On Consciousness as Inner Sense Or as primitive self-representation

Consciousness as inner sense (higher- order perception (HOP)) Lycan “A state is a conscious state iff it is a mental state whose subject is (directly or at least nonevidentially) aware of being in it.” (p.93) To be aware of something is to represent it, or be intentionally directed to it. What sort of representation? A perception-like, rather than a thought-like one.

Lycan’s basic HOP account of consciousness (my gloss) (i) Suppose I have an orangey-yellow afterimage. (I am in a state that “features a certain Q-property (orangey-yellow)” (a state which has a certain “qualitative character”). (ii) There is something that it’s like for me to have this after-image. (This is a property of the [having of the?] Q-property.) (i) can occur without (ii). And it’s only in virtue of the addition of (ii) that the state in (i) is phenomenally conscious. What (ii) adds is a type of Higher-Order Representation of (i). This HOR is “the output of an attention mechanism that is under voluntary control.” Since thoughts are not outputs of an attention mechanism that is under (direct) voluntary control, the HORs are perception-like.

Comments on Lycan: CO and the regress We do not need to take the “Conscious Of” principle, given a strongly necessary, universal scope, intentionalist reading, as a starting point for theorizing about phenomenal consciousness. In the first talk, I showed that there are ways to introduce the notion that do not assume the CO principle at all. Which interpretation of CO principle we should accept as true, if any, should be determined by considerations that emerge independently of it.

One such consideration… How should we best respond to the regress problem facing higher-order representation theories of consciousness? Contra Lycan, this is a serious, not a “bad and ignorant” objection.

Regress Problem (CO) every conscious state is a state one is conscious of (HOR theory: one somehow forms a representation of that very state.). (IC) every state of being conscious of something is conscious—you can’t be unconsciously conscious of something. (HOT theory: every higher-order representation is conscious, since it is a “consciousness of” something) This seems to imply that every conscious state is accompanied by an infinite number of concurrent conscious higher-order representations. The standard response (Rosenthal’s and Lycan’s) is to dismiss (IC) and maintain (CO) is a necessary truth of universal scope (so this may be used as evidence for HOR theory). But this dismissal is arbitrary: IC is at least as intuitive as CO. Is it weird to say: “one can be in a conscious state of which one is not conscious”? It’s at least equally weird to say, “one can be conscious of something, by unconsciously seeing or thinking of it.”

How should we respond to the regress problem if not by tossing IC? 1.Self-representational HOR: We could maintain that all conscious states include a (conscious) representation of themselves. 1.We could drop CO entirely. (Dretske: conscious states are states we are conscious with not states we are conscious of.) 1.We could hold onto IC and adopt interpretations of CO that don’t lead to regress. E.g., – Ambiguity: conscious state is ambiguous between “phenomenal” and “phenomenal reflective”—CO applies only to the second. – Relaxed availability: CO says no more than that conscious states are normally available for to be consciously reflected on in beings capable of conscious reflection. – Non-intentional: what follows the ‘of’ in ‘conscious of’ merely what kind of ‘consciousness’ one has. To be conscious of feeling pain is to have consciousness of this sort: feeling pain. (Compare: ‘sky of blue, sea of green’). ‘Conscious of’ needn’t always introduce an intentional object, an accusative of mental reference.

How should we respond to the regress problem if not by tossing IC? I favor option (3). I reject option (1) since it seems to me that we have no reason to think we are continually consciously thinking of how things look and sound to us. And a substantial form of inner sense (as distinct from reflective thought) is not phenomenologically discernible (as it would be if it were conscious). (To be explained.) And I just don’t see we have adequate reason to posit a sui generis primitive form of state self-consciousness as essential to consciousness generally. (I’ll return to this.)

Further comments on Lycan: “what it’s like” Do we have reason to accept that “what it’s like” to have an experience is a property of a “Q-property” (or rather, of a state featuring a Q-property)? What is my Q-featuring state supposed to be in the after-image case? I would describe it by saying: “it looks orangey-yellow to me.” But why should I believe this is a state that I can be in without there being something that it’s like for me to be in it? I showed in the first talk that there is a legitimate interpretation of ‘looks’ and ‘what it’s like’ on which this is not the case. It’s true one can ask what it like for something to look orangey yellow to me, but this is simply to wonder specifically how things look to me, when they look orangey yellow. It needn’t be interpreted as involving a second order property. There’s no reason to think that if I wonder what it’s like for you to have an orangey-yellow after image, I am wondering how you internally represent your state of representing something as orangey yellow.

