November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 1 1st LEADER PCC MEETING WP4 PLANT OPERATION, INSTRUMENTATION, CONTROL AND PROTECTION SYSTEM DESIGN.

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Presentation transcript:

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 1 1st LEADER PCC MEETING WP4 PLANT OPERATION, INSTRUMENTATION, CONTROL AND PROTECTION SYSTEM DESIGN

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 2 Deliverables TaskDocumentTitle 4.1D14 Normal, transient and accidental operational modes: control and protection functions identification 4.2D06 State of the art Instrumentation and Control Survey 4.3D20 Instrumentation Specifications 4.4 D21 M08 Preliminary definition of the control architecture M08 → Conceptual definition of the control and protection functions and its architecture → M34 → January 2013

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 3 Schedule and Resources  Task 4-2 → 4 MM → April 2010 to March 2011  Task 4-1 → 7 MM → October 2010 to September 2012  Task 4-3 → 15 MM → April 2011 to December 2012  Task 4-4 → 10 MM → April 2011 to January

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 4 WP 4 Participants DocumentResponsibleTask Budget MM Participant Man-Months ANSALDOCIRTENEAENEAINR SCKCEN DEL06EA DEL14CIRTEN DEL20EA DEL21CIRTEN Total

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 5  Objectives Evaluate the applicability of available I&C equipment to the LFR operational needs Identify future R&D needs in the field of I&C  Activities Collect information in relation with the lead technology Identify needs (instruments and control devices)  Core monitoring  Primary Coolant  Secondary system Contact companies interested in participation future developments  D06 State of the art Instrumentation and Control Survey  Schedule: M0-M12 Task 4-2: Description

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 6 Task 4-2: Document Organization DEL06 - IndexResponsibleParticipantsInput Need 1.IntroductionEASCK-CEN 2.ScopeEASCK-CEN 3.Core Monitoring Instrumentation SurveySCK-CENVariables to measure (T3.1) 4.Primary Coolant Monitoring Instrumentation Survey EAVariables to measure (T3.1) 5.Secondary System Monitoring Instrumentation Survey EAVariables to measure (T3.1) 6.ConclusionEASCK-CEN 7.ReferencesEASCK-CEN  Task 3.1 Reference Plant configuration of a LFR

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 7 Task 4-2: Instrumentation inside reactor vessel  Reference ELSY: Definition of the Plant Control System Structure ΦNΦN T HL T CL CRP T HL  Temperature Core Inside / Outside Steam generators Additional points  Control rods position  Neutron flux

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 8 Task 4-2: Instrumentation inside reactor vessel  Required inputs – Variables to control in reactor vessel Task 3.1 – Reference Plant configuration of a LFR D03 – Review and of the main design options of the LFR reference plant o Possible required instrumentation  Lead Level ?  Pressure (cover gas)?  O 2 analyzer (cover gas)?  Lead flow (SG input) ? L O2O2 P F

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 9  Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment Typically developed using commercial standards and practices  Why COTS? Available Lower initial cost Greater flexibility Mature, proven in other industries More open, compliant with standards Task 4-2: Instruments survey Sometimes we don't have a choice

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 10  Equipment used in lead industries Lead primary production (production of metallic lead from lead ore concentrates) Smelting (two stages)  roasting in air, turning the lead concentrate into lead oxide;  heating the lead oxide in a blast furnace Task 4-2: Instruments survey Blast furnace instrumentation

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 11  Resistant thermowell material (Main requirement)  446 Stainless Steel Recommended for thermowells used in lead industries Used in heat treatment processes, iron and steel furnaces and gas production plant Good resistance to high temperature oxidation Good resistance to high temperature corrosion Excellent resistance to sulphurous atmospheres Maximum temperature: 1150 o C Task 4-2: Temperature

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 12  Possible suppliers ABB RdF Corporation Conax technologies Thermocouple instruments (British Rototherm I&C) Thermo-Couple Products Co. (Marsh Bellofram Group) Badotherm Temperature Controls Pty Ltd Pyrosales Pty Ltd Pyro-Electric instruments Wise control Task 4-2: Temperature

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 13  Main requirements High temperature: 500 ºC Harsh operating conditions Range: 9 m Non-maintenance operation Non-contact with lead  RADAR LEVEL SENSOR in the reactor roof  Also used in blast furnace Task 4-2: Level

