Chapter 16 Capital Structure

The Financing Decision- Capital Structure Explain the concept of financial leverage and its potential effect on bondholders and on the return on shareholders; Calculate the pro forma EPS using alternative mixes of bond and stock financing; Calculate key coverage ratios resulting from alternative mixes of bond and stock financing and interpret consequences for S&P debt ratings; Relate the financing decision to sustainable growth by discussing why rapidly growing companies might have different debt levels than low-growth companies; Appraise the impact of higher financial leverage on the market value of the firm.

The Financing Decision: 1 The Capital-Structure Theory 2 What is the goal? Maximizing Firm Value or Maximizing Stockholder Interests 3 Financial Leverage and Firm Value

The Capital-Structure and Modigliani-Miller Theory What is the goal? Maximizing Firm Value versus Maximizing Stockholder Interests Financial Leverage and Firm Value: An Example Modigliani and Miller (MM): Proposition II (No Taxes) MM with Taxes

The Capital-Structure Theory The value of a firm is defined to be the sum of the value of the firm’s debt and the firm’s equity. V = D + E If the goal of the management of the firm is to make the firm as valuable as possible, the firm should pick the debt-equity ratio that makes the pie as big as possible. E B Value of the Firm

The Capital-Structure Question There are really two important questions: 1.Why should the stockholders care about maximizing firm value? Perhaps they should be interested in strategies that maximize shareholder value. 2.What is the ratio of debt-to-equity that maximizes the shareholder’s value? As it turns out, changes in capital structure benefit the stockholders if and only if the value of the firm increases.

Financial Leverage, EPS, and ROE Current Assets$20,000 Debt$0 Equity$20,000 Debt/Equity ratio0.00 Interest raten/a Shares outstanding400 Share price$50 Proposed $20,000 $8,000 $12,000 2/3 8% 240 $50 Consider an all-equity firm that is considering going into debt. (Maybe some of the original shareholders want to cash out.)

EPS and ROE Under Current Capital Structure No Taxes RecessionExpectedExpansion EBIT$1,000$2,000$3,000 Interest000 Net income$1,000$2,000$3,000 EPS$2.50$5.00$7.50 ROA5%10%15% ROE5%10%15% Current Shares Outstanding = 400 shares

EPS and ROE Under Proposed Capital Structure RecessionExpectedExpansion EBIT$1,000$2,000$3,000 Interest Net income$360$1,360$2,360 EPS$1.50$5.67$9.83 ROA5%10%15% ROE3%11%20% Proposed Shares Outstanding = 240 shares

EPS and ROE Under Both Capital Structures Levered RecessionExpectedExpansion EBIT$1,000$2,000$3,000 Interest Net income$360$1,360$2,360 EPS$1.50$5.67$9.83 ROA5%10%15% ROE3%11%20% Proposed Shares Outstanding = 240 shares All-Equity RecessionExpectedExpansion EBIT$1,000$2,000$3,000 Interest000 Net income$1,000$2,000$3,000 EPS$2.50$5.00$7.50 ROA5%10%15% ROE5%10%15% Current Shares Outstanding = 400 shares

Financial Leverage and EPS (2.00) ,0002,0003,000 EPS Debt No Debt Break-even point EBI in dollars, no taxes Advantage to debt Disadvantage to debt EBIT

Capital Structure in Perfect Capital Markets Modigliani and Miller (MM) in their 1958 paper concluded that with perfect capital markets the total value of a firm should not depend on its capital structure. –When the firm has no debt, the cash flows paid to equity holders correspond to the free cash flows generated by the firm’s assets. –When the firm has debt, these cash flows are divided between debt and equity holders. –With perfect capital markets, the total paid to all investors still corresponds to the free cash flows generated by the firm’s assets. –Therefore, the value of the unlevered firm, V U, must equal the total value of the levered firm, V L, which is the combined value D + E of its debt D and levered equity E

