Economics of Conflict Session 9: Third Party Intervention Ismene Gizelis & (Kristian Skrede Gleditsch) Department of Government University of Essex Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)

Key issues from previous sessions Bargaining model: – Power, costs of war Benefits of outcome – Range of outcomes better or worse for actor Regime type and interdependence in interstate relations Costs of conflict to other states Ethnic ties

Outline The bargaining model and third parties Third parties and conflict Third parties and peace or conflict management

Beyond bilateral conflict model Third parties C can have a big impact on outcome – Increasing power means that P will shift toward A or B’s favorite outcome – Ally can share in costs C of conflict Many wars multiparty (e.g., WWI, WWII)

Third parties and war outcomes Siverson & Gartner 1996 JCR – Initiators generally tend to win – Initiators 50% more likely to win if target does not receive help from other states – Support from other states make initiators more likely to lose – Anticipation effect: higher likelihood of attacks against states without allies, not expected to have support

Military alliances Contracts to indicate conditions for intervention – E.g., NATO article 5 – Commitment may be limited Can help make commitment more credible, and deter attacks However, time inconsistency problem – Ally may not come through when deterrence fails and casus foederis arises – Franch alliance with Czechoslavakia

Intervention and conflict Beyond alliances – Alliances do not guarantee intervention in interstate wars – Intervention can come outside formal alliances – Alliances as formalization when need to make promises to aid other party credible

Intervention and conflict General ex ante ties that promote intervention No analogy to alliances for civil wars – States can support both government and rebels in civil wars, but no analogy to treaties for non-state actors Third parties often distinct interest over outcomes – E.g., US in Iraq, not fully alligned with Iraqi gov

Ethnicity Many interventions follow ethnic ties – States more likely to support rebels from same ethnic group – More likely to support government if likely to face challenge from ethnic group – Support from diaspora communities Kurds Syrian civil war

Political affinity Ideology (e.g., Marxism, conservatism) Efforts to prop up governments Concerns over implications for rebellion in own country Examples – Cuban intervention in Angola – Soviet intervention in Afghanistan

Security Civil wars tendendency to spread to neighboring countries Spillovers of conflict (economic, refugees) Syria Bosnia

Economic interests Conflict disrupts trade Oil-importing countries incentives to intervene in oil exporting countries

What about other forms of intervention?

Frazier & Dixon, 2006, International Interactions,p.389

Spectrum of Conflict Resolution / Management Negotiated Negotiations Mediation Recommended Expert Opinion Expert Determination (Adjudication) Imposed Arbitration Court Litigation One sided imposition

Frazier & Dixon, 2006, International Interactions,p. 390

What is mediation? An extension and continuation of peaceful conflict management An extension and continuation of peaceful conflict management Intervention of an outsider: individual; group; organization (NGOs)—or combination Intervention of an outsider: individual; group; organization (NGOs)—or combination Mediation has as a goal to transform a conflict Mediation has as a goal to transform a conflict

Mediation and other forms of conflict management Mediation is used almost in 75% of all attempts to settle a dispute (compared to 12% of negotiation, followed by no management, and arbitration) Mediation is used almost in 75% of all attempts to settle a dispute (compared to 12% of negotiation, followed by no management, and arbitration) Mediation outcomes are fully successful in 8% of the cases, unsuccessful in 55%, while partial settlement is reached in 20.4% and ceasefire in 16.8% of the total cases. Mediation outcomes are fully successful in 8% of the cases, unsuccessful in 55%, while partial settlement is reached in 20.4% and ceasefire in 16.8% of the total cases. Is this acceptable? Selection effects? Is this acceptable? Selection effects? Bercovitch

Conditions for Ripeness Conflict Conflict – Hurting stalemate – Shifting power balances Actors Actors – Redefinition of parties interests due to changes in leadership and public opinion pressures – Replacement of new norms and patterns of behavior with new ones that allow for compromise – Availability of mediators – Nature of mediator Process Process – Shared perceptions about the desirability of an accord – Agreement on new bridging formulas – Availability of formulas that allow for compromise

If mediation is more likely to take place when conditions for ripeness are met, what does this say about the observed success of mediation? If biased mediators are more likely to intervene, what does this mean for the observed success of mediation? (Beber, 2012)

Why do mediators intervene? Individual / personal motivation of mediators Individual / personal motivation of mediators – Spread their own ideas – Put into practice a set of ideas – Gain access to major channels of political communication (career moves) – Stake in the outcome of conflict / fate of ally (bias) State / collective interests State / collective interests – Mandate to intervene (IGOs regional and global) – Security and national interests – Enhance their own power and position in global affairs Take home point: Mediators are actors Mediators carry their own baggage consciously or unconsciously

When is mediation successful? By its very nature, mediation involves a degree of compromise. The outcome is never win-win. The outcome is never win-win. The outcome is a situation all parties can live with. The outcome is a situation all parties can live with. Subjective Criteria for Success: Fairness of mediation and improved overall climate of parties’ relationship Versus : Objective Criteria for Success : Cessation or reduction of violent behaviour (for how long?)

Why would Mediation be Successful? Informational Power: mediator has privileged access to information Expert Power: mediator has greater knowledge Referent Power: parties value relationship with mediator Legitimate Power: mediator has a ‘right’ to ask for change of behaviour Reward Power: mediator can ‘bribe’ parties Coercive Power: mediator can ‘punish’ parties Rubin

Mediation Styles and Nature of Conflict (BEARDSLEY ET AL., 2006)

Occurrence of Mediation Style

Effect of Mediation Style on Conflict Resolution Manipulation increases probability of formal agreement, but does not necessarily lead to reduction in tension, where manipulation may be as relevant

Doyle and Sambanis: Peacebuilding Triangle International Capacity (i.a., Peacekeeping) Local CapacityHostility H Low H High LC Low LC High IC Low IC High The ‘Space for Peace’