Interrogation & Confession Class 18

Confession and Immaturity Haley v Ohio –15 year old “lad” interrogated starting at midnight, denied him access to counsel, confronted him with evidence of co-defendants’ confessions, leading to confession at 5AM –Ruled “involuntary” by U.S. Supreme Court Gallegos v. Colorado –Confession of 14 year old ruled involuntary because he did know or understand his rights, was not the “equal” of the police, was unable to protect himself

Key issue in both Gallegos and Haley is youthfulness and “voluntariness” of confessions –Youthfulness is a “special circumstance” requiring the law’s close scrutiny and special protections Miranda protects juveniles from self- incrimination, and custodial interrogation is deemed inherently coercive –What is “custodial” interrogation? Was it custodial when youth was questioned by parent in front of probation officer in his own home?

Fare v Michael C.(1979) –Defendant interrogated after Miranda warnings by two police officers. Defendant waived right to counsel, but asked to speak with his probation officer. Police refused to contact PO, and interrogation proceeded and defendant made incriminating statements. –CA Supreme Court ruled that request to speak with PO was not the same as a request to speak with an attorney PO cannot provide legal counsel, despite protective mandate –He was experienced in the legal system –US Supreme Court reversed, stating that totality of circumstances analysis needs to be applied, but also stating that defendant’s confession was “voluntary” and “knowing” Marshall dissent – Given role of PO in CA law, asking for PO is same as asking for attorney, Miranda therefore applies, and interrogation should have stopped immediately

–Powell, in his dissent: Although the defendant had prior brushes with the law, and was under the supervision by a probation officer, the…transcript of his interrogation… demonstrates that he was immature, emotional, and uneducated, and therefore likely to be vulnerable to the skillful, two-on-one, repetitive style of interrogation to which he was subjected….[t]he interrogating police officer did not exercise the “greatest of care” to assure that the respondent’s “admission was voluntary”….I am not satisfied that this…16 year old boy…was subjected to a fair interrogation free from inherently coercive circumstances…

If juveniles are immature generally, do Miranda warnings adequately protect their rights? –Owing to their immaturity and diminished competence, do juveniles have the capacity to understand Miranda warnings? To act on these warnings by requesting the presence of an attorney, perhaps risking the displeasure of the police authorities? Are they able to resist enticements to avoid attorneys (e.g., in return for a promise of freedom)? –Does Miranda apply in school settings? Should the school principal in T.L.O. have offered to have an attorney present? Does interrogation by a school authority qualify as “inherently coercive”? Are school officials de facto law enforcement officers when interrogating students? Should questioning by a school authority in the principal’s office or security office deemed custodial”?

Immaturity State v Benoit (NH, 1985) -- “immaturity significantly affects ability to comprehend rights and makes juvenile susceptible to the compelling atmosphere of the interrogation” –“Interested Adult” should be present Dino (1978) – 3 prerequisites to waiver for purposes of interrogation –Juvenile spoke to an atty –Atty was interested in juvenile’s welfare –Atty or adult gave full advice to the juvenile LA overturned Dino standards in Fernandez (1998), opting instead for a “totality” standard –See Grisso et al (2003) research – immaturity as part of ‘totality of circumstances,” but evidence is probative for establishing a ‘bright line rule’ on either procedure or age Despite LA rejection in Dino, per se protections against immaturity are becoming more common –KS (B.M.B)– PA, MA, GA, Colorado cases –NJ (Presha)– WI – Jerrell What about in waiver cases? Juvenile or adult standard for competence in waiver and interrogation evidence? –CT – State v Ledbetter (2003) – protections limited to “delinquency” proceedings, not adult prosecution

Recent Cases Yarborough v Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) –Reverses Alvarado v Hickman, 316 F. 3d 841 (2002) Facts –Alvarado (17 yrs, 7 months) and accomplice Soto attempted to steal truck then murdered driver, part of a larger group of teenagers at a mall; Alvarado helped hide gun –Sheriff Comstock left word at Alvarado’s home and then with his mother at work that she wanted to speak with him. –Parents brought Alvarado to the Sheriff’s Station, he was questioned for two hours starting at 12:30PM, and interrogation was recorded with consent. Parents’ request to be present at interrogation was denied. –No Miranda warnings given. Alvarado denies knowledge of he murder

Alvarado confessed under continued questioning to assisting in the carjacking and then hiding the gun Alvarado refused two offers to take a break. Two months later, he was charged with murder 1 and attempted robbery. Alvarado moved to suppress confession, denied claiming that interrogation was non-custodial. Interview tape introduced at trial to impeach Alvarado’s testimony. Alvarado characterized interrogation as friendly and confession as uncoerced. Alvarado was convicted of murder 1, reduced to murder 2 by judge, and he was sentenced to 15-life.

