1 ECONOMIC TRANSMISSION PLANNING Wholesale Market Subcommittee March 22, 2006 CMWG Proposal #1.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Parallel Flow Visualization and Flowgate Allocations Equity Concerns of Non-Market Transmission Owners Equity Concerns of Non-Market Transmission Owners.
Advertisements

A Primer on Benefit-Cost Analysis Presented to: The Reclaimed Water Technical Committee June 2, 2006 By Bruce Flory, Ph. D. Seattle Public Utilities.
Copyright 2003 PJM 1 PJM’s Annual FTR Auction.
Ramping and CMSC (Congestion Management Settlement Credit) payments.
Economic Criteria for Transmission Planning in the ERCOT Region Public Utility Law Seminar DeAnn Walker August 3, 2012.
Congestion Pricing: Competitive Locational Prices of Power Stoft (2002)
September 15, 2006 Mending the Fractured Value Chain Through Functional Use of Demand Response.
CMWG Update June WMS Meeting CMWG Update 1. CMWG (Vote) Confirmation of new Vice Chair: Greg Thurnher (Representing Luminant/TXU Energy) 2.
EE 369 POWER SYSTEM ANALYSIS
IMO Market Evolution Program Drew Phillips Market Evolution Program
ECON 6012 Cost Benefit Analysis Memorial University of Newfoundland
Valuing Economic Benefits from Transmission Planning ERCOT System Planning March 22, 2006.
Need for Transmission Investment 2010 Mid-American Regulatory Conference AEP.
ERS Procurement Methodology 09/04/2013 ERS Workshop Presented By: ERCOT Staff.
Utah Cost of Service and Rate Design Task Force
Network Customer Meeting Access Metric Update November 16, 2006.
OSC Meeting April 27, Transmission Cost Allocation Overview.
Proposed CMSC Amendments - Imports & Exports Intertie Trading Sub-committee November 24, 2003 PUBLIC.
Market Mitigation Concept Group Update Jim Galvin April 26, 2004.
Market Evolution Program Day Ahead Market Project How the DSO Calculates Nodal Prices DAMWG October 20, 2003.
Bill Hellinghausen EDF Trading North America
RPRS ERCOT System Wide Insufficiency Charge Presented at the Technical Advisory Committee June 1, 2006.
Updated 1/28/2011. Cost Allocations and Affordability of Tariffs March 8, 2011 Jay Caspary ·
Economic Planning Criteria Question 2 1/7/2011 Joint CMWG/PLWG Meeting March 4, 2011.
Proposed Generation Expansion Process For Review and Discussion March 1, 2011.
Economic Planning – Theory and Current Practice Dan Woodfin Director, System Planning Joint PLWG/CMWG Meeting 2/4/2011.
1 CRR Credit Policy Task Force Update WMS April 16, 2008.
PRR 547 – Trading Hubs CMWG Presentation to WMS October 21, 2004.
Allocation Scenarios: Preliminary Analysis April 22 nd, 2008 Snuller Price, Partner Energy and Environmental Economics, Inc. 101 Montgomery Street, Suite.
Wholesale Market Subcommittee Texas Interconnection Long-Term Study Update Warren P. Lasher April 8, 2011.
RCWG Update to WMS July 11, Alternatives to Address Negative Prices At its June meeting, WMS directed RCWG to bring back something to vote on. RCWG.
FURTHER INFORMATION ON MISO FTR AUCTIONS For SPP RSC Discussion October 6, 2010.
CMWG Update WMS September 2015 Meeting. CRR Balancing Account Fund Discussion The CRR Balancing Account fund appears to be working as expected The cap.
Unit-Specific Bid Limits based on Modified Generic Cost.