Assumptions of the Modigliani-Miller Model Homogeneous Expectations Homogeneous Business Risk Classes Perpetual Cash Flows Perfect Capital Markets: –Perfect competition –Firms and investors can borrow/lend at the same rate –Equal access to all relevant information –No transaction costs –No taxes

The MM Propositions I & II (No Taxes) Proposition I –Firm value is not affected by leverage V L = V U Proposition II –Leverage increases the risk and return to stockholders R E = R U + (D / E L ) (R U - R d ) R d is the interest rate (cost of debt) R E is the return on (levered) equity (cost of equity) R U is the return on unlevered equity (cost of capital) D is the value of debt E L is the value of levered equity

The MM Proposition I (No Taxes) The derivation is straightforward: The present value of this stream of cash flows is V L The present value of this stream of cash flows is V U

Capital Structure in Perfect Capital Markets- Financing New Business Upfront investment$24,000 Generates Cash flow$34500 Risk free rate5% Risk Premium10% NPV = /(1.15)= $6000 Value of the firm (unlevered) = (Unlevered Cash Flow)/(1+r U ) V U = $34,500/(1+0.15) = $30,

Capital Structure Choice 1. Equity financing- raising money by selling equity. V U =Value of equity= 34500/1.15=$30, Debt financing- Suppose $15,000 debt is used to buy back half of the equity. Cash Flow from assets = Cash flow to debt holders + cash flow to equity holders Cash flow to debt holders = Interest payment + (New debt – old debt) Cash flow to debt holders = $15000+$15000x5%= $15,750 Cash flow to equity holders = Dividends + Net new Issues Cash flow to equity holders = $34500-$15750= $

Capital Structure in Perfect Capital Markets- Financing New Business Debt =$15,000 CF to equity holders= $18,750 V=D+E Equity= $30,000 - $15,000= $15,000 Cost of equity is based on MM Proposition II R E = R U + (D / E L ) (R U - R d ) R E = 15% +(15,000/15,000)*(15%-5%) =25% Value of equity =$18750/ (1+25%) = $15,

MM Proposition I MM Proposition I: In a perfect capital market, the total value of a firm is equal to the market value of the free cash flows generated by its assets and is not affected by its choice of capital structure. –We can write this result in an equation: V L = E + D =V U Proposition II Value of equity =$15,000 Value of Debt = $15,000 V L = $15,000+$15,000 =$30,

Value and Cost of capital Under different Capital Structure Choice EDD/EReRdD/VE/VWACC %5%0115% %5% % %5%0.5 15% %5% % V equity V levered UcfInterestLcfLCF/(1+rL)V=D+EUCF/(1+WACC)

The Cost of Equity, the Cost of Debt, and the Weighted Average Cost of Capital: MM Proposition II with No Corporate Taxes Cost of capital: R (%) RURU RdRd RdRd No optimal Capital Structure

Debt and Taxes In the real world, markets are imperfect, and these imperfections can create a role for the firm’s capital structure. A firm’s capital structure can affect the corporate taxes it must pay. –Corporations can deduct interest expenses from their taxable income. –The deduction reduces the taxes paid which increases the amount available to pay investors. –In doing so, the interest tax deduction increases the value of the corporation

Debt and Taxes Interest Tax Shield: The gain to investors from the tax deductibility of interest payments Interest Tax Shield = Corporate Tax Rate  Interest Payments 15-23

The MM Propositions I & II (with Corporate Taxes) Proposition I (with Corporate Taxes) –Firm value increases with leverage V L = V U + T C D Proposition II (with Corporate Taxes) –Some of the increase in equity risk and return is offset by interest tax shield R E = R U + (D / E L ) (R U - R d )(1-T C ) R d is the interest rate (cost of debt) R E is the return on (levered) equity (cost of equity) R U is the return on unlevered equity (cost of capital) D is the value of debt E L is the value of levered equity

Weighted Average Cost of Capital with Taxes Another way to incorporate the benefit of the firm’s future interest tax shield Weighted Average Cost of Capital with Taxes The reduction in the WACC increases with the amount of debt financing. The higher the firm’s leverage, the more the firm exploits the tax advantage of debt, and the lower its WACC.

