Changes to Bankers’ Bonuses 10 – 50 x Long-term performance Risk-taking G20 Wall street and Asia 3 years 20 – 30 %

Changes to Bankers’ Bonuses 10 – 50 x Long-term performance Risk-taking G20 Wall street and Asia 3 years 20 – 30 % Used to receive bonuses of their salary don’t have such strict laws Aims to reduce Aims to focus bankers on should set International standards for bonuses Bonuses are now capped at of salary Bonuses held in shares for

Counter-argument paragraph 1 Introduces the point the writer intends to discuss Introduces why the writer disagrees with this point of view Explains the point with examples and / or reasons It has also been claimed that PRP necessarily leads to employees taking excessive risks in order to achieve bonuses. It is true that, preceding the financial crisis, many bankers stood to gain disproportionate rewards and approved unsustainable loans as a result. “Even some of the industry’s leaders, such as Lloyd Blankfein, the head of Goldman Sachs, have publicly acknowledged that these bonuses schemes caused the demise of the industry” (Kendal, 2009: 121). However, while the economic events of 2008 illustrate the dangers of unregulated PRP, a more skilful application of the scheme can create incentives for employees which are not tied to excessive risk- taking.

Counter-argument paragraph 1 Introduces the point the writer intends to discuss Introduces why the writer disagrees with this point of view Explains the point with examples and / or reasons It has also been claimed that PRP necessarily leads to employees taking excessive risks in order to achieve bonuses. It is true that, preceding the financial crisis, many bankers stood to gain disproportionate rewards and approved unsustainable loans as a result. “Even some of the industry’s leaders, such as Lloyd Blankfein, the head of Goldman Sachs, have publicly acknowledged that these bonuses schemes caused the demise of the industry” (Kendal, 2009: 121). However, while the economic events of 2008 illustrate the dangers of unregulated PRP, a more skilful application of the scheme can create incentives for employees which are not tied to excessive risk- taking.

Counter-argument paragraph 1 It has also been claimed that PRP necessarily leads to employees taking excessive risks in order to achieve bonuses. It is true that, preceding the financial crisis, many bankers stood to gain disproportionate rewards and approved unsustainable loans as a result. “Even some of the industry’s leaders, such as Lloyd Blankfein, the head of Goldman Sachs, have publicly acknowledged that these bonuses schemes caused the demise of the industry” (Kendal, 2009: 121). However, while the economic events of 2008 illustrate the dangers of unregulated PRP, a more skilful application of the scheme can create incentives for employees which are not tied to excessive risk-taking. Introduces the point the writer intends to discuss Introduces why the writer disagrees with this point of view Explains the point with examples, evidence and / or reasons

Counter-argument paragraph 1 It has also been claimed that PRP necessarily leads to employees taking excessive risks in order to achieve bonuses. It is true that, preceding the financial crisis, many bankers stood to gain disproportionate rewards and approved unsustainable loans as a result. “Even some of the industry’s leaders, such as Lloyd Blankfein, the head of Goldman Sachs, have publicly acknowledged that these bonuses schemes caused the demise of the industry” (Kendal, 2009: 121). However, while the economic events of 2008 illustrate the dangers of unregulated PRP, a more skilful application of the scheme can create incentives for employees which are not tied to excessive risk-taking. Introduces the point the writer intends to discuss Introduces why the writer disagrees with this point of view Explains the point with examples, evidence and / or reasons

Useful language to show doubt / disagreement It has also been claimed that PRP necessarily leads to employees taking excessive risks in order to achieve bonuses. It is true that, preceding the financial crisis, many bankers stood to gain disproportionate rewards and approved unsustainable loans as a result. “Even some of the industry’s leaders, such as Lloyd Blankfein, the head of Goldman Sachs, have publicly acknowledged that these bonuses schemes caused the demise of the industry” (Kendal, 2009: 121). However, while the economic events of 2008 illustrate the dangers of unregulated PRP, a more skilful application of the scheme can create incentives for employees which are not tied to excessive risk-taking.

Useful language to show doubt / disagreement It has also been claimed that PRP necessarily leads to employees taking excessive risks in order to achieve bonuses. It is true that, preceding the financial crisis, many bankers stood to gain disproportionate rewards and approved unsustainable loans as a result. “Even some of the industry’s leaders, such as Lloyd Blankfein, the head of Goldman Sachs, have publicly acknowledged that these bonuses schemes caused the demise of the industry” (Kendal, 2009: 121). However, while the economic events of 2008 illustrate the dangers of unregulated PRP, a more skilful application of the scheme can create incentives for employees which are not tied to excessive risk-taking.

