HOW ARE TRADE UNIONS AROUND EUROPE TACKLING PRECARIOUS CONTRACTS ? Torino, June 2011

Two parts Trade union initiatives around 2007: Bargaining for better jobs (Background: trying to develop our ‘own’ concept of flexicurity) Recent initiatives (mainly at level of European federations)

A ‘flexicurity’ agenda that is balanced Starting point: Labour markets in Europe are already very flexible Too much backdoors in labour law have been opened in the past Real challenge is not to cut labour law and job protection but to limit parctices of ‘excessive’ flexibility by improving labour law It’s also about ‘smart’ reforms of job protection. Trade off between job and employment security is false; « To protect the worker (‘transitional security’) we also need to protect the job (‘job security’ »

Some interesting case examples

Advance notification as an ‘early warning’ signal Advance notification in months for a worker with 4 year tenure and in case of collective dismissal UK: 3 Ge: 2 FR: 2,5 FI 2 SW 5 DK 5

Complementing job protection with employment security Sweden, Finland: Social partner funds to prevent workers from falling into the ‘black hole’ of unemployment

Promoting internal flexibility Instead of firing workers, redeploy them How to promote such a strategy ? – Robust job protection – Incentive to pursue an alternative strategy than simply firing workers Air France versus British Airways Telia (Swedish telecom company) Plasturgics sector, North of France

Pooling risks Austrian reform: Severance pay no longer paid by individual employer but by sectorwide fund

Dual job protection systems Role of collective bargaining to provide flexibility – Netherlands – Germany – Sweden

Flexi – insurance: The precarious employer pays The ‘Latin’ model ? (FR, IT,ES) – Higher social contributions on short term contracts – Lower social contributions on open ended contracts – Special rates on agency contracts to fund training funds – Combined with negotiations on limits on the share on special contracts in companies, sectors

Ensure reasonable trial periods Problem: a symmetry of information leads employers to discriminate against special groups if job contracts offered are well protected Trial periods overcome this asymmetry of information problem (However, trial periods longer than 6 months are m ore about abuse than about providing labour market access to groups at risk)

Putting limits to chains of fixed term contracts Max number of contractsMax cumulated duration in months Austria1,5No limit Belgium430 Czech RepublicNo limit Denmark1,530 Finland1,5No limit France218 Germany424 Greece324 Hungary2,560 IrelandNo limit(48 or 72) Netherlands3No limit Italy136

Limits to chains fixed term contracts PolandNo limit Portugal448 Slovak RepNo limit60 Spain324 SwedenNo limit24 UKNo limit48

Adressing ‘invisible’ employers Chains of outsourcing – FI: subcontractor has to report terms of wages to main firm – ES: limiting subcontracts to three levels Economically dependent workers – SP, UK, PL: criteria are set (fex 75% of orders originating from one single contractor). ‘Core’ of rights such as specific bargaining processes, labour courts – IT: ‘parasubordinare’ : Re regulation

Recent initiatives Common demand/campaign of Emg against precarious work of EMF Steel agreement: Equal pay for equal work (final responsability of main firm) EFFAT charter on precarious work