The Effect of Financial Leverage on the Cost of Debt and Equity Capital (D/E) Cost of capital: R (%) RURU RdRd Optimal (D/E) 100% debt

Total Cash Flow to Investors Under Each Capital Structure with Corp. Taxes All-Equity RecessionExpectedExpansion EBIT$1,000$2,000$3,000 Interest000 EBT$1,000$2,000$3,000 Taxes (Tc = 35%)$350$700$1,050 Total Cash Flow to S/H $650$1,300$1,950 Levered RecessionExpectedExpansion EBIT$1,000$2,000$3,000 Interest 8% ) EBT$360$1,360$2,360 Taxes (Tc = 35%)$126$476$826 Total Cash Flow $ $468+$640$1,534+$640 (to both S/H & B/H): $874$1,524$2,174 EBIT(1-Tc)+T C R d D $650+$224$1,300+$224$1,950+$224 $874$1,524$2,174

Total Cash Flow to Investors Under Each Capital Structure with Corp. Taxes The levered firm pays less in taxes than does the all- equity firm. Thus, the sum of the debt plus the equity of the levered firm is greater than the equity of the unlevered firm. EGEG D All-equity firm Levered firm

Summary: No Taxes In a world of no taxes, the value of the firm is unaffected by capital structure. This is M&M Proposition I: V L = V U Prop I holds because shareholders can achieve any pattern of payouts they desire with homemade leverage. In a world of no taxes, M&M Proposition II states that leverage increases the risk and return to stockholders

Summary: Taxes In a world of taxes, but no bankruptcy costs, the value of the firm increases with leverage. This is M&M Proposition I: V L = V U + T C D Prop I holds because shareholders can achieve any pattern of payouts they desire with homemade leverage. In a world of taxes, M&M Proposition II states that leverage increases the risk and return to stockholders.

The Costs of Bankruptcy and Financial Distress If increasing debt increases the value of the firm, why not shift to nearly 100% debt? With more debt, there is a greater chance that the firm will be unable to make its required interest payments and will default on its debt obligations. A firm that has trouble meeting its debt obligations is in financial distress.

Capital Structure and Financial Distress Cost 1.Costs of Financial Distress 2. Description of Costs 3.Can Costs of Debt Be Reduced? 4.Integration of Tax Effects and Financial Distress Costs 5.Shirking, Perquisites, and Bad Investments: A Note on Agency Cost of Equity 6.The Pecking-Order Theory 7.Growth and the Debt-Equity Ratio 8.Personal Taxes 9.How Firms Establish Capital Structure 10.Summary and Conclusions

Costs of Financial Distress Bankruptcy risk versus bankruptcy cost. The possibility of bankruptcy has a negative effect on the value of the firm. However, it is not the risk of bankruptcy itself that lowers value. Rather it is the costs associated with bankruptcy. It is the stockholders who bear these costs.

Description of Costs Direct Costs –Legal and administrative costs (tend to be a small percentage of firm value).

The Costs of Bankruptcy and Financial Distress Direct Costs of Bankruptcy Legal and administrative costs (tend to be a small percentage of firm value). Each country has a bankruptcy code which is designed to provide an orderly process for settling a firm’s debts. However, the process is still complex, time-consuming, and costly. Outside professionals are generally hired. The creditors may also incur costs during the process. In the case of reorganization, creditors must often wait several years for a reorganization plan to be approved and to receive payment. The average direct costs of bankruptcy are approximately 3% to 4% of the pre-bankruptcy market value of total assets. The costs are likely to be higher for firms with more complicated business operations and for firms with larger numbers of creditors.

