Bar Lev Line fortification (along the West Bank of Suez)

All to gain… A war against Israel would solve Sadat’s problems – Strengthen his standing in Egypt and the Arab region – Encourage Egyptians; boost in self-confidence – Military strength demonstrated  stronger position in peace negotiations with Israel – Peace agreement with Israel  Suez canal reopened and Sinai reclaimed  Reduce defense expenses  Stability could attract foreign investors

The war Assumption that the superpowers would prevent either side from complete victory Alliance with Syria  two front attack Support from Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Libya October 6 – 22 Early Egyptian/Syrian success (the crossing) Israeli outmaneuvered Egyptian troops Cease fire brokered by USA/USSR who had supported their client states during the war; seemed to have been on the brink of “superpower war” “Oil weapon” used effectively

Effects Political victory for Sadat, Egypt and Arabs – Israeli military invincibility shaken October war a proxy war between US and USSR  the Middle East a possible arena for Cold War conflict (  reason for peace) Oil embargo (  another reason for peace)  US got involved in peacemaking in the Middle East – accompanied by economic assistance Sadat’s position strengthened  new domestic policies introduced Economic problems  riots Political repercussions in Israel; Meir and Dayan resigned, intelligence failure criticized Big human losses – Arab numbers uncertain; perhaps as many as soldiers killed (Mansfield) – First Arab-Israeli war in which Israel lost large number (3000 killed, 8000 wounded) of soldiers

Sadat wanted permanent peace agreement w/Israel  Camp David Accords, September 1978  Egypt isolated in Arab world and dependent on the USA