1 Authorization Federation in Multi-Tenant Multi-Cloud IaaS Navid Pustchi Advisor: Prof. Ravi Sandhu.

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Presentation transcript:

1 Authorization Federation in Multi-Tenant Multi-Cloud IaaS Navid Pustchi Advisor: Prof. Ravi Sandhu

World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! “Moving” to Cloud Accessibility Flexibility Reliability Mobilitysecurity

Why Collaboration ? Acme CERN Software Development Tenant Software Development Tenant Financial Tenant  Large Organization with multiple tenants  Distinct Organizations’ Collaborative tasks Cloud Service Provider World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

4 Why Multi Cloud?

 Cloud Federation  Collaboration of cloud service providers and identity providers in order to share their services and resources based on trust agreements.  Multi-Cloud  Collaboration of multiple cloud service providers (public or private) within different administrative domains (Cloud and Domain) to provide complex services at specified service model (Infrastructure, Platform and Software). 5 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Federation Cloud Federation Multi-CloudInter-Cloud Deployment Broker Seamless Communication Broker Hybrid CloudCloud Federation Inter-Cloud Multi-Cloud

6 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Multi Cloud Collaboration Cloud Federation Service (IaaS, PaaS, SaaS)  Heterogeneous: Google account (Open ID 2.0) Heterogeneous within google.  Homogeneous: Eduroam federated network access. Platform  Heterogeneous: OpenStack federation with AWS.  Homogeneous: Keystone to Keystone federation. Trust  Circle-of-Trust: Alliance of institutions for sharing scientific data such as CERN.  Peer-to-Peer: Best Buy federating with Rackspace. Coupling  Identity Federation: SAML, OAuth, OpenID, SSO.  Authorization Federation: SAML, OAuth.

 Problem Statement  Thesis Statement 7 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Problem & Thesis Current access control models provided by cloud platforms are not sufficient to cultivate efficient peer-to-peer and circle-of-trust collaboration between tenants in a cloud or across multiple cloud platforms. Prior role-based and attribute-based access control models in distributed systems are not effectively applicable to cloud IaaS. The problem of authorization federation in multi-tenant cloud IaaS can be partially solved by integrating multiple types of peer-to-peer and circle-of-trust relations between tenants in single-cloud and multi-cloud environments into role-based and attribute based models.

8 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Scope of Contribution Cloud Federation IaaS SaaS Peer-to-Peer Circle-of-Trust Authorization Federation Authentication Federation Service Trust Coupling PaaS Platform HomogenousHeterogeneous

9 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Scope of Contribution Cloud Federation IaaS SaaS Peer-to-Peer Circle-of-Trust Authorization Federation Authentication Federation Service Trust Coupling PaaS Platform HomogenousHeterogeneous

 A collaboration group of clouds, relationships are established by a set of contracts defining obligations and access rights of participating clouds.  Member clouds have access to a set of shared services and resources.  Joining the circle of trust requires agreement of member clouds. A B D C E 10 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Circle-of-Trust

 Collaboration of clouds, relationships established between each two participating clouds.  Clouds share resources and services upon trust relationship between trustor and trustee clouds.  Joining a new relationship requires stablishing trust with other clouds. 11 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Peer-to-Peer Trust A B D C E

 Identity (Authentication) Federation:  Authenticating users (services and applications) in a cloud service provider other than their registered identity provider based on trust between collaborating clouds.  Authorization Federation:  Granting access to authenticated users by assigning roles in cloud service provider based on trust agreements between two clouds.  Authorization federation is dependent on identity federation to authenticate users. 12 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Identity vs Authorization Is she a user in CSP1? (Authentication Federation) CSP1 Users Alice Resources CSP2 Users Resources What permissions she should be assigned to? (Authorization Federation)

13 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Contribution Infrastructure-as-a-Service Multi-Tenant CloudMulti-Tenant Multi-Cloud Peer-to-PeerCircle-of-TrustPeer-to-Peer Homogeneous Heterogeneous

14 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Peer-to-Peer Trust UnilateralBilateral Initiation Transitive Non-transitive Transitivity Unidirectional Bidirectional Direction

15 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Administrative Realms

16 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Multi Cloud Trust  Two trust scopes based on administrative realms in cloud:  Cross Cloud Trust  Sharing cloud infrastructure resources, such as services.  Cross Domain Trust  Sharing domain resources such as projects.

