Republican Strategic Policy Détente and Nuclear Anxieties

Sufficiency  Nuclear Options Needed  Old Thinking  Counterforce and CEP  Counter limited strikes in kind  Damage Limitation (hard target kill)  Seemed more feasible because weapons accuracy was improving… or was it?  Nuclear Options Needed  Old Thinking  Counterforce and CEP  Counter limited strikes in kind  Damage Limitation (hard target kill)  Seemed more feasible because weapons accuracy was improving… or was it?

Sufficiency  RAND’s James Schlesinger was skeptical of accuracy claims and what was necessary for surgical counterforce strikes  Measures of warhead accuracy misleading  CEP measures more reliability than accuracy (radius within which a missile will land 50% of the time)  CEP more a description of clustering and reliability than accuracy  Accuracy affected by wind patterns, gravity, etc. that can only be revealed through testing  RAND’s James Schlesinger was skeptical of accuracy claims and what was necessary for surgical counterforce strikes  Measures of warhead accuracy misleading  CEP measures more reliability than accuracy (radius within which a missile will land 50% of the time)  CEP more a description of clustering and reliability than accuracy  Accuracy affected by wind patterns, gravity, etc. that can only be revealed through testing

Sufficiency  U.S. tests missiles out of Vandenberg AFB in California to the Kwajalein Islands in the South Pacific  No a true measure given different elements, trajectory, gravitational pull, etc. on route toward USSR  U.S. tests missiles out of Vandenberg AFB in California to the Kwajalein Islands in the South Pacific  No a true measure given different elements, trajectory, gravitational pull, etc. on route toward USSR

Schlesinger as SecDef  James Schlesinger suggests “shot across the bow”  Very limited nuclear use… demonstration shots  Compellent threat accompanied by action demonstrating resolve  Interesting idea but with considerable problems  James Schlesinger suggests “shot across the bow”  Very limited nuclear use… demonstration shots  Compellent threat accompanied by action demonstrating resolve  Interesting idea but with considerable problems

Schlesinger as SecDef  Problems with “shot across the bow”  How do you do it? What targets should you select?  If target is too safe and attack too small, the adversary might think you’re chicken  How might Soviets respond?  Respond in kind  Hit back harder  Do nothing, simply ignore  Problems with “shot across the bow”  How do you do it? What targets should you select?  If target is too safe and attack too small, the adversary might think you’re chicken  How might Soviets respond?  Respond in kind  Hit back harder  Do nothing, simply ignore

Consequences of Sufficiency  SIOP suggests need for more and wider variety of weapons to accomplish all sorts of missions from the smallest to massive retaliation  Debate over sufficiency:  Set stage for change in nuclear debate to one of renewed anxiety about adequacy of nuclear forces  Critics argued US was dangerously vulnerable to increasingly powerful Soviets  Late 1970s criticisms echo those of the late 1950s  SIOP suggests need for more and wider variety of weapons to accomplish all sorts of missions from the smallest to massive retaliation  Debate over sufficiency:  Set stage for change in nuclear debate to one of renewed anxiety about adequacy of nuclear forces  Critics argued US was dangerously vulnerable to increasingly powerful Soviets  Late 1970s criticisms echo those of the late 1950s

Renewed Concerns about US Inferiority  Soviet First Strike Incentives  Soviets continue buildup even after early 1970s parity  More accurate Soviet MIRVs threaten US nuclear arsenal  One Soviet missile could now carry multiple warheads and take out several US missiles  Each US missile (also MIRV’d) knocked out would neutralize several US warheads  In a crisis, a first strike would be tempting  Nitze’s Committee on the Present Danger  Nitze had quit arms control delegation because he thought treaties being negotiated were militarily unwise and only done for political reasons.  Soviet First Strike Incentives  Soviets continue buildup even after early 1970s parity  More accurate Soviet MIRVs threaten US nuclear arsenal  One Soviet missile could now carry multiple warheads and take out several US missiles  Each US missile (also MIRV’d) knocked out would neutralize several US warheads  In a crisis, a first strike would be tempting  Nitze’s Committee on the Present Danger  Nitze had quit arms control delegation because he thought treaties being negotiated were militarily unwise and only done for political reasons.

Nitze’s Nightmare  U.S. will be self-deterred  Soviets evacuate cities  Use part of MIRV’d ICBMs to attack US land-based missiles, bombers, and missile submarines in port  US left with SLBMs that could only hit cities  Soviet cities only have 3-4% of population left in them  US won’t retaliate because USSR still has massive countervalue forces at the ready  President fears destruction of US cities  After absorbing Soviet first-strike, USSR numerical advantage has been further increased  U.S. will be self-deterred  Soviets evacuate cities  Use part of MIRV’d ICBMs to attack US land-based missiles, bombers, and missile submarines in port  US left with SLBMs that could only hit cities  Soviet cities only have 3-4% of population left in them  US won’t retaliate because USSR still has massive countervalue forces at the ready  President fears destruction of US cities  After absorbing Soviet first-strike, USSR numerical advantage has been further increased

Nitze’s Nightmare  Arguments against Nitze  Technically doubtful… plenty of US forces would be likely to survive for retaliation  Ignores risks Soviets would have to heed before launching  What if US launches on warning?  Counterforce attack would still kill million Americans. Could USSR count on US to be rational and show restraint or would it lash out and kill million Soviet citizens?  Arguments against Nitze  Technically doubtful… plenty of US forces would be likely to survive for retaliation  Ignores risks Soviets would have to heed before launching  What if US launches on warning?  Counterforce attack would still kill million Americans. Could USSR count on US to be rational and show restraint or would it lash out and kill million Soviet citizens?

Assured Destruction Not Good Enough  Colin S. Gray says Soviets will not be deterred by threats of assured destruction  USSR leaders not deterred because they don’t value the society threatened  Must threaten the regime and the survival of the Soviet state  Threaten regime-change like Japan and Germany in WWII  Nuclear weapons should not be countervalue or counterforce, but “counter- state”  Colin S. Gray says Soviets will not be deterred by threats of assured destruction  USSR leaders not deterred because they don’t value the society threatened  Must threaten the regime and the survival of the Soviet state  Threaten regime-change like Japan and Germany in WWII  Nuclear weapons should not be countervalue or counterforce, but “counter- state”

Assured Destruction Not Enough  Response to Gray’s argument  What evidence do you have that Soviet leadership doesn’t value society? (WWII not a good illustration)  Soviets would know that any nuclear war would threaten the existence of the state  Assumes that only acceptable resolution of conflict is unconditional surrender  Such an all-or-nothing prospect could prevent US from settling for less to avoid nuclear annihilation  Imminent political demise of the USSR might be one situation that would provoke desperation and elicit an irrational massive retaliation from Soviets  Response to Gray’s argument  What evidence do you have that Soviet leadership doesn’t value society? (WWII not a good illustration)  Soviets would know that any nuclear war would threaten the existence of the state  Assumes that only acceptable resolution of conflict is unconditional surrender  Such an all-or-nothing prospect could prevent US from settling for less to avoid nuclear annihilation  Imminent political demise of the USSR might be one situation that would provoke desperation and elicit an irrational massive retaliation from Soviets

1970s Concerns Pertinent Today  What to do if deterrence fails?  How likely is it that deterrence will fail?  If you’re nervous about the second question, you’d better think a lot about the first question  Ever-increasing Soviet capabilities  More assertive Soviet behavior throughout the world  What to do if deterrence fails?  How likely is it that deterrence will fail?  If you’re nervous about the second question, you’d better think a lot about the first question  Ever-increasing Soviet capabilities  More assertive Soviet behavior throughout the world