Institutional-Anomie, Political Corruption, and Homicide Rates Jerry K. DadayWestern Kentucky University Lisa M. Broidy University of New Mexico Dale Willits University of New Mexico

Institutional Anomie Theory (IAT) Framework for examining the influence of cultural and structural forces on violent crime rates between social aggregates (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2006)  Culture of the American Dream Individualism, achievement, universalism, fetishism of money  Structural imbalance between the economy and non- economic institutions Education, Polity, Family, Health Care Devaluation, Penetration, Accommodation  Weakened social support, social controls & pro-social socialization

Prior Research Core Hypothesis: Strong non-economic institutions can reduce or mediate the anomic effects of the economy  Inequality often serves as proxy measure for economy  Non-economic institutions have a direct, negative effect on violent crime rates % of GDP spent on education % of GDP spent on health care % of population that votes

Prior Research Several cross-national and sub-national test support IAT in whole or in part  Messner and Rosenfeld (1997)  Savolainen (2000)  Pratt and Godsey (2003)  Kim and Pridemore (2005)

Limitations of Prior Research The polity remains an understudied area  Studies primarily use % voter turnout to assess the strength/apathy of the polity  The effects of other non-economic institutions have been studied extensively The effects of political corruption on institutional- imbalance has been understudied  Significant implications for IAT  Corruption: economic principals influencing political decision making

Current Study Messner and Rosenfeld (2001) stress the need for empirical tests of IAT that incorporate corruption measures  “We have speculated that high levels of corruption result under conditions of political dominance and that the dominance of the so-called primordial institutions such as the family and religion leads to excessive social control and human rights abuses. No one to our knowledge has yet tested these implications of IAT.”

Current Study We have attempted to address this need by  Examining the effects of corruption, as a measure of the polity, on cross-national homicide rates Directly (net of controls) Net of non-economic institutions (educ and health care) Interacting with non-economic institutions

Our study Sample Size = 97 countries  Includes all countries for which data exist all on variables for at least 1 year between Average between OLS Regression Models Imputation: EM Algorithm Dependent Variable: Logged Homicide Rate  United Nations Crime Statistics

Independent Variables Polity: Political Corruption Index  Transparency International’s Corruptions Perceptions Index (CPI) From Heritage Foundation  Defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain  Composite index draws on different polls and surveys from independent institutions Example: Global Competitiveness Report and World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Survey

Independent Variables Non-Economic Institution Index  Education Teacher ratio and gross secondary enrollments in school World Bank Development Indicators (WBDI)  Health Care % of GDP spent on Health Care, infant mortality, and life expectancy WBDI It was necessary to index these two items because of their high correlation  Loaded on a single component score, Eigenvalue = 3.54

Control Variables % Female  WBDI Inequality  Ratio of Top 20% of Income Earners to Bottom 20% of Income Earners  WBDI

VariableModel 1Model 2Model 3 Corruption Index0.016**0.010*0.006 Non-economic Institutions *-0.871** Interaction (Corruption X Non- Economic Institutions) ** Female (%)0.149**0.168** Inequality0.065**0.066**0.057** Constant-7.729**-8.360**-7.910** R2R * = significant at the 0.05 level, ** = significant at the 0.01 level OLS Regression Coefficients (n=97), DV= log (homicide)

Results Control variables: Inequality and % Female have positive relationship with homicide rates Corruption has a positive relationship with homicide Non-economic institutions have a negative relationship with homicide  Mediating effects

Results and Conclusions Interaction between Corruption and the Strength Non- economic Institutions  Positive relationship  Non-economic institutions mediate the effects of corruption up to a certain point Before the corruption index reaches 79 (out of 100), non- economic institutions continue to have an overall negative effect on homicide When the corruption index exceeds 79, the non-economic institutions no longer insulate a country from the effects of corruption Conclusion  Pervasive effects of Corruption  Support for IAT: mediating influence of non-economic institutions