The Minds of Peace Experiment: a Simulation of an Israeli- Palestinian Public Negotiating Congress Sapir Handelman Center for Peace & Conflict Studies at Wayne State University, Harvard University, the Lentz Peace Research Association

Intractable Conflict Complex phenomenon Made up of many interdependent factors Cause and effect cannot be controlled One problem solved, another emerges Destructive evolutionary mechanism A revolutionary process is required

A revolutionary peace process Two critical elements:  Peacemaking leadership  The preparation of the opposing societies The two elements are intertwined:  Peacemaking leaders need social support  Public support demands progression How to create such a circulating structure?

Two complementary models The “political elite” model  Forms of interactions between political elites  Intends to reach a peace agreement  The dominant experience in the P-I conflict  Oslo Peace Process ( ) The “public assembly” model  Public, multi-party negotiating assembly  Designed to involve the public in the peace process  New in the P-I experience  South Africa and Northern Ireland

The “political elite” model Interactions between political elites  Track II diplomacy  Secret diplomacy  Track I diplomacy Aimed at reaching final agreement

The “political elite” model: Examples Madrid negotiations (1991) Oslo Peace Process ( )  Declaration of Principles (1993)  Joint Liaison Committee (JLC)  Ended in violence and mistrust Annapolis process (2007)  Commitment to two-state solution

The “political elite” model: Strengths and Weaknesses Strengths  May be only way for process to begin and end  Ambitious with regard to peace Weaknesses  Depends on political leaders  Does not recover easily from violence  Does not involve the public Conclusion  Ineffective without social foundation for peace

The “public assembly” model A major Public Negotiating Assembly A public congress for conflict resolution Three methods to appoint representatives:  Elections in the opposing societies  All parties are invited to send delegates  Inviting delegates from various sectors Firm rule: violent parties excluded

The “public assembly” model: Agenda and Aims Agenda:  Negotiating a peace agreement Limitations:  Incapable of producing a peace agreement Aims  Provoke a public debate  Motivates spoilers and extremists to join the process  Push the leadership to reach an agreement

The “public assembly” model: Examples South Africa: Codesa  Convention for a Democratic South Africa (1991) Northern Ireland: Assemblies  Forum for Peace and Reconciliation (1994); N.I. Forum (1996); Belfast Assembly (1998)

The “public assembly” model: Strengths and Weaknesses Strengths  De-legitimize violence, which decreases  Involve the public, facilitate other negotiations Weaknesses  Assemblies collapse; violence continues  No final agreement reached Conclusion  The missing element in the P-I peace process

Creating a major public assembly Northern Ireland  External players: English and Irish governments  Elections to the assembly South Africa  Intimate relations between political leaders  All institutions invited to the assembly Palestinian – Israeli conflict  Public assembly can grow from the grassroots level  The Minds of Peace Experiment

The Minds of Peace Experiment: An overview Simulation of a P-I Public Negotiating Congress People-to-people negotiations Delegations: 5 Israelis & 5 Palestinians Moderators: Israeli & Palestinian Assignment: Reaching a peace agreement in 5 sessions

The Minds of Peace Experiment: The rules of the game Participants: delegations & audience Time frame:  5 sessions; Each session 2 hours  1.5 hour delegations; 0.5 hour audience Two ground rules:  Not to put down one another  Not to get into historical debate  (Making demands by peaceful means)

The Diaspora rounds DatePlaceResultsCentral issueMain motif December 2008 University of Missouri-St. Louis Three agreements: 1. Confidence building measures 2. Declaration of Principles 3. Agreement on Boarders and Jerusalem* Gaza crisisCommitment February 2009 University of Missouri-St. Louis 1. Agreement on Cease Fire Solution: Two states versus One state commitment versus initial beliefs May 2009 Wayne State University 1. Statement of Intent and Declaration of Principles** The right of return (refugees) Asymmetrical conflict: Israel is in a better bargaining position October 2009University of California - Irvine 1. Agreement on ceasefire and trust building measures Dispute over signing the preliminary agreement Lack of Commitment March 2010University of Michigan – Ann Arbor 1.Trust Building Measures 2. Partial Final Agreement Two State SolutionWillingness to make painful compromises May 2010UCLA1.Trust Building Measures 2. Final Peace agreement Security versus compromises Strong belief in the ability to end the conflict November 2010University of Windsor (Canada) 1. Peace Agreement*** The right of return(refugees) Disagreements about signing a partial agreement February 2011Fontbonne University (St. Louis) 1.Trust Building Measures 2. Conclusive Peace Pact Old City of JerusalemMajor disagreements * The third agreement was signed by the Israeli delegation and only two Palestinians. **One Israeli did not sign the agreement ***Two Israelis did not sign the agreement

The Israel/Palestine round DatePlaceResultsCentral issue Main motif August 2009 Beit Jala / Bethlehem Israel-Palestine Two agreements: 1. Trust Building Measures 2. Agenda for Peace Dismantling checkpoints and settlements versus security Strong desire to end the conflict November 2009Beit Jala / Bethlehem Israel-Palestine Two agreements: 1. Trust Building Measures 2. Negotiations on a conclusive peace agreement* Borders and land swapTrust and the culture of democracy January 2010Beit Jala / Bethlehem Israel-Palestine Two agreements: 1. Trust Building Measures 2. Borders and Jerusalem The ancient city of Jerusalem Creative ideas and determination December 2010Beit Jala / Bethlehem Israel-Palestine Two agreements: 1. Trust Building Measures 2. Conclusive Peace Pact** Improving the daily life of the Palestinians Difficulties in making compromises April 2011Beit Jala / Bethlehem Israel-Palestine Two agreements: 1. Trust Building Measures 2. Conclusive Peace Pact** Palestinians committed to take responsibility in the West Bank versus skepticism of Israelis. National sentiments of Palestinians *The Palestinians asked to postpone the discussion upon borders modifications. The two delegations did not have enough time to discuss major issues. ** The two delegations needed more time to conclude and finalize the agreement Each assembly succeeded to create peace coalitions. How to create a mass movement?

The Minds of Peace Experiment: Lessons and Implications A peace building mechanism:  Provoke a public debate  Commitment to promote peace  P&I learn that there are partners for peace  Creating peace coalitions The critical element – peace coalitions:  Pro negotiation elements need coordination  Pressure to establish a major congress  Peacemaking leaders can grow

Conclusions Fate of the two societies is intertwined Peacemaking as a learning process Combination between two models:  “Political elite” – begins, supports and finalizes a peace process  “Public assembly” – builds the foundations for a peaceful social order Together they can animate a continuing peace process