Dr. Heike Link Gegenwart versus Zukunft – Zur unsicheren Empirie der sozialen Diskontrate 44. Verkehrsplanerisches und verkehrsökologisches Kolloquium TU Dresden, 13. April 2016 High Speed Rail in Germany – too costly and too slow? Conference „High Speed Rail for Central and Eastern European Countries Prague, 10 June 2016
Settlement structure in Germany Polycentric Only few large cities but various medium and small- sized cities Densly populated and densely built-up urban areas Many lines have to pass mountenous areas High construction costs © Wikipedia. Janndo04.
Characteristics of HSR in Germany Not rays to centre (France, Spain) not line-structure (Japan) In Germany it is rather: A network with many entry points High train frequency, many stops, low average speed Few newly constructed lines (300 km/h) Upgrades of existing lines ( km/h) ICE also on conventional lines (200km/h) Mixed passenger and freight traffic
History of HSR in Germany 1971First study on a nation-wide 300 km/h HSR network + upgrading existing lines to 200 km/h 1973 CBA-based 1st Masterplan on Transport Infrastructure: HSR lines Hannover –Würzburg and Mannheim – Stuttgart, Frankfurt - Groß-Gerau 1974 Decision on freight operation at HSR 1973 Start of construction HS Line Hannover- Würzburg 1976 Start of construction HS Line Mannheim - Stuttgart 1991 Start of operation at these lines 1998 Opening Hannover – Berlin line Further lines (Cologne – Frankfurt, Nürnberg – Ingolstadt)
Overview on completed HSR in Germany LineTypeLength (km) Max. Speed Start of Construction OpeningCost ** (mill ε/km) Hannover- WürzburgN Stuttgart – MannheimN Hannover – BerlinU/N Köln – FrankfurtN Nürnberg – IngolstadtU/N – Nürnberg – ErfurtU/N – * 27.8 Erfurt – Leipzig/HalleN * 19.3 Berlin – Halle/LeipzigU/N N= New construction. U= Upgrading. Planned date of completion. ** 2010 prices.
Impact of tunnels and bridges (% of km) on construction costs
Cost benefit analysis for HSR in Germany HSR projects undergo the procedures of the Federal Masterplan on Infrastructure Development Are subject to ex-ante CBA, but not to ex-post CBA Scope of CBA often used for HS-favourable results CBAs not publicly available Sometimes CBA outcomes were updated lower BCRs BVU and ITP (2005): Methodology for ex-post CBA for rail projects, tested for 2 HSR projects
Cost benefit analysis for HSR in Germany LineBCR ex-post*BCR ex-ante**BCR ex-ante update*** Hannover – Würzburg1.6 (1.8) – 1.7 Hannover - Berlin1.19 (1.7) >3 (?) *includes benefits from decreasing air operating costs (not inluded in ex-ante CBA). ** Hannover- Würzburg: 1973 Masterplan. Hannover – Berlin: 1992 Masterplan. *** Update for 1981 Masterplan. Source: BVU and ITP (2005)
Cost overuns of German HSR projects – in Mill. Euro
Reasons for cost overruns Over-optimistic demand forecasts Underestimated costs: Partly exclusion of tunnels in cost estimates for CBA assumption of too short construction times too low buffers for geological risks Change of legal obligations (noise/environmental protection) Citizens protests Stakeholder relationships (Federal Governement - Länder) Difficult topographic and geological situation Long planning and construction times, delays
Average travel speed at HSR lines – in km/h
Thank You! Travel times 2009 vs from Frankfurt to: Source: DB International, 15 May Presentation Grein.
Patronage in HSR Passengers (mill.) Pass-km (mill.) Decrease/stagnation of overall long-distance passenger demand Shift between train types (abolishing Inter-Regio 1999) to ICE – absorption of traffic from conventional rail
Average travel distance (km) Trend to shorter trips in HSR, ICE trains not anly on genuine HS- lines
Conclusions German High Speed lines are Very costly Rather slow Rather percieved as a long-distance travel product with better quality (better trains, prestigeous) Benefit cost ratios often lower than for other rail projects Absorption of traffic from conventional rail, presumaby less from air But travel time gains combined with higher comfort might have stabilised rail passenger demand (?)
Thank You!