Page 1 IRU CONFERENCE THE ROAD TO SUCCESS: EURO-ASIAN FREIGHT MARKET Challenges and Opportunities Warsaw, June 2007 Security in Euro-Asian Road Transport: Attacks on International Drivers Mary Crass International Transport Forum/ ECMT

Page 2 FROM ECMT INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT FORUM TO THE

Page 3 THE PROBLEM  Security = major concern across transport and logistics chain:  theft of goods, vehicles,  illegal immigration,  smuggling of goods…  Violent attacks on truck drivers a growing problem …  Until recently, anecdotal evidence only.  Security = major concern across transport and logistics chain:  theft of goods, vehicles,  illegal immigration,  smuggling of goods…  Violent attacks on truck drivers a growing problem …  Until recently, anecdotal evidence only. ;;

Page 4 Problem is complex:  Multitude of actors involved: drivers, companies, police/law enforcement agencies, authorities, trade associations, unions, insurers, truck parking operators, etc.  Reporting, recording and monitoring = weak in most countries.  Measures to combat crime = not or hardly implemented. Problem is complex:  Multitude of actors involved: drivers, companies, police/law enforcement agencies, authorities, trade associations, unions, insurers, truck parking operators, etc.  Reporting, recording and monitoring = weak in most countries.  Measures to combat crime = not or hardly implemented.

Page 5 THE IRU-ECMT STUDY  OBJECTIVES  Better ascertain nature and scale of the problem; what government is doing  Explore methods used, costs (commercial loss, human suffering)  Propose practical recommendations for stakeholders  OBJECTIVES  Better ascertain nature and scale of the problem; what government is doing  Explore methods used, costs (commercial loss, human suffering)  Propose practical recommendations for stakeholders

Page 6 METHODOLOGY  Survey of international HGV drivers, managers  Web-based questionnaire (26 languages; responses)  Face-to-face random driver interviews conducted at or near 4 locations (1 275 responses):  Berlin  Budapest and Szeged  Several locations near London  Turin  Survey of international HGV drivers, managers  Web-based questionnaire (26 languages; responses)  Face-to-face random driver interviews conducted at or near 4 locations (1 275 responses):  Berlin  Budapest and Szeged  Several locations near London  Turin

Page 7 METHODOLOGY (2)  Survey of competent authorities (via Ministries of Transport)  Responses from 24 countries across Europe  Special inquiries to transport companies (248 responses) and  Trade unions (limited no. of responses)  Desk research on several issues including incidence of gas attacks on drivers  Survey of competent authorities (via Ministries of Transport)  Responses from 24 countries across Europe  Special inquiries to transport companies (248 responses) and  Trade unions (limited no. of responses)  Desk research on several issues including incidence of gas attacks on drivers

Page 8 To keep in mind… Several persistent factors hinder robustness of information:  Lack of systematic driver/company reporting and recording of attacks means Authorities may not be fully aware of the scale of the problem.  With the exception of several countries focusing on the problem (UK, Netherlands) : lack of consistent, targeted data collection/ monitoring on the part of authorities.  Inadequate police investigation/follow-up in many countries.  Better reporting & recording of attacks, data collection and monitoring needed! Several persistent factors hinder robustness of information:  Lack of systematic driver/company reporting and recording of attacks means Authorities may not be fully aware of the scale of the problem.  With the exception of several countries focusing on the problem (UK, Netherlands) : lack of consistent, targeted data collection/ monitoring on the part of authorities.  Inadequate police investigation/follow-up in many countries.  Better reporting & recording of attacks, data collection and monitoring needed!

Page 9 KEY RESULTS - DRIVERS  476 primary attacks on drivers signalled out of replies to driver questionnaire  227 attacks on drivers recorded in Face to Face interviews  1 in 6 (or 17%) of drivers (random FtF-interviewed) attacked in the past 5 years (30% more than once).  476 primary attacks on drivers signalled out of replies to driver questionnaire  227 attacks on drivers recorded in Face to Face interviews  1 in 6 (or 17%) of drivers (random FtF-interviewed) attacked in the past 5 years (30% more than once).

