INMM Nuclear Security and Physical Protection Technical Division.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Museum Presentation Intermuseum Conservation Association.
Advertisements

Department of Homeland Security Site Assistance Visit (SAV)
/0403 Copyright ©2004 Business and Legal Reports, Inc. BLRs Safety Training Presentations Transportation Security TrainingPart II 49 CFR
Homeland Security and Law Enforcement Created By: Ashley Spivey For _Local_Actions_for_Homeland_Security.pdf.
Airport Security – Post 9/11
1 Technical Meeting on Managing the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power SECURITY STATUS IN CHILE Mauricio Lichtemberg Chilean Nuclear.
Introduction to Operations Security (OPSEC) Updated 09/28/11 1 Security is Everyone's Responsibility – See Something, Say Something!
FACILITY SAFETY: Creating a Safe and Secure Environment in the Community Health Center Presented by Steve Wilder, BA, CHSP, STS Sorensen, Wilder & Associates.
SAND No C Sandia is a multi-program laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of.
In-depth look at ISACS Stockpile Management: Weapons Photo: MAG.
GSA Office of Emergency Response and Recovery Risk Based Continuity Planning Darren J. Blue, Director, Policy and Plans, Office of Emergency Response.
Copyright 2004 Foreman Architects Engineers School Security From Common Sense to High Tech.
Physical Security John Schwertfeger Security Manager Duane Arnold Energy Center.
Chapter 5 Enhancing Security Through Physical Controls
Physical and Environmental Security Chapter 5 Part 1 Pages 427 to 456.
Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) June 2011 Physical (Environmental) Security.
1 An Overview of Computer Security computer security.
Sanjay Goel, School of Business/Center for Information Forensics and Assurance University at Albany Proprietary Information 1 Unit Outline Qualitative.
Sanjay Goel, School of Business/Center for Information Forensics and Assurance University at Albany Proprietary Information 1 Unit Outline Information.
Physical and Cyber Attacks1. 2 Inspirational Quote Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running between, deep natural hollows,
A brief overview of the IRVS for Schools Assessment Tool and its four major components.
Responsible CarE® Employee health and Safety Code David Sandidge Director, Responsible Care American Chemistry Council June 2010.
Developing a Chemical Risk Management Program
1 SAND No C Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of.
Introduction to Network Defense
Physical Security SAND No C Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States.
National Response Team Presentation: “Security Risk Assessment Methodologies: Community VAM 3/3/3 Presented By: Gloria E Chavez Sandia National Laboratories.
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency International Cooperation in Nuclear Security David Ek Office of Nuclear Security.
/0503 Copyright ©2005 Business and Legal Reports, Inc. BLR’s Safety Training Presentations Hazardous Materials Transportation 49 CFR BLR’s.
Visual 3. 1 Lesson 3 Risk Assessment and Risk Mitigation.
Module 02: 1 Introduction to Computer Security and Information Assurance Objectives Recognize that physical security and cyber security are related Recognize.
FOOD SAFETY AND SECURITY Operational Risk Management DHHS, US Food and Drug Administration, Center for Food Safety and Nutrition November 2001.
Overview Of Information Security Management By BM RAO Senior Technical Director National Informatics Centre Ministry of Communications and Information.
HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM. Established after the terrorist attacks on America September 11, 2001.
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA Nuclear Security Programme Enhancing cybersecurity in nuclear infrastructure TWG-NPPIC – IAEA May 09 – A.
Computer Security: Principles and Practice First Edition by William Stallings and Lawrie Brown Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown Chapter 1 – Overview.
Computer Security: Principles and Practice
Important acronyms AO = authorizing official ISO = information system owner CA = certification agent.
Certification and Accreditation CS Phase-1: Definition Atif Sultanuddin Raja Chawat Raja Chawat.
Dr. Benjamin Khoo New York Institute of Technology School of Management.
Securing Critical Chemical Assets: The Responsible Care ® Security Code Protection of Hazardous Installations from Intentional Adversary Acts European.
Information Systems Security Operations Security Domain #9.
 Is the process of conducting an exhaustive physical examination and thorough inspection of all operational systems and procedures of a facility.
1 Appendix B Initial Briefing Template. 2 Site X Vulnerability Assessment (VA) Presenter name Presenter organization Presenter phone Presenter phone/ .
Physical (Environmental) Security
Nuclear Safety & Nuclear Security Synergy By Dr. Lucian BIRO Director General ROMANIA National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control International.
Energize Your Workflow! ©2006 Merge eMed. All Rights Reserved User Group Meeting “Energize Your Workflow” May 7-9, Security.
Health Emergency Risk Management Pir Mohammad Paya MD, MPH,DCBHD Senior Technical Specialist Public Health in Emergencies Asian Disaster Preparedness Center.
Personnel & Equipment Implement Measures To Reduce Your Unit’s Vulnerabilities to Terrorist Acts/Attacks Figure 1.
Visual 1. 1 Lesson 1 Overview and and Risk Management Terminology.
Introduction and Overview of Information Security and Policy By: Hashem Alaidaros 4/10/2015 Lecture 1 IS 332.
Principles of Security
INTEGRAL SYSTEM OR SIMPLE COMBINATION
STEALTH AND DECEPTION – SPEED AND VIOLENCE: How the New Threat Affects Physical Protection Systems.
IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making Workshop Information IAEA Workshop Defence in Depth Safety Culture Lecturer.
10. Security and Physical Protection Basic Concepts
Safety Management Systems Session Two Safety Risk Management APTA Webinar April 28, 2016.
Physical Security at Data Center: A survey. Objective of the Survey  1. To identify the current physical security in data centre.  2.To analyse the.
Headquarters U.S. Air Force
Physical and Technological Security
Headquarters U.S. Air Force
Presenters Robert “RJ” Hope, CPP Kevin Whaley
Risk management.
Presentation Objectives
A Holistic Approach to School Security
Chapter 7: RISK ASSESSMENT, SECURITY SURVEYS, AND PLANNING
Objectives Telecommunications and Network Physical and Personnel
GNI Advanced Reactors Security Analysis & Findings
Securing Critical Chemical Assets: The Responsible Care® Security Code
Project Risk Management Jiwei Ma
Presentation transcript:

