Prof. Enrico Zio Event tree analysis Prof. Enrico Zio Politecnico di Milano Dipartimento di Energia.

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Prof. Enrico Zio Event tree analysis Prof. Enrico Zio Politecnico di Milano Dipartimento di Energia

Prof. Enrico Zio Techniques for Risk Analysis Hazard identification: FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis) & HAZOP (HAZard and OPerability study) Accident Scenarios Identification: ETA, FTA System Failure Probabilty Assessment: ETA, FTA, Monte Carlo simulation

Prof. Enrico Zio Event Tree Analysis (ETA) Systematic and quantitative Systematic and quantitative Inductive Inductive AIM: 1.Identification of possible scenarios (accident sequences), developing from a given accident initiator 2.Computation of accident sequence probability

Prof. Enrico Zio ETA: Procedure steps 1. 1.Define accident initiator I (system failure); 2. 2.Identify safety/protection systems (S k ) demanded by I 3. 3.Specify failure/success states of S k 4. 4.Combine the states of all S k to generate accident sequences

Prof. Enrico Zio Event Tree

Prof. Enrico Zio Event Tree

Prof. Enrico Zio Event Tree Example 1: Fire protection system

Prof. Enrico Zio Event Tree Example 1: The Tree

Prof. Enrico Zio Event Tree Example 2: Release of flammable gas

Prof. Enrico Zio Event Tree Example 3 Loss of coolant accident A A M M M M M M A High Pressure Injection System SRV RPV CST Low Pressure Injection System Suppression Pool Depressurize System

Prof. Enrico Zio A small pipe crack can induce the loss of coolant of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). The frequency of this event is 5.0E-4. Under the small loss of coolant accident (SLOCA) condition, the RPV water level drops due to the crack and decay heat. When it drops to a certain low level, the high pressure injection system (HPIS) starts to pump water into the core. In case that the HPIS works properly, the RPV can be depressurized under control and low pressure injection system (LPIS) will take care of long term heat removal to bring the core to safe status. If HPIS fails (at probability of 2.0E-3), the water level goes down to another setting level and trigger-starts LPIS. Then the operator has to open the safety relief valve (SRV) to relief the RPV pressure in order to keep LPIS pumping the water into the core. In case either the operator fails to open SRV (at probability of 5.0E-3) or LPIS fails (at probability of 5.0E-4), the core will be damaged. Event Tree Example 3 (cont.)

Prof. Enrico Zio Event Tree Example 3: The tree SLOCAHPDPLP OK CD OK CD 5.0E-4 5.0E-3 2.0E-3 5.0E-4 5.0E-4

Prof. Enrico Zio ETA: comments 1. 1.One ET for each accident initiator 2. 2.Time and logic of S k interventions important for the tree structure (simplifications possible) 3. 3.S k states conditional on accident initiator and previous S j ’s 4. 4.Conditional probabilities of S k states (FTA)

Prof. Enrico Zio ETA+FTA

Event Tree Analysis SLOCAHPDPLP OK CD OK CD 5.0E-4 5.0E-3 2.0E-3 5.0E-4 5.0E-4 HP Unavailable LP Unavailable Fail to Depressurize

Prof. Enrico Zio Fault Tree Analysis – HP, DP HP Unavailable Suction Vlv Fail to open HP Pump Failure Injection Vlv Fail to open Pump Fail to start Pump Fail to run SRV mech. failure Operator Fail to Depress. Fail to Depressurize

Prof. Enrico Zio Fault Tree Analysis – LP LP Unavailable Suction Vlv Fail to open Injection Vlv Fail to open Pump Section Fail Train A Failure Suction Vlv Fail to open LP Pump Failure Injection Vlv Fail to open Pump A Fail to start Pump A Fail to run Train B Failure Suction Vlv Fail to open LP Pump Failure Injection Vlv Fail to open Pump B Fail to start Pump B Fail to run

Prof. Enrico Zio MONTE CARLO SIMULATION Perform many simulations (trials or histories) of the system life during its mission time Each trial is a random walk of the system from one stochastic configuration to another, at stochastic times. For each piece of walk, starting from a given system configuration k’ entered at t’, we need to determine when the next transition occurs and which new configuration is reached by the system. When the system enters in a failure configuration, we record the event realization Perform statistical estimates on the failure events to compute system failure probabilities

Prof. Enrico Zio MONTE CARLO SIMULATION