Indirect Cost of Bankruptcy Indirect Costs –Impaired ability to conduct business (e.g., lost sales) –Estimated potential loss due to financial distress of 10% to 20% of firm value. –Many of these indirect costs may be incurred even if the firm is not yet in financial distress, but simply faces a significant possibility that it may occur in the future.

Cost of Bankruptcy and Agency Costs Agency Costs Selfish strategy 1: Incentive to take large risks Selfish strategy 2: Incentive toward underinvestment Selfish Strategy 3: Milking the property

Can Costs of Debt Be Reduced? Protective Covenants Debt Consolidation: –If we minimize the number of parties, contracting costs fall.

Protective Covenants Agreements to protect bondholders Negative covenant: Thou shalt not: –Pay dividends beyond specified amount. –Sell more senior debt & amount of new debt is limited. –Refund existing bond issue with new bonds paying lower interest rate. –Buy another company’s bonds. Positive covenant: Thou shall: –Use proceeds from sale of assets for other assets. –Allow redemption in event of merger or spin-off. –Maintain good condition of assets. –Provide audited financial information.

Integration of Tax Effects and Financial Distress Costs There is a trade-off between the tax advantage of debt and the costs of financial distress. It is difficult to express this with a precise and rigorous formula.

Integration of Tax Effects and Financial Distress Costs

Cost of Capital and Optimal Capital Structure

Summary

The Pie Model Revisited Taxes and bankruptcy costs can be viewed as just another claim on the cash flows of the firm. Let G and L stand for payments to the government and bankruptcy lawyers, respectively. V T = E + D + G + L The essence of the M&M intuition is that V T depends on the cash flow of the firm; capital structure just slices the pie. E G D L

Shirking Perquisites and Bad Investments: The Agency Cost of Equity An individual will work harder for a firm if he is one of the owners than if he is one of the “hired help”. Who bears the burden of these agency costs? While managers may have motive to partake in perquisites, they also need opportunity. Free cash flow provides this opportunity. The free cash flow hypothesis says that an increase in dividends should benefit the stockholders by reducing the ability of managers to pursue wasteful activities. The free cash flow hypothesis also argues that an increase in debt will reduce the ability of managers to pursue wasteful activities more effectively than dividend increases.

The Pecking-Order Theory Theory stating that firms prefer to issue debt rather than equity if internal finance is insufficient. –Rule 1 Use internal financing first. –Rule 2 Issue debt next, equity last. The pecking-order Theory is at odds with the trade-off theory: –There is no target D/E ratio. –Profitable firms use less debt. –Companies like financial slack

Growth and the Debt-Equity Ratio Growth implies significant equity financing, even in a world with low bankruptcy costs. Thus, high-growth firms will have lower debt ratios than low-growth firms. Growth is an essential feature of the real world; as a result, 100% debt financing is sub-optimal.

How Firms Establish Capital Structure Most Corporations Have Low Debt-Asset Ratios. Changes in Financial Leverage Affect Firm Value. –Stock price increases with increases in leverage and vice-versa; this is consistent with M&M with taxes. –Another interpretation is that firms signal good news when they lever up. There are differences in capital structure across industries. There is evidence that firms behave as if they had a target debt to equity (D/E) ratio.

Factors in Target D/E Ratio Taxes –If corporate tax rates are higher than bondholder tax rates, there is an advantage to debt. Types of Assets –The costs of financial distress depend on the types of assets the firm has. Uncertainty of Operating Income –Even without debt, firms with uncertain operating income have high probability of experiencing financial distress. Pecking Order and Financial Slack –Theory stating that firms prefer to issue debt rather than equity if internal finance is insufficient.

Summary and Conclusions Because costs of financial distress can be reduced but not eliminated, firms will not finance entirely with debt. Debt (D) Value of firm (V) 0 Present value of tax shield on debt Present value of financial distress costs Value of firm under MM with corporate taxes and debt V L = V U + T C D V = Actual value of firm V U = Value of firm with no debt D* Maximum firm value Optimal amount of debt