Tues. Apr. 19

Full Faith and Credit state for sister state – Art. IV, sect. 1 federal for state – 28 U.S. Code § 1738 state for federal – Supremacy Clause?

Fauntleroy v Lum (US 1908)

Yarborough v Yarborough (US 1933)

Durfee v Duke (US 1963)

Kalb v Feuerstein (US 1940) State ct took jurisd over a foreclosure proceeding – as a result farmer lost farm State judgment not given FF&C because at the time a bankruptcy action was pending, which deprived state ct of jurisd State court was unaware of bankruptcy action as dictum SCt said that even if state ct found that it had jurisd over an action despite bankruptcy, the judgment could be ignored

Judgment in Calif. state ct FF&C ignored, resulting in an incompatible judgment in Nevada state ct Which judgment should an Oregon state ct respect?

Clarke v. Clarke (US 1900)

How to make Clarke compatible with Fauntleroy?

“This is but to contend that what cannot be done directly can be accomplished by indirection, and that the fundamental principle which gives to a sovereignty an exclusive jurisdiction over the land within its borders is in legal effect dependent upon the nonexistence of a decree of a court of another sovereignty determining the status of such land. Manifestly, however, an authority cannot be said to be exclusive, or even to exist at all, where its exercise may be thus frustrated at any time.”

How to make Clarke compatible with Durfee?

Fall v Eastin (US 1909)

The husband violated the Wash. injunction. Does the wife have no recourse?

Assume the wife bought suit against the husband in Nebraska state court to compel him to deed her the property. What result?

“Fall not having executed a deed, the court's conclusion was, to quote its language, that "neither the decree nor the commissioner's deed conferred any right or title upon her." This conclusion was deduced not only from the absence of power generally of the courts of one state over lands situate in another, but also from the laws of Nebraska providing for the disposition of real estate in divorce proceedings. In Cizek v Cizek it was held that portion of the decree which set off the homestead to the wife was absolutely void and subject to collateral attack, for the reason that no jurisdiction was given to the district court in a divorce proceeding to award the husband's real estate to the wife in fee as alimony.”

The sister knew about the injunction. How can the transfer to her be valid? Doesn’t the husband still own the property?

Holmes, J., concurring “The real question concerns the effect of the Washington decree. As between the parties to it, that decree established in Washington a personal obligation of the husband to convey to his former wife. A personal obligation goes with the person. If the husband had made a contract, valid by the law of Washington, to do the same thing, I think there is no doubt that the contract would have been binding in Nebraska.”

But the Nebraska court carefully avoids saying that the decree would not be binding between the original parties had the husband been before the court. The ground on which it goes is that to allow the judgment to affect the conscience of purchasers would be giving it an effect in rem. It treats the case as standing on the same footing as that of an innocent purchaser. Now, if the court saw fit to deny the effect of a judgment upon privies in title, or if it considered the defendant an innocent purchaser, I do not see what we have to do with its decision, however wrong. I do not see why it is not within the power of the state to do away with equity or with the equitable doctrine as to purchasers with notice if it sees fit. Still less do I see how a mistake as to notice could give us jurisdiction. If the judgment binds the defendant, it is not by its own operation, even with the Constitution behind it, but by the obligation imposed by equity upon a purchaser with notice. The ground of decision below was that there was no such obligation. The decision, even if wrong, did not deny to the Washington decree its full effect.

If you are in a non-situs state and wish the court to issue a judgment that will be subject to FF&C in the situs state, what do you do?

Return to Clarke - why wasn’t there jurisdiction over the persons, not the property?

Nancy B. Clarke, one of the parties to the suit in South Carolina, and whom the Connecticut court has held inherited, to the exclusion of the father, under the laws of Connecticut, the whole of the real estate belonging to her sister, was a minor. She was therefore incompetent, in the proceedings in South Carolina, to stand in judgment for the purpose of depriving herself of the rights which belonged to her under the law of Connecticut as to the real estate within that state… It cannot be doubted that the courts of a state where real estate is situated have the exclusive right to appoint a guardian of a nonresident minor, and vest in such guardian the exclusive control and management of land belonging to said minor, situated within the state.

Assume the SC court in Clarke had simply applied SC law and ordered the parties to divide the proceeds between the husband and the daughter. What result?

Baker v Gen Motors (US 1998)

In general, injunctions and equitable decrees are subject to FF&C

No “roving public policy exception” to FF&C

Is there any Michigan obligation that is relevant to this Missouri case at all?

Assume that in Michigan state court General Motors had brought a declaratory judgment action against the Bakers to determine whether Ewell could testify in any suit they might bring. What result?

African-American applicants to a fire dept sue the department The court enters a decree for an affirmative action program in hiring Subsequently white applicants to the fire department sue the department challenging the program Are they precluded?

Even if there us a Michigan obligation that is relevant, isn’t the obligation modifiable in Michigan and so modifiable in MO?

Scalia’s opinion…

What if GM sued for a declaratory judgment in MO federal court determining the Ewell can’t testify in the Baker case?

substance and procedure in the recognition of judgments…

P sues D in Cal., gets judgment D has no assets in Cal. D has house in Nev. P sues D on judgment in Nev., but under Nev. law houses cannot be used to satisfy judgments (in Cal. they can)

Anglo-Am Provision v Davis (US 1903) NY ct allowed to refuse suit on foreign judgment between 2 foreign corps when judgment arose from cause of action arising out of state

Kenney v Supreme Lodge (US 1920) Ill ct refused jurisdiction for suit on Alabama wrongful death judgment against an Illinoisan basis was statute forbidding actions for death outside state

“Full faith and credit, however, does not mean that States must adopt the practices of other States regarding the time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments. Enforcement measures do not travel with the sister state judgment as preclusive effects do; such measures remain subject to the even-handed control of forum law.”

“Orders commanding action or inaction have been denied enforcement in a sister State when they purported to accomplish an official act within the exclusive province of that other State or interfered with litigation over which the ordering State had no authority.”