The law that governs this dispute is the 1982 UNCLOS, of all 5 state claimants have signed and ratified. Part II, Section 2, Art 3 of the UNCLOS states that the territorial waters of a coastal State extends up to 12 nautical miles from its coastline Part V, Art 56 of the UNCLOS provides for states’ rights to claim EEZs in the territorial sea and outlines what activities can be carried out in the EEZs. In addition, Part VIII, Article 121 states that “[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf” The applicable law

 China claims sovereignty of what appears to be the entire SCS, which includes both island chains and encroaches very closely to a few other. It first released a map in 1947 under Mao Zedong’s reign, which drew a “nine-dash line” – a U-shaped line that demarcated China’s claimed territory, and which comes precariously close to the coastlines of smaller Southeast Asian states, including the 4 ASEAN claimants. It has stated that its right to the territory is based on more than 2,000 years of history during which it considered it to be part of Chinese territory (BBC, 2013). It is said to be the most extensive but also weakest claim amongst all the claims, due to its lack of geographical proximity of the Spratly Islands, as compared to some of the other claimant states. Furthermore, it has not occupied any of the islands, while Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines have. The Claims

The Philippines has claimed, on the basis of its geographical proximity, the whole of. In the alternative, if a tribunal were to find that China has sovereignty over the Spratly land features, the Philippines argues that they are merely rocks or reefs, which means no EEZ rights are conferred on them, and thus China has only limited rights to the surrounding resources

 ASEAN is an association formed by 10 nations in the Southeastern region of Asia, 4 of which are claimants to the Spratly Islands. The “ASEAN Way” refers to a set of principles that governs how ASEAN members behave and relate to one another, including the principle of non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs, and the requirement of a unanimous vote on any major decisions made as a group. As such, many have heavily criticized the association for being slow to make decisions and implement agreements, like in the present matter. In addition, with the small stature and influence of its individual members, and its status as a battleground for influence during the Cold War, members aligned themselves with major world powers, subjecting the group to conflicts between the interests of external powers. Notwithstanding their geographical proximity, there is also great diversity among its members, politically, economically and culturally, and this has been cited as a key challenge to the unity of the association. As a regional association, some commentators still see ASEAN as transitioning from the early stages of serving to build up each member state’s confidence in other members, and in the idea of regional diplomacy, towards a more mature stage of “preventive diplomacy”, and ultimately to “dispute resolution”

 China is the most dominant power in the region – both militarily and economically. It has, in the past, often been the “loser” in territorial disputes. So, one interest of the Chinese is to gain or maintain its prestige and status as a regional power. The public position taken by China is that it aims to protect the country “against foreign and domestic threats to both territory and sovereignty; and the eventual achievement of great power status in Asia and beyond”

 The Philippines has emerged as one of the most vocal claimants in this dispute. It claims sovereignty over the Spratly Islands on the basis of geographical proximity – the Scarborough Shoal, one of the hotly contested islands, lies a little more than 100 miles from the Philippines’ coastline