INMM Nuclear Security and Physical Protection Technical Division

2 Safeguards and Security Program Audits & Inspections Site-specific VAs Program Management Procedures Training Testing & Evaluations Laws & Codes Policies & Directives

ASSESS Model JTS Model SAVI Model Adversary Sequence Diagrams EASI Model Analysis/ Evaluation Analyze PPS Design Redesign PPS Final PPS Design Design PPS Determine PPS Objectives Facility Characterization Threat Definition Target Identification Physical Protection Systems DetectionDelayResponse Exterior Sensors Access Delay Response Force Interior SensorsResponse Force Communications Alarm Assessment Alarm Communi-cation & Display Entry Control Design & Evaluation Process of a PPS

Characterize the facility in terms of: Site boundary Buildings (construction and HVAC systems) Room locations Access points Processes within the facility Operating conditions (working hours, off-hours, potential emergencies) Existing physical protection features Safety considerations Types and numbers of employees Facility Characterization

Using all information sources determine attributes of: Outsiders (no authorized access): protestors (demonstrators, activists, extremists), terrorists, criminals Insiders (authorized access): betrayal, revenge, abnormal behavior Collusion: cooperation between Outsiders and Insiders Threat Definition

Determine the possible targets for the following actions: Sabotage: identify vital areas to protect Theft of material or information: identify location of materials to protect Target Identification

Example: Consequence Factor ( C ) Table Undesired EventMeasure of Consequence Very High 1.0 High 0.8 Medium 0.6 Medium Low 0.4 Low 0.2 Very Low 0.1 Loss of Mission Loss of Nuclear Material Radioactive Environmental Damage Public Relations Impact Weapons Program % change of acceptance attitude in the state Loss of a nuclear weapon1 Weapon-- -20%-15%-10%-1%-- Chemical or Environmental Damage Number of deaths >3000 deaths deaths death <1 death -- Exposure to person at site boundary for 2 hours after the sabotage event >250 Rem Rem Rem Rem Rem <25 Rem Time out of service Cost to recover or loss >2 years2 yrs-14 days<1 dayMinutes--14 days-1 day $500M-$100M$1M-$100K<$100K--$100M-$50M>$500 M High Enriched U >20% Enriched U 10% - 20% Fresh Fuel Assemblies <10% Pu >5 Kg Kg g 5 Kg -1 Kg >10 Kg >10 Assays 2 Kg g 1 Kg - 15 g 10 Kg - 1 Kg >10 Assays 500 g - 15 g 15 g - 1 g 1 Kg - 1 g - 15 g - 1 g < 1 g

System functions that must all be present Detection: Indicates the start of the adversary act Delay: Only after detection is delay effective; delay retards the adversary to give the response force time to respond Response: Can come from onsite guards or off- site police or military personnel Design of Physical Protection Systems

Adversary Task Time vs PPS Time Requirements Begin Action First Alarm Time Task Complete System Detect System Respond Alarm Assessed Adversary Interrupted T0T0 TATA TITI TCTC System Delay Adversary Task Time PPS Time Required

Pick the Worst Path For The Site Building Door Sensors Gate Fence VITAL AREA

Determine Probability of Interruption Along that Path Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption Delay (in Seconds) TaskDescriptionP(Detection)LocationMeanStandard Deviation 1Cut Fence0E10.3 2Run to Building0E Open Door0.9E20.6 4Run to Vital Area0E Open Door0.9E51.5 6Sabotage Target0E Probability of Alarm Communication Response Force Time (in Seconds) Mean Standard Deviation Probability of Interruption 0.61

How do we know if security measures are good enough? Use “Consequence Weighted Conditional Risk” Risk ( R ) = P A * [1- (P I *P N )] * C Probability of Interruption (P I ) Probability of Neutralization (P N ) Consequence Value ( C ) Probability of Adversary Attack (P A ) Conditional Risk (R C ) = 1 * [1- (P I *P N )] * C Risk Analysis

As a result of the analysis: Identify vulnerabilities in the PPS Redesign system to correct noted vulnerabilities Re-evaluate to verify vulnerability is corrected Redesign or Upgrade of PPS

System Integration DETECTIONDELAYRESPONSE SYSTEM CONCEPT UPGRADED SYSTEM CURRENT SYSTEM TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS Threats Site Characteristics Vulnerabilities Safety Cost Operational Budget Protection Level Performance Communication Entry Control Assessment Intrusion Detection Active Barriers Passive Barriers Guards Numbers Equipment Tactics Training Balanced Supportable Acceptable Cost Effective