Modified Onion Routing GYANRANJAN HAZARIKA AND KARAN MIRANI.

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Presentation transcript:

Modified Onion Routing GYANRANJAN HAZARIKA AND KARAN MIRANI

Onion Routing  Provides measures against traffic analysis.  Provides protection against eavesdropping.  Provides bi-directional anonymous communication.  Provides anonymous socket connection through a proxy server for easy deployment.

Implementation Overview Routing Topology  Creates an anonymous, bi- directional, real-time VC between initiator and responder.  Information is hidden by making a data stream pass through the anonymous circuit en route to its destination  Each node (except initiator’s proxy server) knows nothing but the previous and the next hops in the communication chain  Consists of the initiator, it’s proxy server, the responder’s proxy server, the responder and the nodes on the route between the initiator and responder

Onion Structure Initiator’s proxy identifies a series of routing nodes forming a route through the network. It then creates an onion which encapsulates the route. The basic onion structure depends on the route to the responder chosen by the initiators proxy. Based on this route the initiator’s proxy encrypts first for the responder’s proxy, then for the preceding node on the route and so on back to the first routing node to whom the onion will be sent

Formation & Delivery of Onion Sende(S)rS’s ProxyRouter 1Router 2R’s Proxy Receiver(R)

Limitations  It is assumed that the public key certificates for each node have been distributed to all others prior to operations.  No mechanism of checking message authenticity.  Single point of failure: If proxy server is compromised, then the entire system fails.  Two level encryptions for the header and each layer of onion.  No way to authenticate a returning participant in the network.  It is assumed that the proxy/routing nodes and the intermediate routing nodes know about each other in advance.

Proposed Modifications  Remove proxy servers  Use authentication code with message to protect against message corruption by an attacker  Use ‘Type’ field indicationg whether message can tolerate delay or not. If it can, then each routing node assumes the functionality of BINOMIAL MIX !!  Encrypt message with sec_keyxy rather than encrypting header and payload separately  Eliminate need of random bits in message by use of sex_keyxy

Thank You