State Appellate Court denied appeal, citing that warning was not required in non-custodial setting for the interview, although Alvarado was not told that he could leave at any time or ask for an attorney to be present. 9 th Circuit reversed, citing Haley and Gault. Trial court and state appellate court failed to consider youthfulness and inexperience in evaluating whether a reasonable person in his position would have felt free to leave. Age must be a factor, and a minor with no criminal record is more likely to feel coerced. Combination of age and inexperience made interview itno a custodial interrogation.

SCOTUS Decision (Kennedy) –Rejected the idea of a subjective evaluation of whether Alvarado felt free to leave –Citing California v Beheler and Thompson v Keohane, the test is whether there was “a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest” –Relevant inquiry is how a ‘reasonable man’ would have understood his situation’ … not a boy of –Rule re: specificity of test is clear re: conditions of custody. This wasn’t custody. No pressure, threats Appeal to conscience, no manipulation Alvarado returned home after interview, he was not taken into custody Court rejected relevance of age, experience and maturity in a Miranda analysis (Beheler) Breyer dissent –Age matters, context matters, ‘reasonable’ should invoke a juvenile standard, not a median adult standard

Recent Cases Lacresha Murray (In re L.M., 993 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App. 1999) –Female, 11 years, charged in 1996 with capital murder in death of 2 year old female –No prior contact with juvenile justice system –Stomped to death, sneaker imprints on victim’s body were linked to defendant –Interrogation: 2.5 hours, videotaped, conducted at group home facility where defendant was placed following her arrest, neither parents nor attorney present –Detectives read Miranda warnings from printed card, did not ask if Lucresha understood them and could repeat them back to detectives. Detectives did not affirmatively ask if she wanted to have an attorney present.

–Detectives suggested a scenario that Lucresha confirmed (after repeated questioning), then added a hypothetical that Lucresha said was “possible” as accidental contact. –She had reading and comprehension difficulties while trying to understand the confession she was about to sign Was Lucresha in custody? Did Miranda apply? Was confession obtained under duress? Was Lucresha competent? To comprehend Miranda warning? To resist pressures of police and suggestion? To comprehend her confession? for what else? TX Ct of Appeals reversed the second conviction, ruling that the age of the child was relevant in determining whether the child was “in custody” and what rights therefore attached. Standard is…… “whether…a reasonable child of the same age would believe her freedom of movement was significantly restricted”

Recent Cases Oregon v. Romero, 81 P.3d 714 (2003) –Romero accused of assaulting one of her nieces she provided in- home day care for –After niece taken to the hospital, police take Romero down to the station for questioning –During the three-hour interview, Romero admits hitting her niece –In a tape recorded confession, she said police had not threatened her or made any promises to her that induced her confession, and agreed the statement was the product of her own free will –However, at trial she testified that the statement was involuntary and coerced. –She claimed the police told her they would put her in jail and not let her see her family if she didn’t confess and that they would let her go home if she admitted hitting the child.

–Trial judge excludes testimony of psychologist who administered a suggestibility scale that indicated Romero was more susceptible to suggestion in a police interrogation setting than an average member of the population. “I’m going to exclude [the psychologist’s] testimony, not based upon a lack of competence or not based upon the fact that the test are not good, or that he is not a good clinician. I’m going to do it simply [because] it’s a comment on the evidence, it’s a comment on the voluntariness, it’s a comment on the truth or the falsity of the testimony.” Oregon Court of Appeals –Expert testimony supported defendant’s claim that her confession was made involuntarily, and was not excludable as a direct comment on defendant’s credibility. –Testimony of defense expert, based on use of suggestibility scale, constituted prima facie demonstration that psychological assessment of defendant was admissible –Improper exclusion of expert testimony was not harmless because prosecution relied heavily on confession in closing arguments and testimony went to the heart of defense’s theory.

Recent Cases Wisconsin v. Jerrell C.J. (2005) Facts: –Three young men rob a McDonald’s –Following morning, 14-year-old Jerrell picked up at his home –Questioned for five-and-a-half hours –Repeatedly asks to make a phone call to his mother or father, police refuse. –After almost 6 hours of questioning, Jerrell signs a statement admitting his involvement in the robbery. –Jerrell moves to suppress written confession, claiming it was involuntary, unreliable, and coerced.

Wisconsin Supreme Court: –Jerrell’s written confession to the police was involuntary under the totality of circumstances –Court adopts a per se rule requiring the state to electronically record all juvenile interrogations. Only two states require this: Alaska and Minnesota –However, refuses to adopt a per se rule excluding in- custody admissions from any child under the age of 16 who has not been given the opportunity to consult with a parent or interested adult Should be given weight under totality of circumstances Court reaffirms its warning that the failure “to call the parents for the purpose of depriving the juvenile of the opportunity to receive advice and counsel will be considered strong evidence that coercive tactics were used to elicit the incriminating statements

False Confessions Susceptibility to suggestion Susceptibility to threat from authority figures (Drizin and Leo, 82 NCLR 891 (2004) Desire to please authority figure, leading to distorted or inaccurate information Loss of temporal perspective Legal decision making capacity to waive rights How common? Per se rule as prophylactic?