飛彈威脅 ? 飛彈威脅 ? Missile Threat: To What Extent? 飛彈防禦：攔截 ? 飛彈防禦：攔截 ? Missile Defense: Interception? 飛彈防禦：消極作為 ? 飛彈防禦：消極作為 ? Missile Defense: Passive? 飛彈防禦：積極作為.

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飛彈威脅 ? 飛彈威脅 ? Missile Threat: To What Extent? 飛彈防禦：攔截 ? 飛彈防禦：攔截 ? Missile Defense: Interception? 飛彈防禦：消極作為 ? 飛彈防禦：消極作為 ? Missile Defense: Passive? 飛彈防禦：積極作為 ? 飛彈防禦：積極作為 ? Missile Defense: Aggressive? 第十週 /Week 10 政策議題（ 1 ）飛彈與飛彈防禦 Policy Issue I: Missile and Missile Defense

Shlapak, David A., David T. Orletsky, Toy I. Reid, Murray Scot Tanner, Barry Wilson “ Chapter 3 Missiles over the Strait: China ’ s Short- Range Ballistic Missile Force. ” A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, _MG888.pdf Shlapak, David A., David T. Orletsky, Toy I. Reid, Murray Scot Tanner, Barry Wilson “ Chapter 3 Missiles over the Strait: China ’ s Short- Range Ballistic Missile Force. ” A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, _MG888.pdf _MG888.pdf _MG888.pdf Shlapak, David A., David T. Orletsky, Toy I. Reid, Murray Scot Tanner, Barry Wilson “ Appendix Missile Attacks on Economic Targets on Taiwan, ” A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, Shlapak, David A., David T. Orletsky, Toy I. Reid, Murray Scot Tanner, Barry Wilson “ Appendix Missile Attacks on Economic Targets on Taiwan, ” A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, Readings…

飛彈威脅 ? Missile Threat: To What Extent? 300km 600km 200km

飛彈威脅 ? Missile Threat: To What Extent? BallisticMissilesCruiseMissiles 30~600+m<10m 1.0M>>6.0M

飛彈威脅 ? Missile Threat: To What Extent? 易於擊中 ? Easy To Hit? 損害 ? Damage?

Target: Cities 3,000 10,000 10,000 23, ,000

Target:Industries

Target: Armed Forces

彈道飛彈防禦：攔截 ? Missile Defense: Interception? Patriot Advanced Capability 3

x16x9=1,152

命中率偏低命中率偏低 Low Accuracy 防禦範圍有限防禦範圍有限 Limited in Defense Footprint 攔截飛彈造價高於來襲飛彈攔截飛彈造價高於來襲飛彈 Unit Cost higher than Incoming Missile 彈道飛彈防禦無用 ? Doomed to Fail? NOT REALLY

防護範圍來看 , X5

其他選擇 Other Options SM-3 THAAD

保護對象來看 /9

「一般」而言：無效「一般」而言：無效 In “General” : Yes 不過在短期內還能保護武裝部隊不過在短期內還能保護武裝部隊 Armed Forces In the Short-term 且在長期來看仍能保護地面部隊 … 且在長期來看仍能保護地面部隊 … Ground Forces In the Long-term … 彈道飛彈防禦無用 ? Doomed to Fail?

巡弋飛彈防禦：攔截 ? Missile Defense: Interception 防禦範圍有限 ? 防禦範圍有限 ? Limited in Defense Footprint 攔截飛彈造價高於來襲飛彈 ? 攔截飛彈造價高於來襲飛彈 ? Unit Cost higher than Incoming Missile NOT REALLY

防護範圍來看 , X7

其他選擇 Other Options

保護對象來看 /9

巡弋飛彈防禦也無用 ? Doomed to Fail? 「一般」而言無效「一般」而言無效 In “General”: Yes 不過在短期內還能保護武裝部隊不過在短期內還能保護武裝部隊 Armed Forces In the Short-term 且在長期來看仍能保護地面部隊 … 且在長期來看仍能保護地面部隊 … Ground Forces In the Long-term …

飛彈防禦：消極作為 ? Missile Defense: Passive? 加固 Hardening 加固 Hardening 備份 Redundancy 備份 Redundancy 疏散 Dispersion 疏散 Dispersion 偽裝 Camouflage 偽裝 Camouflage 誘餌 Decoy 誘餌 Decoy 機動 Mobilizing 機動 Mobilizing

Target:Industries 加固 Hardening 備份 Redundancy 疏散 Dispersion 偽裝 Camouflage 誘餌 Decoy 機動 Mobilizing

Target: “Armed Forces” 加固 Hardening 備份 Redundancy 疏散 Dispersion 偽裝 Camouflage 誘餌 Decoy 機動 Mobilizing Differed……

船艦 Fighting Ships

戰機Fighter-Aircraft

地面部隊 Ground Troops

Objection! No place to hide!

飛彈防禦：積極作為 ? Missile Defense: Aggressive?

KOSOVO, 1999 KOSOVO, 1999

Lebanon, 2006 Lebanon, 2006

Future…. HOW to Find? Future…. HOW to Find?

飛彈防禦：攔截 ? 飛彈防禦：攔截 ? Missile Defense: Interception? 飛彈防禦：消極作為 ? 飛彈防禦：消極作為 ? Missile Defense: Passive? 飛彈防禦：積極作為 ? 飛彈防禦：積極作為 ? Missile Defense: Aggressive? 是飛彈防禦也是防空 !! 飛彈威脅目前還不是真的那麼強大，對武裝部隊而言，暫且還只是破門鎚的角色，但此一威脅遲早會強大到只剩地面部隊能有效作戰的程度 …..