Appeal of PRS Action NPRR 351, Calculate and Post Projected Non-Binding LMPs for the Next 15 Minutes Floyd Trefny Texas Steel Companies.
Implications of Engineering Analysis Assumptions Organization of MISO States: CARP XII December 14-15, 2009 Nick Bowden: 1.
Load Resources Negative RRS Bidding in the Nodal Market Credit Working Group January 30, 2008.
SPP.org 1. Status Update for Reliability and Economic Assessments Stakeholder Meeting September 16, 2008 Austin, TX.
TCR to CRR Transition Plan Proposed method for TCR Auction Revenue refunds Contingency plans For TAC Nov 1st, 2007.
SPP.org 1. Final Report: Reliability and Economic Assessments Stakeholder Meeting December 1, 2008 Austin, TX.
Introduction to Economics of Water Resources. Public or private Excludability (E): the degree to which users can be excluded Subtractability (S): the.
ISO New England State of the Markets Report May April 2002 Robert Ethier, Ph.D. Manager, Market Monitoring and Mitigation ISO New England June 26,
2003 State of the Market Report ERCOT Wholesale Electricity Markets.
2010 CSC & Zone Selection: 6 Lines W-N & 4 Zones (WN2_SN0-4Z) Shams Siddiqi, Ph.D. Crescent Power, Inc. (512) August 19,
Announcements Homework 8 is 11.19, 11.21, 11.26, 11.27, due now
ERCOT CSC – Vote “Yes” to 3b Jan A. Bagnall Sr. Director Transmission, Reliability & Compliance October 2008.
Mitigation of Credit Tail Risk Exposure Donald Meek Credit Working Group January 20, 2015.
Market Credit Working Group Update to WMS Wed. Nov 18, 2009.
Economic Analysis Proposed Scope ERCOT RPG Meeting September 17, 2010.
ECE 476 Power System Analysis Lecture 18: LMP Markets, Symmetrical Faults and Components Prof. Tom Overbye Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering.
Criteria for Economic Transmission Additions Bill Bojorquez May 4, 2006.
ERCOT – MISO DC Tie Study Comments
May14, 2010 RPG Meeting Houston Import Study Update Jeff Billo.
Transmission Services Report: North and West RPG Projects Bill Bojorquez TAC July 7, 2005.
October 26, 2005 ICF Consulting RGGI Electricity Sector Modeling Results RPS Sensitivity & Very High Emissions Reference and Package Cases.
2% Shift Factor dispatchable rule discussion and alternatives for the 2% rule Kris Dixit 1.
NPRR 649 Board Appeal Koch Ag & Energy Solutions February 9,
OOMC and Local RPRS Settlement Alignment January 2007 WMS Meeting Ino Gonzalez ERCOT Settlements.
RCWG Update to WMS March 7, Draft NPRR, Caps and Floors for Energy Storage Resources Chair of ETWG gave high level overview ERCOT had questions.
07/27/2006 Overview of Replacement Reserve Procurement ERCOT Staff PRS RPRS Task Force.
PJM© Market Efficiency RTEP Proposal Window PJM TEAC 1/9/2014 – Market Efficiency Presentation.
Settlement of Ancillary Service Infeasibility ERCOT QMWG April 15, 2016.
EE590 Transmission Planning Projects and Cost Allocation Ming NI Economic Studies, Midwest ISO.
TAC Rejection of NPRR Mitigated Offer Caps for RMR Units
Houston Import Study Update
PRS Rejection of NPRR Mitigated Offer Caps for RMR Units
ERCOT – Southern Cross Transmission ROS/WMS Working Group Assignments
Warren Lasher Manager, Long-Term Planning and Policy
Alternative Approach for Loads in SCED v.2
Further Information on MISO FTR Auctions
Presentation transcript:

