1956: The Year of Crises Anti-Soviet Uprisings in Eastern Europe

Khrushchev’s New Course in Foreign Policy Improving relations with Soviet communist allies: - reconciliation with Yugoslavia; encouragement of moderate policies in East European states; aid and equal treatment of China Courting radical allies in the Third World among anti-colonialist liberation movements - state visits and extension of Soviet economic aid to such states as Egypt, India, Indonesia, Afghanistan, etc. Peaceful coexistence and diplomatic engagement with the United States and Western powers: - armistice in Korea - Austrian State Treaty and establishment of diplomatic relations with FRG (1955) - Geneva Summit (1955)

Geneva Summit of the Four Powers, 1955

Khrushchev’s Peaceful Coexistence Reduction of the danger of war. Continuation the Cold War by ideological, political and socio-economic competition to win “hearts and minds.” Emphasis on voluntary acceptance and enthusiasm for communism rather than on coercion, but preservation of all Soviet positions. Overt de-Stalinization and its dangers to the Soviet Union: - denunciation of Stalin undermines legitimacy of Soviet international position

The “Secret Speech,” February 1956

The Year of Crises Consequences of de-Stalinization and the “Secret speech” in Eastern Europe: - discrediting of Stalinist leaders; public invalidation of purges, calls for reversal of existing policies Anti-Soviet unrest in Poland(October 1956) Anti-Soviet uprising in Hungary (October- November 1956)

Events in Poland in 1956 Workers’ protests erupt in Poznan in June of 1956 and suppressed by the army. Installation of national communist Wladislaw Gomulka to lead the Polish communist party: - dismissal of pro-Soviet members of Politburo, demands for economic concessions Khrushchev and the Soviet leaders visit Warsaw and threaten intervention Compromise settlement: internal Polish autonomy in return for Poland remaining part of the Soviet camp and maintaining domestic one-party system.

Wladislav Gomulka, Polish Communist leader in

Anti-Soviet Revolution in Hungary Instability of Hungarian leadership and turnover at the top. Anti-Soviet demonstrations in Budapest erupt into a riot: - reprisals against security forces (AVO) Half-hearted Soviet intervention. Negotiations to reach a settlement with the Hungarian communist leadership along Polish lines Nagy and his government join popular revolutionary movement and demand complete Soviet withdrawal and abandonment of the Warsaw Pact.

Matyas Rakosi, Hungarian Communist leader,

Hungarian Uprising of 1956

Soviet response to the crises in Eastern Europe Reluctance of Khrushchev to abandon his “New Course” in foreign policy and fear of losing grip on Eastern Europe. Hesitation between military intervention and political accommodation. Seeking Chinese support and advise to deal with crises: enhancement of Mao Zedong’s position within the communist camp

Suppression of the Hungarian Revolt Initial willingness to compromise and withdraw Soviet troops Change of heart and military intervention when Imre Nagy announced Hungarian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, declared neutrality, and appealed for foreign support: Khrushchev: “if we let things take their course, the West will say we are either stupid or weak, and that is one and the same thing. We cannot possibly permit it. We would have capitalists on the frontiers of the Soviet Union.” Use of massive military force to defeat Hungarian resistance and install a pliant government under Janos Kadar

American role in East European events American non-involvement in the Hungarian crisis: incitement of Hungarian resistance on American-funded radio stations vs. diplomatic messages to Moscow about lack of American interest in Hungary. US has “no ulterior purpose in desiring their independence of the satellite countries…We do not look upon these nations as potential military allies..”