Page 10 Share of Attacked Drivers 17,8%

Page 11 KEY RESULTS - DRIVERS  1 in 6 (or 17%) of drivers (random FtF-interviewed) attacked in the past 5 years (30% more than once).  Target: 63% - vehicle and its load targeted 43% - driver’s personal belongings  1 in 6 (or 17%) of drivers (random FtF-interviewed) attacked in the past 5 years (30% more than once).  Target: 63% - vehicle and its load targeted 43% - driver’s personal belongings

Page 12 Preferred crime targets * primary attacks (476); figures overlap

Page 13 KEY RESULTS - DRIVERS  1 in 6 (or 17%) of drivers (random FtF-interviewed) attacked in the past 5 years (30% more than once).  Target: 63% - vehicle and its load targeted 43% - driver’s personal belongings  21% of drivers physically assaulted; 32% of attacks involved the use of gas (approx. 1 in 3 of attacked drivers!)  1 in 6 (or 17%) of drivers (random FtF-interviewed) attacked in the past 5 years (30% more than once).  Target: 63% - vehicle and its load targeted 43% - driver’s personal belongings  21% of drivers physically assaulted; 32% of attacks involved the use of gas (approx. 1 in 3 of attacked drivers!)

Page 14 Method of attack * primary attacks (476) ** Examples of “Other” include: armed robbery, being shot at and having stones thrown at the driver / vehicle.

Page 15 KEY RESULTS- DRIVERS  1 in 6 (or 17%) of drivers (random FtF-interviewed) attacked in the past 5 years (30% more than once).  Target: 63% - vehicle and its load targeted 43% - driver’s personal belongings  21% of drivers physically assaulted; 32% of attacks involved the use of gas (approx. 1 in 3 of attacked drivers!)  42% of attacks in truck parking areas; 19% at motorway lay-bys  1 in 6 (or 17%) of drivers (random FtF-interviewed) attacked in the past 5 years (30% more than once).  Target: 63% - vehicle and its load targeted 43% - driver’s personal belongings  21% of drivers physically assaulted; 32% of attacks involved the use of gas (approx. 1 in 3 of attacked drivers!)  42% of attacks in truck parking areas; 19% at motorway lay-bys

Page 16 Attack locations * primary attacks (476)

Page 17 KEY RESULTS - DRIVERS  30% did not call the police: Why? lack of trust in authorities (12%), language difficulties (5%) fear of consequences (1%) authorities paid “no attention” (21%) arrest of the criminals (2%)  35% of drivers: attacks had affected their working life; 25% -- attacks had an impact on personal life; 9% seeking medical and/or psychological attention.  18% reported adequate company support in case of attacks  30% did not call the police: Why? lack of trust in authorities (12%), language difficulties (5%) fear of consequences (1%) authorities paid “no attention” (21%) arrest of the criminals (2%)  35% of drivers: attacks had affected their working life; 25% -- attacks had an impact on personal life; 9% seeking medical and/or psychological attention.  18% reported adequate company support in case of attacks

Page 18 KEY RESULTS: Financial Loss  Loss per incident (TruckPol, UK, from over 6’000 cases): app. Euro 40’000  476 recorded attacks identified (FtF interviews); theft in 60% = 286 cases  Loss for 286 cases: Euros 12’000’000 (286*40’000) plus personal belongings Financial Loss  Loss per incident (TruckPol, UK, from over 6’000 cases): app. Euro 40’000  476 recorded attacks identified (FtF interviews); theft in 60% = 286 cases  Loss for 286 cases: Euros 12’000’000 (286*40’000) plus personal belongings

Page 19 KEY RESULTS: AUTHORITIES Yes%No% Is the Gov’t authority aware of attacks on drivers? Are attacks tracked and monitored? Awareness of attacks