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 14  Possible suppliers Emerson – Tank Radar Pro Steel Temperature: up to 1000ºC Range: up to 60 m Vega – Vegapuls 68 Temperature: up to 450ºC Range: up to 75 m Wadeco TMT Task 4-2: Level

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 15 Task 4-1: Description  Objectives Definition of the operational modes and parameters or functions to be controlled  Activities Plant operation procedures involving both primary and secondary systems  Start up  Operation at full and reduced power  Shutdown Perform the conceptual design of the plant control and protection systems  D14 Normal, transient and accidental operational modes: control and protection functions identification  Schedule: M7-M32

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 16 Task 4-1: Document Organization DEL14 - IndexResponsibleParticipantsInput Need 1.IntroductionCIRTEN 2.ScopeCIRTEN 3.Identification of LEADER characteristics for control and protection systems CIRTENEA, SCK-CEN C&I philosophy and general architecture 4.Development of a simplified primary loop control oriented model CIRTENSCK-CENSystem state variables, outputs and I/O equations 5.Development of a simplified secondary loop control oriented model EACIRTENSystem state variables, outputs and I/O equations 6.Analysis of the core and the whole system dynamic behavior with coupling between primary and secondary loop CIRTEN, EA, SCK-CEN 7.Plant transient analysisCIRTEN, SCK-CEN EA 8.ConclusionCIRTEN

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 17 Task 4-3: Defense-in-Depth  Prevention of deviations from Normal Operation;  Detection of deviations from normal operation and provision of means to prevent such deviations leading to Accident Conditions;  Provision of engineered safeguards to control and mitigate the Design Basis Accident conditions  Prevention and mitigation of Severe Accidents Several protection barriers

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 18 Task 4-3: Defense-in-Depth 1. Control and monitoring during normal operation 2. Control of plant function implemented to initiate corrective measures in case of deviation from control limits 3. Control of limitation functions implemented to mitigate the consequences of a DBE 4. Control of functions to mitigate the consequence of the Design Extended Condition Functions identification:  Control  Protection

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 19 Task 4-3: Description  Objectives Instrument Specifications  Activities Prepare the design specification of the instruments and control devices needed to perform the control and monitoring functions defined for primary and secondary systems  parameter ranges  safety aspects and redundancy  seismic qualifications  other characteristics needed for the total definition of the instruments  D20 Instrumentation specifications  Schedule: M13-M34

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 20 Task 4-3: Document Organization DEL20 - IndexResponsibleParticipantsInput Need 1.Scope and document structureEA 2.Codes and Standards applicableEAINR, ENEA, SCK-CEN D04 (WP5) 3.ReferencesEAINR, ENEA, SCK-CEN 4.Core Control & Instrumentation devicesINRENEAD14 (Task 4.1) 5.Primary Coolant Control & Instrumentation devices INRSCK-CEND14 (Task 4.1) 6.Secondary Coolant Control & Instrumentation devices EASCK-CEND14 (Task 4.1) DOC01 7.Radiation InstrumentationEAD14 (Task 4.1) 8.R&D activities identifiedEAINR, ENEA, SCK-CEN  DEL04 – Safety approach for LFR plants  DEL14 – Normal, transient and accidental operational modes: control and protection functions identification  DOC01 – Description, functional sizing and drawings of the main components of the LFR plant

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 21 Task 4-4: Description  Objectives Define the conceptual European Lead Cooled Fast Reactor control and operation philosophy to maintain the reactor in operable and safe conditions  Activities Define the control architecture to perform  Control and monitoring during normal and abnormal conditions  Control and monitoring to mitigate the consequences of a design basis event  Control and monitoring to mitigate the consequences of the design extended conditions  D21 - Preliminary definition of the Control Architecture (Milestone M08)  Schedule: M13-M34

November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 22 Task 4-4: Document Organization DEL21 - IndexResponsibleParticipantsInput Need 1.IntroductionCIRTEN 2.ScopeCIRTENINR, ANSALDO, EA, SCK-CEN 3.Assessment of the state inputs, outputs, control variables and noise for control analyses CIRTENINR, ANSALDO, EA, SCK-CEN 4.Development of a suitable control strategy for LFR EA, SCK-CEN CIRTEN, ANSALDO 5.Assessment of controller performance CIRTENINR, ANSALDO, EA, SCK-CEN Reactor control and monitoring functions 6.Dynamic analyses and controlCIRTEN, INR, ANSALDO, EA, SCK-CEN 7.7.ConclusionCIRTEN