We can attend to experience. Grounds to believe in inner sense? Regarding the point about attention. Some (“transparentists”) say we don’t and can’t attend to our own experiences. (Tye, Harman, Dretske) I think this is wrong. I agree with Lycan that we can attend to our own experience. I disagree with him that this requires some notion of “inner sense.” I will return to this.

My general critique of inner sense theories Theories that consciousness is inner or higher-order sensing or perception either: reduce to high-order thought accounts, or else depend on the notion that a first-order distinction between sensing and thinking can be re-applied at the second-order level. But higher-order thought accounts are unacceptable, and an iterated sensing/thinking distinction is warranted neither phenomenologically nor on explanatory grounds.

What a substantial “inner sense” would be a)At the first-order level: there is a distinction between: sensing something and thinking about it. b)In general, sensing does epistemic work—provides knowledge of the item sensed, or warrant for thinking what you do about it. c)If there is inner sense, this sensing/thinking distinction can be iterated. There is both first-order sensing (of, e.g., colors, shapes, smells and sounds) and also—distinct from this in kind—a second or higher order sensing of such sensing (and perhaps of other mental states/occurrences), that serves an epistemic function. d)On some versions: this involves a distinctively sensory form of attention to experience.

A distinction between sensing and thinking Can be drawn at the first-order level. (As illustrated (e.g.) by subjective contrast employing blindsight) Can an analogous distinction be drawn at the higher-order levels?

Can an analogous (sensing/thinking) distinction be drawn at the higher-order levels? It’s not enough that you can say that you experience your own experiences (e.g., you feel your own feelings)—where this doesn’t just mean they happen to you). For this is true in a sense in which experiencing the experience simply coincides with the experience itself, and how you experience it coincides with the character of the experience. To have a substantial “inner” sensing—not just sensing an odor or sound or color, but sensing a sensing of odor, sound, color—you’d need to distinguish: – the manner of sensing the sensing from – the manner of sensing. We might say: there needs to be a difference between features of the experience experienced, and how those features are experienced.

To find substantial inner sense… We need to find a way in which you sense your own sensing, and do not merely think about it, that is not just: coincident experiencing your own experience …a way in which you sense your own sensing, where the manner of sensing does not simply coincide with, but is distinguishable from, the features sensed.

Is genuine inner sense phenomenologically discernible? It would be, only if critical first-person reflection confirmed that we had, not just thought about our sensing, but either: – a form of objectual sensing of one’s own sensing (displaying object constancy), or – a form of sensory registration of one’s own sensing.

Try to discern objectual sensing of your own sensing (displaying object constancy): – without changing the way the figure looks to you, – try to shift your attention with respect to this (constant, stable) appearance, – so as to alter, in a subjectively detectable manner, how this appearance is sensed by you—where this is distinct from: how or what you think about this appearance.

Try then to discern sensory registration of your own sensing. – Consider (reflectively)—e.g., feeling nauseated. – Try to find a sensing of the feeling, distinct in kind from the feeling itself and any thought about it— – a separate sort of sensing that registers this feeling, as that feeling registers the condition of [your] stomach.

Substantial inner sensing is phenomenologically indiscernible Critical first-person reflection confirms that we have, distinct from thought about our sensing, neither: – a form of objectual sensing of one’s own sensing (displaying object constancy), nor – a form of sensory registration of one’s own sensing. But perhaps there are sufficient theoretical-explanatory grounds to posit it? Because of attention to experience, say?

Is inner sense justifiable as an explanatory posit? Lycan: we need inner sense to explain attention to experience. So we are justified in positing it even if it is unconscious, and phenomenologically indiscernible. Response: The only reasonable response to the regress problem require that, if HOR are to figure in an explanation of consciousness, they need to be conscious. But even aside from this, there are problems with the appeal to attention. First, I grant there is a form of attention to experience.

Attending to your own experience This happens when (eg) you taste the wine and ask yourself: how does this taste to me? Dry, sweet? Chalky? Flinty? Mineraly? You don’t withdraw attention from the wine or its flavor and focus it exclusively “inwards” whatever that might mean. But neither does your thought (“the way this tastes to me is…”) exclude from its scope the wine’s tasting to you as it does (that experience). Contra Lycan—this direction of thought is a direction of attention (one can voluntarily direct one’s thoughts (and not just via a direction of sensory attention (looking at, listening to)).