1 ECONOMIC TRANSMISSION PLANNING Wholesale Market Subcommittee March 22, 2006 CMWG Proposal #1

2 Reject Project Coalition Position We agree that projects with a net present value (NPV) of Societal Surplus (SS), which exceeds the NPV of the incremental transmission cost of service (TCOS) should be built However, in recognition of how transmission is paid for in ERCOT (i.e. REPs/loads pay), we believe that projects whose NPV of Consumer Surplus (CS), which exceeds the NPV of TCOS should also be built Proposed benefit metric: NPV of SS > NPV of TCOS NPV of CS > NPV of TCOS Quantify SS & CS over life of project RPG Recommend Project Approval Request of WMS Vote to support the proposed metric, which appropriately identifies and recommends projects with long-term system benefit (SS), as well as, near-term benefits to loads (CS) Yes No Yes

3 Presentation Overview Utilized a two area system to examine a series of individual transmission upgrade proposals both incrementally (on a project by project basis) and cumulatively (as a set of projects) An example of a project that has negative Consumer Surplus, but positive Societal Surplus will be reviewed An example of a worthwhile project that passes both the Societal and Consumer Surplus test will be reviewed An example of a worthwhile project that passes only the Consumer Surplus will be reviewed

4 Scenario1: Base Case Generator Term Definitions Equiv. Hourly OOMC Start Cost ($/hr) – cost to start out of merit unit ($18k in this example) divided by total run hours (10 hrs in this example) Running Cost ($/hr) – Output MW * Production Cost Production Cost ($/hr) – Running Cost + Equiv. Hourly OOMC Start Cost Generator Revenue ($/hr) – Output MW * Locational Marginal Price (LMP) at the bus + reimbursement for OOMC Start Cost Generator Profit ($/hr) – Generator Revenue minus Production Cost Load Term Definitions Clear Price ($/MWh) – Load Zone LMP Initial Cost ($) – Load MW * Load Zone LMP Out Of Merit Uplift ($) – Equivalent Hourly OOMC Start Cost allocated to each Load Zone on a load ratio share (LRS) basis Congestion Refund ($) – [Initial Cost + Out Of Merit Uplift] minus Generator Revenue, which is allocated to each Load Zone on a LRS basis Final Cost ($) – Initial Cost minus Congestion Refund Net Load Cost ($/MWh) – Final Cost by Load Zone divided by Load Zone MWs Generation PocketLoad Pocket

5 Scenario 7: Completely De-Bottlenecked Upgrade Set Note: refer to the Appendix for a detailed project-by-project walk forward of successive projects that build serially upon one another to achieve the end state shown above Generation PocketLoad Pocket

6 Observations A project with a large Societal Surplus, but a Negative Consumer Surplus, is an indication that more upgrades are likely needed Project would be recommended if NPV of SS > NPV of TCOS 3 projects where the Societal Surplus consists entirely of Consumer Surplus Each project would be recommended if NPV of SS > NPV of TCOS Project with substantially smaller Societal Surplus than Consumer Surplus Without considering a Consumer Surplus metric this project may not be funded leaving loads / REPs in a precarious situation Project with negligible Societal Surplus and negative Consumer Surplus Loads / REPs shouldn’t be required to fund this project

7 Observations (cont.) It is important to look at the cumulative Societal & Consumer Surplus of the package of individual projects within a project set If the de-bottlenecking of a constraint is stopped too soon, the loads / REPs will be left paying for a set of upgrades without recognizing a fair return for their investment This example illustrates that projects up through Scenario 6 should be approved to properly treat the loads / REPs who are funding the project(s)

8 Conclusion We have illustrated: –Why the potential concern of approving a project based on Societal Surplus benefits, but has negative Consumer Surplus is a non issue. It means that more upgrade projects are still needed –How it is necessary to approve projects based on Consumer Surplus even if Societal Surplus alone doesn’t justify it. This is necessary to allow loads to recognize a fair & timely return on their transmission upgrade investments Request of WMS Approve the proposed economic benefit metric shown below: Reject Project NPV of SS > NPV of TCOS NPV of CS > NPV of TCOS Quantify SS & CS over life of project RPG Recommend Project Approval Yes No Yes

9 APPENDIX

10 Scenario1: Base Case Generator Term Definitions Equiv. Hourly OOMC Start Cost ($/hr) – cost to start out of merit unit ($18k in this example) divided by total run hours (10 hrs in this example) Running Cost ($/hr) – Output MW * Production Cost Production Cost ($/hr) – Running Cost + Equiv. Hourly OOMC Start Cost Generator Revenue ($/hr) – Output MW * Locational Marginal Price (LMP) at the bus + reimbursement for OOMC Start Cost Generator Profit ($/hr) – Generator Revenue minus Production Cost Load Term Definitions Clear Price ($/MWh) – Load Zone LMP Initial Cost ($) – Load MW * Load Zone LMP Out Of Merit Uplift ($) – Equivalent Hourly OOMC Start Cost allocated to each Load Zone on a load ratio share (LRS) basis Congestion Refund ($) – [Initial Cost + Out Of Merit Uplift] minus Generator Revenue, which is allocated to each Load Zone on a LRS basis Final Cost ($) – Initial Cost minus Congestion Refund Net Load Cost ($/MWh) – Final Cost by Load Zone divided by Load Zone MWs

11 Scenario 2: Upgrade Transfer Capability by 100 MW

12 Scenario 3: Upgrade Transfer Capability by 200 MW

13 Scenario 4: Upgrade Transfer Capability by 300 MW

14 Scenario 5: Upgrade Transfer Capability by 400 MW

15 Scenario 6: Upgrade Transfer Capability by 500 MW

16 Scenario 7: Upgrade Transfer Capability by 600 MW