1 Sixth ROK-UN Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Issues 3-5 December 2007 CONTROLLING SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE ACTIVITIES Mr Jeff Robinson, Minister and Deputy Head of Mission, Australian Embassy, Seoul for the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office

2 Non-Proliferation Regime: Challenges & Strengths Deal effectively with a determined proliferator. Show collective will against challenges. Recognise potential misuse of NPT’s peaceful nuclear energy provisions. Sensitive technology can be for peaceful uses or to produce weapons material. Effective non-proliferation in everyone’s interest

3 The Right to Peaceful Nuclear Energy Enrichment and reprocessing not desirable or necessary for every country with nuclear power. NPT rights to peaceful uses of nuclear energy not unqualified. Need strong non-proliferation credentials and clear economic or fuel cycle justification. Not about denying anyone peaceful nuclear energy. Balance needed between right and risk

4 Emerging Proliferation-Resistant Technologies Thermal reactors will predominate well past Increase in global enrichment capacity foreseen. Technologies not requiring enrichment or reprocessing

5 Spread of Enrichment Capability CountryTechnologySourceStatus ArgentinaDiffusionIndigenousPilot AustraliaCentrifuge; Laser Indigenous; Indigenous Pilot – dismantled; R&D – transferred to US BrazilCentrifugeIndigenousCommercialising GermanyCentrifugeIndigenousCommercial-scale IndiaCentrifugeIndigenousMilitary, limited IranCentrifugeIllicitPilot/Intermediate stage JapanCentrifugeIndigenousCommercial-scale NetherlandsCentrifugeIndigenousCommercial-scale PakistanCentrifugeIllicitMilitary South AfricaAerodynamicIndigenousDismantled Non-P5 States that have demonstrated enrichment capability - enrichment capability already widespread - in most cases developed indigenously - centrifuge technology predominant

6 Risks from Spread of Enrichment Technology Centrifuge plant designed for LEU could be modified to make HEU. Safeguards measures alone not sufficient. Centrifuge plants can have a small ‘footprint’. Can make HEU with few thousand or less centrifuges. LEU feed reduces size of plant or time to produce HEU. Control of sensitive technology needs security. Some technologies possibly proliferation resistant. Risks of:break-out using declared (safeguarded) facilities break-out using clandestine facilities illicit transfer of enrichment technology to others

7 Limiting the Spread of Enrichment Capability Need to limit spread of sensitive technology. Ideas:fuel supply assurances, international fuel cycle centres, criteria for assessing acceptability. Export controls not sufficient - some have pursued enrichment indigenously or via black market

8 Assessing Proliferation Risk of Enrichment Projects One approach – Urenco, no technology transfer. Another approach – international involvement. Marked differences between non-proliferation performance of states. Assessment of a state could involve: – strategic environment of the state, – non-proliferation record, – consistency with state’s circumstances, etc. Key factors: actual enrichment capability of the state relevant institutional arrangements state-specific factors

9 Assessing Acceptability of Enrichment Projects Criteria approach may offer a way forward. Number of states that might consider enrichment is likely to remain small. Enrichment pursuit harder to justify under a global framework for nuclear development. Desirable to assess international acceptability of enrichment projects. Cautious approach required

10 Factors for Consideration Non-proliferation record Technological capability Institutional arrangements Project rationale Strategic environment Non-proliferation benefit State to accept stronger safeguards and transparency.

11 Need a Comprehensive Approach Healthy market for enrichment and fuel services important. Economic and technical reasons not to pursue sensitive facilities. Diplomacy key to equitably limit spread of sensitive activities. Satisfactory approach achievable through diplomacy and incentives. Towards an international framework

12 THANK YOU