Refutation paragraph 2 Motivation to excessive risk-taking can be lessened by ensuring a balance between bonuses and base salaries. Currently, executives often receive a lower base-salary on the understanding that it will be compensated for once targets have been met. As Kirk (2009) states, such a model can result in an increased need to reach targets and therefore an increased need to take excessive risks. Consequently, reducing the size of bonuses but increasing base salaries can reduce risk-taking. A growing number of firms are now pursuing this course. ING, for example, is readdressing the role that PRP plays in remuneration. In 2010, it was announced that its executive bonuses would be limited to one year’s fixed salary. Lloyds Banking Group and Goldman Sachs (The Economist, 2010) are following suit. These initiatives show an acknowledgement that careful regulation of PRP can reduce risk-taking. In this way it can increase the short-term productivity of a company without endangering its long-term security. Introduces the point the writer intends to discuss Shows how these ideas refute the counter- argument Explains the point with examples, evidence and / or reasons

Refutation paragraph 2 Motivation to excessive risk-taking can be lessened by ensuring a balance between bonuses and base salaries. Currently, executives often receive a lower base-salary on the understanding that it will be compensated for once targets have been met. As Kirk (2009) states, such a model can result in an increased need to reach targets and therefore an increased need to take excessive risks. Consequently, reducing the size of bonuses but increasing base salaries can reduce risk-taking. A growing number of firms are now pursuing this course. ING, for example, is readdressing the role that PRP plays in remuneration. In 2010, it was announced that its executive bonuses would be limited to one year’s fixed salary. Lloyds Banking Group and Goldman Sachs (The Economist, 2010) are following suit. These initiatives show an acknowledgement that careful regulation of PRP can reduce risk-taking. In this way it can increase the short-term productivity of a company without endangering its long-term security. Introduces the point the writer intends to discuss Shows how these ideas refute the counter- argument Explains the point with examples, evidence and / or reasons

Refutation paragraph 2 Motivation to excessive risk-taking can be lessened by ensuring a balance between bonuses and base salaries. Currently, executives often receive a lower base-salary on the understanding that it will be compensated for once targets have been met. As Kirk (2009) states, such a model can result in an increased need to reach targets and therefore an increased need to take excessive risks. Consequently, reducing the size of bonuses but increasing base salaries can reduce risk-taking. A growing number of firms are now pursuing this course. ING, for example, is readdressing the role that PRP plays in remuneration. In 2010, it was announced that its executive bonuses would be limited to one year’s fixed salary. Lloyds Banking Group and Goldman Sachs (The Economist, 2010) are following suit. These initiatives show an acknowledgement that careful regulation of PRP can reduce risk-taking. In this way it can increase the short-term productivity of a company without endangering its long-term security. Introduces the point the writer intends to discuss Shows how these ideas refute the counter- argument Explains the point with examples, evidence and / or reasons

Refutation paragraph 2 Motivation to excessive risk-taking can be lessened by ensuring a balance between bonuses and base salaries. Currently, executives often receive a lower base-salary on the understanding that it will be compensated for once targets have been met. As Kirk (2009) states, such a model can result in an increased need to reach targets and therefore an increased need to take excessive risks. Consequently, reducing the size of bonuses but increasing base salaries can reduce risk-taking. A growing number of firms are now pursuing this course. ING, for example, is readdressing the role that PRP plays in remuneration. In 2010, it was announced that its executive bonuses would be limited to one year’s fixed salary. Lloyds Banking Group and Goldman Sachs (The Economist, 2010) are following suit. These initiatives show an acknowledgement that careful regulation of PRP can reduce risk-taking. In this way it can increase the short-term productivity of a company without endangering its long-term security. Introduces the point the writer intends to discuss Shows how these ideas refute the counter- argument Explains the point with examples, evidence and / or reasons

Useful language to show agreement Motivation to excessive risk-taking can be lessened by ensuring a balance between bonuses and base salaries. Currently, executives often receive a lower base-salary on the understanding that it will be compensated for once targets have been met. As Kirk (2009) states, such a model can result in an increased need to reach targets and therefore an increased need to take excessive risks. Consequently, reducing the size of bonuses but increasing base salaries can reduce risk-taking. A growing number of firms are now pursuing this course. ING, for example, is readdressing the role that PRP plays in remuneration. In 2010, it was announced that its executive bonuses would be limited to one year’s fixed salary. Lloyds Banking Group and Goldman Sachs (The Economist, 2010) are following suit. These initiatives show an acknowledgement that careful regulation of PRP can reduce risk-taking. In this way it can increase the short-term productivity of a company without endangering its long-term security.

Useful language to show agreement Motivation to excessive risk-taking can be lessened by ensuring a balance between bonuses and base salaries. Currently, executives often receive a lower base-salary on the understanding that it will be compensated for once targets have been met. As Kirk (2009) states, such a model can result in an increased need to reach targets and therefore an increased need to take excessive risks. Consequently, reducing the size of bonuses but increasing base salaries can reduce risk-taking. A growing number of firms are now pursuing this course. ING, for example, is readdressing the role that PRP plays in remuneration. In 2010, it was announced that its executive bonuses would be limited to one year’s fixed salary. Lloyds Banking Group and Goldman Sachs (The Economist, 2010) are following suit. These initiatives show an acknowledgement that careful regulation of PRP can reduce risk-taking. In this way it can increase the short-term productivity of a company without endangering its long-term security.

The financial cost of effectively monitoring employees’ computer activity exceeds the financial benefits this activity provides. Monitoring employees’ computer activities helps to improve the profitability of a company.