Page 20 KEY RESULTS: AUTHORITIES  9 countries (37%) signalled contact person handling transport crime issues  14 (58%) reported no specific agency to deal with attacks on HGV drivers, truck theft…  9 countries (37%) signalled contact person handling transport crime issues  14 (58%) reported no specific agency to deal with attacks on HGV drivers, truck theft…

Page 21 KEY RESULTS: AUTHORITIES Question regarding attacksNo. of countries Policy priority? 7 National legislation? Yes: 7; No: 17 Provide information/advice to operators? 11 Coordination with other government bodies/law enforcement to track attacks? 9

Page 22 RECOMMENDATIONS For all stakeholders:  Improve the reporting, recording and monitoring of attacks on drivers of heavy goods vehicles  This concerns drivers, police/ law enforcement/ transport companies  Government needs to provide the policy and legislative framework. For all stakeholders:  Improve the reporting, recording and monitoring of attacks on drivers of heavy goods vehicles  This concerns drivers, police/ law enforcement/ transport companies  Government needs to provide the policy and legislative framework.

Page 23 RECOMMENDATIONS For authorities:  Develop a policy, legislative framework for better reporting, recording and tracking attacks on drivers;  Establish a road freight crime unit to oversee this issue across the country, serve as a contact point.  Initiate, assist and facilitate the establishment of a network of safe and secure truck parking facilities -- especially along key routes;  Establish incident reporting and recording structures for authorities at all levels;  Provide intelligence/information and advice to police officers, transport companies and drivers on trends... For authorities:  Develop a policy, legislative framework for better reporting, recording and tracking attacks on drivers;  Establish a road freight crime unit to oversee this issue across the country, serve as a contact point.  Initiate, assist and facilitate the establishment of a network of safe and secure truck parking facilities -- especially along key routes;  Establish incident reporting and recording structures for authorities at all levels;  Provide intelligence/information and advice to police officers, transport companies and drivers on trends...

Page 24 RECOMMENDATIONS For national transport and trade associations:  Raise awareness with member operators of attacks on drivers;  Promote guidelines for risk prevention and problem solution with members;  Support and harmonise training activities on security- related issues;  Cooperate with government authorities including national police and law enforcement agencies... For national transport and trade associations:  Raise awareness with member operators of attacks on drivers;  Promote guidelines for risk prevention and problem solution with members;  Support and harmonise training activities on security- related issues;  Cooperate with government authorities including national police and law enforcement agencies...

Page 25 RECOMMENDATIONS For transport companies :  Provide security awareness training for drivers;  Equip vehicles with robust security devices;  Increase depot security;  Issue drivers with appropriate security and crime prevention instructions (route planning, parking areas, etc) and a clear policy on what to do if they come under attack;  Increase incident reporting discipline. For transport companies :  Provide security awareness training for drivers;  Equip vehicles with robust security devices;  Increase depot security;  Issue drivers with appropriate security and crime prevention instructions (route planning, parking areas, etc) and a clear policy on what to do if they come under attack;  Increase incident reporting discipline.

Page 26 RECOMMENDATIONS And last but not least – for drivers :  Be aware of the risk of attacks to ensure personal safety, health and security as well as to protect the vehicle and its load – including personal effects;  Exercise all recommendated guidelines to minimize risk of attack;  Report all attacks to local police / authorities; your company.... And last but not least – for drivers :  Be aware of the risk of attacks to ensure personal safety, health and security as well as to protect the vehicle and its load – including personal effects;  Exercise all recommendated guidelines to minimize risk of attack;  Report all attacks to local police / authorities; your company....

Page 27 Next steps  Study will be published following final scrutiny and approval of report by ECMT groups and IRU.

Page 28 IRU CONFERENCE THE ROAD TO SUCCESS: EURO-ASIAN FREIGHT MARKET Challenges and Opportunities Warsaw, June 2007 Security in Euro-Asian Road Transport: Attacks on International Drivers Mary Crass International Transport Forum/ ECMT