Ageing and the Tax Implied in Public Pension Schemes: Simulations for Selected OECD Countries* Robert Fenge / Martin Werding Ifo Institute for Economic Research & CESifo * Generous support by the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) of the Japanese Government is gratefully acknowledged.
The Impact of Ageing on Public Pensions Concepts of measurement: Net pension liabilities General government fiscal balances Generational accounting “Implicit taxes”
Implicit taxes: definition #1 Implicit tax falling on “generation t”: IT t = NPV (contributions t ) – NPV (benefits t+1 ) Implicit tax rate: t = IT t / w t = [ t w t – p t+1 / (1+r t +1 )] / w t = Extension to an N-period setting...
Implicit taxes: definition #2 straightforward from the simple algebra of pensions well-founded in pension theory (Sinn 2000) : 0 < 0; N 0 0 = –ID 0 ; ID 0 = N t t, t = 1 easy to apply to an empirical context (Thum / Weizsaecker 2000; Fenge / Werding 2001) suited to analyse welfare effects at an individual level
Implicit taxes: application to real-world pension schemes Financial projections for public pension schemes in selected OECD countries (CESifo Pension Model) Stylised biographies for representative individuals (covering disability pensions, old-age pensions, and survivor pensions) The rôle of assumptions... Impact of policy responses
The anatomy of our results: Germany #1
The anatomy of our results: Germany #2
Incremental reforms: Germany
Fixing contribution rates: Austria
CPI indexation (p. after award): France
CPI indexation (p. at award): UK
Partial pre-funding: USA
A “funded” system: Japan
Concluding remarks Not surprisingly, ageing causes a general upward trend in implicit tax rates Levels and curvatures of tax profiles are highly country-specific Effectiveness of different policy measures can be illustrated Is tax smoothing useful?
Annex
The standardised agent’s biography* * Basic assumptions for the case of Germany. Probability of disablement and conditional life expectancies adapted to national averages.
UK: The impact of wage indexation
UK: The effects of contracting-out