Chapter 6 INTEREST GROUPS: The Politics of Influence Theory/Philosophical Focus: Federalist #10 © 2011 Taylor & Francis

Introduction In Federalist #10, Madison counters the anti- Federalist’s arguments against the proposed Constitution. Specifically the Anti-Federalist Papers: Letters from the Federal Farmer (October 8-9, 1787) and Brutus’ Essay #1 (October 18, 1787) opposing the proposed Constitution and supported tenets of Jeffersonian democracy: sovereignty should reside in small republics. large, consolidated republics threaten republican liberty A distant federal government will lead to tyranny (faction) Local traditions and regional differences will inhibit an effective national government © 2011 Taylor & Francis

Extended Republic Alternatively, Publius believes an extended republic will actually control the effects of factions. Representation alone will be insufficient because it would require all representatives to have good character. This is utopian given the conflicts among men. There must be another “mechanism” to ensure that if representation fails faction can still be controlled. © 2011 Taylor & Francis

Extended Republic That mechanism is the Extended Republic: By taking in a multiplicity of interests, the interests and parties will effectively moderate the threat to republican liberty. The differences between regions and locales will cancel each other so no one interest will become overly powerful. © 2011 Taylor & Francis

Extended Republic James Madison lays out the skeleton of his argument for the proposed Constitution in the first paragraph: A well constructed Union will work against factionalism. Such a union is in comportment with popular sovereignty. © 2011 Taylor & Francis

Defining Faction A group of citizens working contrary to other citizens or to the general welfare of the community. © 2011 Taylor & Francis

Reasons for Factions The nature of man is inherently factional due to: −Difference in possession of property © 2011 Taylor & Francis

Dealing with the Problem of Faction Madison provides two alternatives: Removing its causes Controlling its effect(s) How do we remove the cause of faction? −Destroy liberty −control the effects of faction How do we secure the collective good and individual rights without destroying liberty? © 2011 Taylor & Francis

Controlling the Effects of Faction Surprising to many that Madison is arguing against democracy—showing that democracy provides no control of faction Democracy is a flawed government in that it cannot secure inalienable rights against faction. © 2011 Taylor & Francis

Madison’s Mechanisms to Control the Effects of Faction Madison proposes two mechanisms that will allow the Republic to control the effects of faction Representation (the filtration argument) An extended Republic (the size argument) © 2011 Taylor & Francis

First Mechanism: Representation A simple majority of votes eliminate the threat of a minority faction. The representative process, which will take place within the two legislative branches, allows for a refinement and enlargement of the public views. According to Madison, factions will be controlled by a representative acting as a trustee who will use his wisdom and expertise to filter the views of his constituency © 2011 Taylor & Francis

Second Mechanism: An Extended Republic Madison proposes an Extended Republic Republics, through representation, can be spread out over large territories. Representative democracy provides for a channeling of interests. Multiple factions make it harder to form majority factions. Factions will be smaller due to greater diversity. Similar interests are more likely to be spread out. © 2011 Taylor & Francis

Conclusion In Federalist #10, Madison provides two mechanisms: an extended republic and a scheme of representation where the threat of faction will be controlled. Representatives filtering the public views with those promoting the common good does not solely ensure protection against tyranny. © 2011 Taylor & Francis

Conclusion Yet, this scheme of representation combined with an extended republic consisting of a multiplicity of interests will make it more difficult for faction to form. Publius provides a pragmatic solution to control the effects of faction with the republican principles of representation and self-rule but also recognizing the capacity of factions to work against the common good. © 2011 Taylor & Francis