Topic 10Summer 2003 1 Ariane 5 Some slides based on talk from Sommerville.

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Presentation transcript:

Topic 10Summer Ariane 5 Some slides based on talk from Sommerville

Topic 10Summer Ariane 5 l Capable of hurling 2 – 3 ton satellites into orbit l 10 years l $7 Billion l Would have given Europe supremacy in the commercial satellite business

Topic 10Summer Ariane 5 –On June 4, 1996, the Arianne 5 took off on its maiden flight. l Successor to the successful Ariane 4 launchers l Ariane 5 can carry a heavier payload than Ariane 4 l 40 seconds into its flight it veered off course and self- destructed

Topic 10Summer Launcher failure l 39 seconds after lift off Altitude reaches 2.5 miles - Ariane 5 goes into self destruct Along with 5 expensive and uninsured satellites l Why did it go into self destruct mode? Incorrect control signals were sent to the engines and these swivelled - Ariane 5 swerved Pressure in boosters and main engine l Why did it swerve? It was making a course correction that was not needed.

Topic 10Summer Launcher failure l Why the course correction? Steering controlled by onboard computer Thought course change was necessary because of numbers being displayed by the inertial guidance system The numbers looked like data – impossible data- but was actually an error message The guidance system had shutdown l Why did the guidance system shutdown? Tried to convert a 64-bit format velocity to a 16-bit format Overflow error l What about the backup? Backup system failed too.. »It was running the same software

Topic 10Summer General Problem l The system failure was a direct result of a software failure. However, it was symptomatic of a more general systems validation failure l No exception handler associated with the conversion The system exception management facilities were invoked. These shut down the software.

Topic 10Summer Avoidable failure? l The software that failed was reused from the Ariane 4 launch vehicle. The computation that resulted in overflow was not used by Ariane 5. l Decisions were made Not to remove the facility as this could introduce new faults Not to test for overflow exceptions because the processor was heavily loaded. For dependability reasons, it was thought desirable to have some spare processor capacity

Topic 10Summer Why not Ariane 4? l The physical characteristics of Ariane 4 (A smaller vehicle) are such that it has a lower initial acceleration and build up of horizontal velocity than Ariane 5 l The value of the variable on Ariane 4 could never reach a level that caused overflow during the launch period.

Topic 10Summer Validation failure l As the facility that failed was not required for Ariane 5, there was no requirement associated with it. l As there was no associated requirement, there were no tests of that part of the software and hence no possibility of discovering the problem. l During system testing, simulators of the inertial reference system computers were used. These did not generate the error as there was no requirement!

Topic 10Summer Review failure l The design and code of all software should be reviewed for problems during the development process l Either The inertial reference system software was not reviewed because it had been used in a previous version The review failed to expose the problem or that the test coverage would not reveal the problem The review failed to appreciate the consequences of system shutdown during a launch

Topic 10Summer Lessons learned l Don’t run software in critical systems unless it is actually needed l Test what the system should do l test what the system should not do l Do not have a default exception handling response which is system shut-down in systems that have no fail-safe state

Topic 10Summer Lessons learned l In critical computations, always return best effort values even if the absolutely correct values cannot be computed l Wherever possible, use real equipment and not simulations l Improve the review process to include external participants and review all assumptions made in the code

Topic 10Summer Avoidable failure l The designer’s of Ariane 5 made a critical and elementary error. l They designed a system where a single component failure could cause the entire system to fail