17 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Domain Trust

18 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Domain Trust

19 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Domain Trust

20 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Domain Trust

World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC)  Attributes are name:value pairs  Represents user and resource properties  Associated with  Users  Objects  Tenants  Contexts  Converted to rights by authorization policies  In-time  Entity attributes  Set of actions

World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Why Another Model  ABAC  RBAC shortcomings needs custom extension  For example real time environmental parameters.  ABAC is more flexible  Accommodate environmental parameters.  MT-ABAC  Multi-tenancy  Collaboration consistent with trust

World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! O U A Auth OATT UATT Association Access Decision

World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! T O U A Auth OATT UATT trustedTenants userOwner objOwner oattOwner uattOwner Association Access Decision Many-to-one atomic-valued function Many-to-many set-valued function

World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Tenant-Trust Sec_EngSec_Mng

World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Tenant-Trust Sec_EngSec_Mng

World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Tenant-Trust Sec_EngSec_Mng

28 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! P2P vs. CoT ACME Multi-Tenant Circle-of-Trust Public Cloud Finance Tenant Human Resource Tenant Sales Tenant Research & Dev. Tenant Software Testing Tenant Software Dev. Tenant

29 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Trust in Circle-of-trust Unidirectional Bidirectional Non-Transitive Transitive Multilateral Circle-of-Trust HomogenousHeterogeneous Unilateral Multilateral Entity Coupling Direction Transitivity Initiation

30 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Tenant-Trust in CoT

31 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! U OPS OBS PRMS PA T RO OO CoT UO UA RH Roles Many-to-one relationMany-to-many relation

32 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

33 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

34 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! uattOwneroattOwner U OPS OBS PRMS PA T RO OO UO UA RH Roles UATT OATT TATT Many-to-one relation Many-to-many relationAssociation Many-to-one atomic-valued function

 Adding Identity federation to OpenStack cloud, multiple identity providers can federate their users to an OpenStack cloud.  CHADWK. (2014). Adding Federated Identity Management to OpenStack. Journal of Grid Computing, World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Openstack Federation Trust Identity Provider Service Provider Request for a service. 2.Determine user’s IdP. 3.User redirection for authentication. 4.User Authentication. 5.IdP redirects user’s attributes. 6.User access to service is granted.

 Takes SAML assertion as input, and as output OpenStack Token.  OpenStack cloud admin creates a set of mapping rules which determines how to map SAML attributes to groups and users.  OpenStack Paris Summit, Keystone to Keystone Federation, videos/presentation/keystone-to-keystone-federation, (2014) 36 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Keystone Mapping Engine SAML Assertion Mapping Engine OpenStack Token SAML Attributes: Groups: IBM Regular Employees Canada, SWG Canada User: Allen Mapped Keystone Attributes: Groups: Regular_Employees_ Canada, SWG_Canada User: Allen Identity Provider Service Provider

 Takes as input: an OpenStack Token, and the service provider the user wants to use.  Outputs a SAML Assertion that can be forwarded to the Service Provider.  Assuming service provider has the Identity Provider created, the Private Cloud user should get a token that is valid at the Service Provider.  OpenStack Paris Summit, Keystone to Keystone Federation, videos/presentation/keystone-to-keystone-federation, (2014) 37 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Keystone SAML Generator SAML Assertion SAML Generator OpenStack Token Private CloudPublic Cloud

 OpenStack Paris Summit, Keystone to Keystone Federation, videos/presentation/keystone-to-keystone-federation, (2014) 38 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Keystone to Keystone Federation Keystone Nova Swift Public Cloud Keystone Nova Swift Private Cloud A. Add public cloud as service provider B. Add Private Cloud as Identity Provider 1. Ask for SAML Assertion 2. Return SAML Assertion 3. Present SAML Assertion 4. Return a Keystone token that can be used on Public Cloud

Questions ?  Coarse-grained and fine-grained trust models in cloud.  Multi-Tenant Cloud.  Multi-Tenant Multi-Cloud.  Peer-to-Peer Policy  Multi-cloud role-based model.  Multi-tenant attribute-based model.  Circle-of-Trust Policy  Multi-tenant role-based access control model.  Multi-tenant role-centric attribute-based access control model.  Implementation  Single-cloud tenant trust.  Federated-cloud tenant trust. World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!