Would positing inner sense explain reflective attention? A non-phenomenal (blindsight) vision by itself would not enable us to attend to visual objects so as to confirm or disconfirm our judgments about them by “getting a better look at them”—it would not furnish an “epistemically enhancing attention. A reflectively inaccessible inner sense would have—to the extent we have reason to judge—no phenomenal character of its own. It would be a kind of “inner blindsight” A “blind” (nonphenomenal) inner sensing would be no more able to furnish an epistemically-enhancing attention than would blindsight. So it cannot help explain how we attend to our own experience, in an epistemically enhancing way.

Plus, we can explain subjective attention without inner sense First-order sensory appearances can do double duty. They can both: – constitute attention to extra-mental objects, and – (as will be shown in the next talk!) make possible (attentive) thought about themselves. Positing an extra layer of hidden sensing would add nothing that we can’t get without just one level of “sensing”.

The rejection of inner sense We have reason to believe in a substantial inner sense, only if we have reason to accept the notion that a distinction between sensing and thinking can be justifiably re-applied at the second-order level. But this notion is phenomenologically unwarranted, and cannot be justified on explanatory grounds sometimes alleged.

Inner sense (or higher-order perception) accounts of consciousness either a)Amount to high-order thought accounts, or else b)depend on the notion that a first-order distinction between sensing and thinking can be re-applied at the second-order level. The previous talk shows why (a) leaves inner sense accounts unacceptable. This talk shows why (b) does the same. The idea that there is a way in which you sense (and do not just form thoughts of) your own sensing, where the manner of sensing does not simply coincide with, but is distinguishable from, the features sensed— this is phenomenologically unwarranted, and cannot be justified on explanatory grounds alleged.

But what about “sui generis” self- representationalist theories? Suppose you agree that consciousness can’t be explained in terms of thoughts about one’s own mental states or sensings or perceivings of them—properly so called. And that neither of these are necessary for consciousness. Still, might you maintain that there is a way in which one’s own conscious states are themselves necessarily represented—which isn’t properly regarded as thinking of them, and isn’t “substantial” inner sense? Kriegel’s “self-representationalist” theory of consciousness could be regarded in this manner.

What’s wrong with the Kriegelian suggestion? Requires us to posit a form of intentionalist state self- consciousness, which we have no phenomenological grounds for believing in… Unless we give an intentionalist reading of the “Conscious Of” principle (CO), give it universal scope, and take it to state a necessary truth. There are alternative readings of the CO. There is no good reason to think alternative readings of the CO principle do not exhaust its truth. To elaborate on these alternatives, mentioned earlier….

Alternative Interpretations of CO CO: One is in a conscious state c, only if one is conscious (or aware) of c. Ambiguity Proposal Relaxed Availability Proposal Non-intentionalist Proposal

Ambiguity We may distinguish reflective sense of ‘conscious state’ from the plain phenomenal sense. In the first sense, a mental state of yours is conscious, only if it is the object of your conscious reflection, or your are disposed to affirm it in conscious reflection, apparently without inference. CO is true of ‘conscious state’ in this sense. Perhaps not in the plain phenomenal sense.

Relaxed Availability Do you still think that phenomenally conscious states are quite generally ones we are, in some sense “conscious of”? Maybe this is just the idea that phenomenally conscious states are usually available to reflect upon consciously, when they occur in beings, like ourselves, who are capable of reflective thought.

That is, if you have a general ability to form “higher-order thoughts,” then, usually you will be able and disposed to think phenomenal thoughts of some kind about your own actual phenomenal thoughts and experiences, if only retrospectively, should the issue of what you’re thinking or experiencing arise. That’s what’s meant by saying ‘our conscious states are states we are conscious of’.

Non-intentionalist ‘of’ Do we also wish to say that Pickles the dog is conscious of feeling pain? We may treat this ‘of’ as the ‘of’ in ‘feeling of pain’ above. I.e., to say she is conscious of feeling is only to say that she has a consciousness of a certain sort: a “feeling” sort. if we insist (strangely) that whenever Pickles sees a ball, and is conscious of a ball, she is, in some sense conscious of seeing, then we may analogously take this just to mean she has consciousness of a certain sort—a visual sort.

My claim: once we recognize such construals of CO (and others perhaps), we find there is nothing we need take it to express that we should accept that supports a strong intentionalist state reflexivist reading of it.

Conclusion: re relation of consciousness and state self-consciousness The fact that that you have a conscious state does not entail, and it is not explained by, your thinking you are in that state, or by your innerly sensing that state, or by your state representing itself. We still need an understanding of the consciousness/state self-consciousness relation that accounts for how we can attend to our own experience in thought (as in wine tasting)—that avoids the problems of the rejected views.